

Rev. John O. Proctor
2565-69

TERMS, THREE DOLLARS A YEAR, PAYABLE IN ADVANCE.

2855

D2

THE

DANVILLE QUARTERLY

REVIEW.

EDITED BY

AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS.

MARCH, 1861.

Published for the Quarter and Half-yearly for the Association—2 TIM. I: 10

DANVILLE, KY., AND CINCINNATI, OHIO.

PUBLISHED BY

RICHARD H. COLLINS, 25 WEST FOURTH STREET, CINCINNATI,

AND SOLD BY

CHESBY, NEWBORN & CO., BOSTON; ROBERT CARTER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK; WM. B. & ALFRED MARTIN, PHILADELPHIA; ROBERT S. DAVIS, PITTSBURGH; JOHN D. THORPE, ROBERT CLARKE & CO., GEO. A. BLANCHARD, AND HICKET & CARROLL, CINCINNATI; A. DAVIDSON, LOUISVILLE; KEITH & WOODS, ST. LOUIS; WM. G. HOLMES, CHICAGO.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1860, by

RICHARD H. COLLINS,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

Sentings, to all parts of the U. S., when paid Quarterly in advance, 24 cents per each number, or 12 cents for a year.

CONTENTS OF No. I.

	PAGE
EXPLANATORY NOTE.....	i
ART. I.—THE RELATIVE DOCTRINAL TENDENCIES OF PRESBYTERIAN- ISM AND CONGREGATIONALISM IN AMERICA.....	1
ART. II.—THE RELATION WHICH REASON AND PHILOSOPHY SUSTAIN TO THE THEOLOGY OF REVELATION.....	24
ART. III.—THE MYSTERY OF INIQUITY.....	54
ART. IV.—OUR COUNTRY—ITS PERIL—ITS DELIVERANCE.....	73
ART. V.—IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.....	115
ART. VI.—ULPHILAS. THE GOTHES AND THEIR LANGUAGE.....	135
ART. VII.—NATURE AND REVELATION IN RELATION TO THE ORIGIN OF OUR CONCEPTION OF A GOD.....	140
ART. VIII.—DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY MANIFESTED IN DIVINE PREDESTINA- TION—THE ONLY SECURITY FOR THE USE AND SUCCESS OF MEANS.....	164
ART. IX.—CRITICAL NOTICES.....	169
1. Dr. Adams's Evenings with the Doctrines	169
2. Dr. Addison Alexander's Commentary on Matthew.....	172
3. Dr. James W. Alexander's Thoughts on Preaching.....	173
NEW PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.....	176

NOTE.—Other Notices omitted for want of room will appear in the June number.

6
8
4
19
3

Compl. note
College of Wooster Lib.
4-19-29
19529
3v.

EXPLANATORY NOTE.

The following statement will enable the Subscribers to this Review to understand clearly the posture of the whole matter.

The extract which follows formed a part of the published Prospectus, and also of the Circular which was privately sent to those who were supposed to be friendly to the enterprise, which contemplated the establishment of a new and original periodical, at Danville, Ky., of the general character described in the extract;

"This publication is designed mainly for the exposition, advancement and defence of the Christian Religion, considered in its purely Evangelical sense; and for open resistance to whatever is hostile to it, or inconsistent with it. In perfect consistency with that chief design, its pages will be open to the consideration of all other interests of man, and the discussion of everything that promotes or obstructs any one of these interests. The work is projected, and will be controlled, by persons, all of whom are members of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, all of whom accept the standards of that Church in their obvious sense."

The names of the persons who compose the Association will appear from time to time, on one of the pages of the cover of the work: and whatever changes may occur in the membership of the Association, will be made public in the same way.

The work will be published at Danville, Ky., and Cincinnati, Ohio, during the first week of March, June, September, and December, by RICHARD H. COLLINS, Esq., of Covington, Ky., whose business address is No. 25 West Fourth Street, Cincinnati.

By the contract between the Association — which has projected the work, and will conduct it — and Mr. COLLINS, the property of the work is in him, in every sense that involves a business relation between it and those who subscribe for it. Any member of the Association will be happy to receive the names of subscribers; but

all payments must be made to Mr. COLLINS. The Association has no connection with the business part of the matter, and no control or responsibility, further than to see that the work is published in all respects, according to their contract with Mr. COLLINS,—of which, it is supposed this number will be a fair specimen. The Association think it proper to say, that in point of personal character, education, long experience, and practical knowledge and skill, they confidently rely on Mr. COLLINS to give entire satisfaction, in the whole business department of the work.

The contents of the publication are under the absolute and exclusive control of the members of the Association,—which is limited to twelve persons,—and which now consists of nine: and nothing will appear in its pages, for which one or other of them is not responsible. The contributions of persons, not members of the Association—several of which appear in this number, and which, it is both desired and expected, will constitute a large and permanent element of the publication—will, therefore, pass to the Publisher through the hands of some member of the Association.

The personal right of each member of the Association, not only to publish his own contributions, but also those of his friends which appear to him suitable to our pages, necessarily produces a large degree of freedom, as a characteristic of this work. The nature of the restraints, deemed to be sufficient, upon this freedom, is somewhat various and somewhat peculiar. The chief one is strict adherence, in the moral and religious aspect of the work, to the precise statements of the extract from the Prospectus, published above. A second is, the prohibition of direct controversy in the Review, between its different contributors. A third is, the requirement of some special signature, initial, or other uniform designation—by which all the articles from the same pen will be distinguished.

After all, however, every association has, in its origin, the elements of a fixed character, without which it could not be constituted. These elements, in proportion to their strength and uniformity, necessarily work in a definite way, and to a determinate result. Very soon, opinions, principles, character, become traditional. But, in fact, what type is finally reached, was certain

from the start—for it is implicitly contained in the original elements. What may be expected in this Review is—great personal freedom of opinion, great unity of fundamental principles, great diversity of didactic treatment, great variety on minor points.

It is the earnest desire of the Association to put this work on a secure and permanent footing. By this means, it appears to them, immense interests may be promoted, and immense perils be warded off. The Presbyterian Church in America is one of the largest, richest, and most enlightened reading communities in the world: and the whole country, as every thing shows, expects of it the full performance of its share of the work of forming, guiding, and confirming public opinion. At present, there are but two Reviews emanating from its bosom, of the general description proposed in this; and both of them are near the Atlantic seaboard; and both occupy peculiar positions, in some important respects. This attempt is to establish a third one, in the more central parts of the Church and the country—designed to occupy a position in some respects common to both the others, in some agreeing with one or other of them, in some different from both.

DANVILLE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

No. I.

MARCH, 1861.

ART. I.—*The Relative Doctrinal Tendencies of Presbyterianism and Congregationalism in America.*

FOR the purposes of the present article, the Congregationalism of Connecticut will be mainly illustrated, in contrast with the Presbyterianism of the Old School Presbyterians: the doctrinal tendencies of each, being the particular point which it is designed to illustrate.

It is, of course, well known to all who are moderately acquainted with the past history of the American Churches, that the standards of doctrine, adopted by the Congregational Churches of New England, and those of the Presbyterian Church, whether considered in its original Presbytery, its original Synod, or its General Assembly, were not only substantially the same, but were, as to the most important of those standards—namely, those prepared by the Westminster Assembly, identical. The Congregational Synod of 1648, which formed the *Cambridge Platform*, unanimously adopted the *Westminster Confession of Faith*. The Synod of 1680, at Boston, which adopted the *Savoy Confession*, whose articles of Faith are nearly identical with the corresponding ones of the Westminster Assembly, also adopted the *Westminster Confession*. The consociated Council of the Churches and ministers of Connecticut, consented in 1708, both to the *Savoy* and the *Westmin-*

ster Confession. The *Congregational Order*, issued by the General Association of Connecticut in 1841, and containing the standards of the associated Churches, declares that the *Saybrook Platform* had been several times formally approved by conventions, subsequent to its original adoption, and that it remained to that time, (1841) as much as ever their Confession of Faith. THOMAS HOOKER, the first pastor of the first church organized in Connecticut, (the church now, and for a long time, under the pastoral care of the *Rev. Dr. J. Hawes*, in Hartford,) was invited to sit as a member of the Westminster Assembly. And in 1799, DR. STRONG, the immediate predecessor of *Dr. Hawes*, in the famous First Church at Hartford, united with some of the leading ministers of his time, in an official declaration, affirming and explaining how, in fact, the churches of Connecticut had been from the beginning, "the same as the Presbyterian," "in the most essential and important respects;" and how, in fact, as to common usages, and the Confession of Faith, Heads of Agreement, and Articles of Church Discipline, they were not Congregational at all, in any sense in which Congregationalism departed from the Church of Scotland, or the Presbyterian Church in America. Two years after this, (1801) the *Plan of Union* was formed for the New Settlements, (chiefly Western New York and Northern Ohio,) between the Presbyterian Church, and these very Connecticut churches thus described. However much a subsequent generation of Presbyterians saw reason to deplore that *Plan of Union*, and to declare it (in 1837) fatal in its effects, and wholly illegal from the beginning, the statements we have made afford the best defense, probably, that could be made for the generation of Presbyterians that entered into the Plan of Union. And these statements, conclusive as to the doctrinal standards, and probably also as to the actual faith of the early New England churches, involve directly, in the general result which was reached in 1837, the fact, and to some extent the nature, of the divergence between the tendency of Presbyterianism and the tendency of Congregationalism — even in the very mitigated form of it presented in Connecticut. In about thirty-eight years, (from 1799 to 1837,) these two branches of the visible church incur such mutual changes, as are

broadly exhibited at the commencement of that period, by the statements of Dr. Strong and his brethren, and the adoption of the Plan of Union; and as broadly exhibited again, at the end of the period, by the Acts of the General Assembly of 1837—followed by those of 1838 and 1839. Within that period, a doctrinal tendency in Congregationalism—wholly unobserved before 1799 by Presbyterians in this country, and stoutly ignored by the best and ablest men of the Congregational churches of that day—had developed the high evangelical doctrines of Christianity, into that confused, shallow and turbulent New School Theology, against which the *Act and Testimony* of 1834, and the *Memorial* of the Convention at Pittsburgh in 1835, and the *Memorial and Testimony* of the Convention at Philadelphia in 1837, and the chief Deliverances of the Assemblies of 1837, 1838 and 1839 were mainly directed. Historically, no ecclesiastical fact of the sixty years immediately preceding the present hour, is better known to all men, than that the sympathy of Congregationalism was steadily and strongly with New School, and against Old School Presbyterianism. Beyond this, it would be no way difficult to prove that the sum of the doctrinal deterioration of Presbyterianism, from the beginning of this century to 1837, was the product of the influence of Congregationalism upon the Church, and in it. So completely was this true, that the particular direction toward error, manifested in the Presbyterian Church, under the close embrace of Congregationalism, was totally new to our Presbyterianism generically considered. And so thoroughly was it inconsistent with the whole nature and spirit of Presbyterianism, that the reaction which had manifested itself in the New School branch of the Presbyterian Church, proceeds *pari passu* toward evangelical doctrine, and from Congregationalism. We have, therefore, the whole case clearly and simply before us—as to the original faith of the Congregational churches, as to their general apparent condition to the end of the last century—as to their new direction and tendency during this century, and as to the point of doctrinal declension generally reached by them, at the period of the great crisis in the doctrinal controversies of the first half of this century, reached in the Acts and Deliverances of the Presbyterian

Church in 1837, and the two following years. We shall presently point out the progress it has made, in the same fatal direction, since that crisis.

The standards drawn up by the Westminster Assembly of Divines—which it has just been shown were, from the first, adopted, and afterward continually professed by the Congregational Churches, and which they have never formally repudiated—always set forth the faith of the Presbyterian Church from the gathering of her first congregation on this continent; nor did that Church ever adopt, as her own, any other human standards of Faith, Holy Living, Order or Discipline. To say nothing of what occurred before 1729, in that year the Original Synod formally adopted the *Westminster Confession of Faith and Larger and Shorter Catechisms*; with some brief exceptions, which the Church has adhered to as valid exceptions ever since. Again, in 1788, preparatory to the formation of the General Assembly, the Confession of Faith, Catechisms, Form of Government, Discipline and Directory for Worship were adopted by the General Synod of the Church; the doctrinal portion of the standards being changed no farther than had been excepted to in 1729, and the other portions being accommodated to the new state into which the Church was about to pass, and in which it has continued till the present time. The adoption of these standards has continued to be exacted of every office-bearer of the church, at his ordination; and strict adherence to them all in practice, has been enforced in repeated Deliverances by all the courts of the Church. Anterior to the formation of the General Assembly in 1789, the schism in the original Synod, which lasted from 1742 till 1758, produced no change, by either party, in their common standards; nor from the réunion of the parts in 1758, onwards for a period of half a century, and until after the organic union with Congregationalism in 1801, is there any evidence of doctrinal declension, or even of serious doctrinal differences, in the Presbyterian Church. Following the Plan of Union of 1801, during the first quarter of the present century, ministers from New England were rapidly diffused through the Presbyterian Church, and settled over many important congregations; and they occupied, in other respects,

positions of great influence in her bosom. In like degree, during the same period, the speculations, the theories, and the expositions of Christian doctrine, which have borne such terrible fruits in New England, were silently diffused through certain portions of the Presbyterian Church. These new views and opinions, to a certain extent modified preëxisting convictions; to a certain extent merely mixed with them; to a certain extent supplanted them. Most decided, and most obnoxious to the traditional spirit, habit and doctrine of Presbyterianism, were, of course, the manifestations made of them in the great and rapidly populating regions covered by the Plan of Union, where there was the heaviest New England immigration, and the freest scope for the new ideas.—First, claiming to be, not doctrines, but explanations of the philosophy of certain Gospel truths; defended as enduring, certainly innocent, perhaps improved methods of treating the Way of Salvation; the standards of the church were not assailed, but set aside, and the faith of God's people was not openly opposed, but diligently undermined. At the next step, the new ideas became the true, the only effective, the really divine ideas; and their hearty reception became the indispensable proof of Gospel holiness, and their vehement use the solitary way of a ministry fruitful in winning souls for Christ. The culminating point was reached, in the frantic notion that the ancient faith of the church was a heresy which the new holiness could not always endure—and in the long-suffering intimation to the true children of the church that they, and not the Apostles of the new faith, were the true subjects of Disciple. Side by side with these developments, which seem so wonderful as we look back over them, were multiplied debates and great agitations upon questions, about which it seems, to one in a calm mood, impossible for the human mind to entertain a doubt. It had to be proved that our Catechisms formed any part of our standards; it had to be proved that the statements of the Catechisms agreed with those of the Confession; it had to be proved that in accepting standards of faith any thing more was meant than vowing for substance of doctrine; it had to be proved that in accepting a system of doctrine, we thereby accepted its parts; it had to be proved that in our oaths we must

use words in their accepted sense, and not in a hidden sense of our own; it had to be proved that when we undertake to tell the truth, it means all the truth, and not such portions of it as will gain our ends. At last, it only remained for the Presbyterian Church to make utter shipwreck, or to extricate herself completely, and at whatever cost of apparent temporal advantages, from the influences which had hurried her on for a quarter of a century, and brought her to the brink of ruin. By the great grace of God, and through his wonderful working, she did extricate herself. In what manner, has already been generally indicated, but sufficiently for the present purpose. Upon what grounds of doctrine she planted herself during the great conflict from 1834 till 1839, in opposition to the combined efforts of New School and Congregational Theology, her own solemn, deliberate and repeated testimonies, then and since, abundantly declare. And as before, with regard to Congregationalism, so now with regard to Presbyterianism, the statements we have thrown together clearly set before us the true nature of the original faith of this great Church — the constant tendency of that faith — and the exact posture of it, when she threw off the enormous pressure under which she was finally staggering, after enduring, from 1801 till 1837, an organic union with Congregationalism. The illustration is immense. For besides the separate doctrinal tendencies of these two great systems, when acting separately, and each with a pure creed, before their organic Union in 1801 — which has been briefly intimated, as to each; and besides their separate tendencies, when acting alone, after their separation in 1837, one with her original pure creed restored in its power, and the other with that same pure creed perverted to the extent then reached — which remains to be pointed out; there is, in addition, this vast manifestation of their respective tendencies, afforded by the persistent attempt of the doctrinal tendency of Congregationalism, working in the bosom of Presbyterianism, from 1801 till 1837, more than one-third of a century, with the steadfast purpose to destroy its doctrinal tendency — and by the irresistible force with which Presbyterianism reacted at the perilous culmination of the event, and, freeing herself, started in a new and higher career. There is no more remarkable episode in the modern history of doctrines. No more

signal triumph of truth over error, has marked the career of the Reformed Church.

It is somewhat more than twenty-three years, since this conflict of tendencies within the Presbyterian Church was ecclesiastically terminated; and the subsequent doctrinal tendency of that Church, during those years, and after its deliverance from the interior influence of Congregationalism, is now to be estimated. No doubt can exist that the force which was competent to extricate the Church, would be competent to carry her forward with accelerated momentum afterward; and the direction the Church would take, was obliged to be determined by the direction of the force. How long the force would continue—how soon it might encounter other forces tending in other directions—in short, what might be the secret providence of God touching the future career of this Church under this impulse—no mortal could tell beforehand. But every thoughtful mind was obliged to see, that a mighty reaction of the life of God in this Church, could not fail to produce by its victory increased repugnance to every error it struggled with, and overcame; nor could it fail to increase the devotion of God's people to every truth which sustained them during their long trial and desperate struggle, and comforted them in their signal deliverance. It was as natural, therefore, as it was noble and affecting, that the Church—at the very moment of its highest excitement, and under the flush of its first complete triumph—manifested a solicitude as tender to recall every one of her children, whom the exigencies of the times, or his own temporary delusion, had separated from her communion, as she did to be rid of every intruder, whose object was to subvert her testimony and destroy her peace. And both tendencies have remained steadfast; on the one side leading her, by repeated acts and explanations and invitations, to smooth the way for the return of every one like-minded with herself, and on the other side leading her to refuse steadfastly to relax any rule whose use helped to assure her of the soundness of her own ministers, or to allow the entrance of ministers from without upon any pretext besides their personal fitness to enter, or by any means different from those she applied to her own children. And great as is the odium which her implacable enemies have attempted to heap upon her, for her conduct in both

respects, their very malignity furnished proof of the nature and force of the tendency under which she acts;—since they reviled her in the same words for the acts and the spirit in which she revolted against their dominion over her, and reviled again in the same words for the acts and the spirit in which her deliverance was achieved.

This powerful tendency to keep herself pure, was coupled, as it always is and needs must be, with a corresponding tendency to do the work of the Lord with an earnestness corresponding to her increased fitness to be about it. The Assembly which passed the reforming acts (1837) organized the Board of Foreign Missions; and the following Assembly (1838), which perfected those acts and thoroughly provided for the movement of the Church under them, organized the Board of Publication; thus in both respects completing what had been before set on foot, and partly carried out under great difficulties, in the heart of, probably, the most orthodox section of the Church. There was in both these events, a very wide significance. For in addition to what has been just stated, and the reflections naturally suggested thereby, these acts were the result of a doctrinal tendency specifically Presbyterian, and specifically opposite to the corresponding tendency of Congregationalism—touching the nature, the powers, and the duties of the Church of Christ. The previous discussions of the principles involved, had taken a special relation to the subject of Missions—especially foreign missions; and the same New School majority which virtually made the Church responsible, by the action of the Assembly of 1836, for the system of false doctrine then struggling for mastery, also virtually made her responsible for that distinctive error of Congregationalism—that the Church of God *as such* has neither organic power, nor duty, to conduct foreign missions. It was a great retribution, that within one year (1837) the Board of Foreign Missions was established by the Assembly—the power of those who would have hindered it being utterly broken. Nor is it a coincidence much less remarkable, or a proof much less striking of the tendency we are illustrating, that the Bi-Centenary of the Westminster Assembly in 1843, was made the occasion, by acts of previous Assemblies, at once of commemorating that great Synod—of giving special instruction

throughout the whole Church concerning the standards prepared by it—and of taking collections in all its congregations for the liberal endowment of the Board of Publication. The first known intimation of this Bi-Centenary, and its use, was made in the opening sermon to the Assembly of 1842, by the retiring Moderator of 1841; and being, under the movement of the Assembly, widely taken up, ended in those great and repeated commemorations of the day by nearly every branch of sound English-speaking Presbyterians in the world. And it may be confidently asserted that this Board of Publication has put in circulation, within twenty years, more copies of these noble standards, than all the other printing-houses on earth have unitedly done, during the same period.

And so, step by step continually, during the twenty-three years we are considering, this devotion of the Church to her professed faith, has manifested itself in inseparable connection with her increasing diligence and munificence in doing the work committed to her by God. Striving to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bonds of peace with all the true disciples of Christ—openly resisting all the enemies of His cross—carefully abstaining from all worldly discussions and excitements concerning which God had given her no command; she has had great peace in her own bosom, and great prosperity in her work. In many respects, no greater contrast could well be exhibited, than that between her state and her work, during the twenty-three years preceding 1837, while the Congregational tendency was perverting and abstracting her very life—and the twenty-three years following 1837, during which the tendency that threw off Congregationalism has had free scope. Nor is it a small matter, that the very area which was covered by the Plan of Union, and that great region west of it into which it would have carried the same ruinous disorders which seemed to be its natural product everywhere, now present the proofs of a progress and a result as remarkable as has ever been accomplished, in spiritual affairs, on this continent. Who that remembers the condition of Presbyterianism in Western New York, for example, for several years before and after 1837—and the relative position of united Congregationalism and New Schoolism, in the same region, during the same period; and then calls to mind the cir-

cumstances under which the Old School General Assembly met in Buffalo in 1854, and in Rochester in 1860; can doubt, for an instant, that the specific and organic doctrinal tendency of Presbyterianism is not only honest and constant, but that it is also true, spiritual and effective? To buy the truth, and not to sell it; to be tenacious of it, when it is once acquired; to profess it openly and honestly; to maintain it steadfastly, in good report and in evil report; to use it diligently as given to her in trust for the salvation of men: this, it seems to us, is the true Spirit of a witnessing Church. If the religion of Christ is complete, as it is found in the Sacred Scriptures, a Church whose whole tendency accords with that great fact, must be a power in the earth which the human race could illly spare.

The most ungracious part of our task remains: namely, the attempt to estimate the doctrinal tendency of Congregationalism, since the abrogation of the *Plan of Union* in 1837, and the consequent immediate dissolution of the organic union it had maintained with the Presbyterian Church, for the previous thirty-six years. In the order of thought, there were three distinct steps in the proceedings, and there were several distinct acts performed. The *Plan of Union* was abrogated by an act of the Assembly: then, after two distinct attempts to avoid more decided proceedings had failed, the Synod of the Western Reserve in Ohio first, and then the three Synods in Western New York, were declared, by acts of the Assembly, not to be integral portions of the Presbyterian church. These are what have been called the *Excommunicating Acts*. The two attempts, above alluded to, which had been previously made by the Old School majority in the Assembly of 1837, were, in the first place, to take proceedings by the Assembly either by way of citation, or by way of a Commission, to try the Synods which were afterward disallowed; and in the second place, for an amicable and voluntary separation and division of the Church. The final step, was the attempt by the New School commissioners to the Assembly of 1838, in concert with commissioners from the bounds of the four Synods disallowed the previous year, to depose the Moderator, elect one of their own party, retire from the Assembly, constitute elsewhere, and appeal to the courts of law to maintain their claim, got in this manner, to be

the only true Assembly. The counter revolution, and the suit at law, failed. But nearly the whole of those who represented the Congregational tendency then culminating in the Presbyterian Church—including some sounder men, as events prove—by these various means found themselves in a separate organization, in the month of May, 1838. The general result was the division of the Church into two not very unequal parts, the orthodox being rather the stronger in ministers, and still more in churches, professors of religion, and population generally. If this New School body had been a homogeneous one, it would have been very formidable from the moment of its separate existence; and if it had been orthodox as well as homogeneous, it would have been a most powerful and efficacious instrument for good. So largely was the New School element thus separated from the orthodox, impregnated as a body with the doctrinal tendency of Congregationalism, that the vital particles of real Presbyterianism which lay dormant in it, would probably have finally expired, if Congregationalism had been satisfied to remain stationary at the point of declension, which New Schoolism had reached when it separated from the Orthodox. To a spirit so changeful, so turbulent, and so incapable of resting in any thing as settled, this was impossible: and the progress of time and events has rendered it probable, that an effective reaction in the New School body, against the advancing errors and intolerable pressure of Congregationalism, will ultimately establish itself, and restore that body to a better condition than it occupied in 1837.

However this may be, the mode in which Congregationalism has sought to deal with the New School body, since the separation of both of them from the Orthodox, in 1837 and 1838, affords a clear illustration of its tendency, during the period we are now considering. And other illustrations of a kind equally pregnant and indubitable, are to be found all along the career of Congregationalism, during the quarter of a century now drawing to its close. One may be found in the development of that Congregational doctrine, concerning the nature of the Gospel church, whose tendency, while it robs it of all power to execute some of the chief ends of its existence, is to cast it headlong into the vortex of all temporal excitements, making the pulpit a rostrum

from which human passion is to display itself, touching every human interest strong enough to command a party. One may be found in the vehement tendency to pervert all existing instrumentalities of good doing, into engines for the promotion of objects utterly foreign to their nature:—and if utterly ruinous to the particular institutions perverted, and utterly offensive to multitudes of their wisest and best supporters, possibly that only increases the perverse urgency. One may be found in the general instability of opinion—the entire want of all apparent conception that either constancy in any particular principle, or consistency in successive principles, is a thing to be desired, much less to be sought. One may be found in the immense doctrinal deterioration of the very fountains of light and knowledge:—for example, the bulk of the eminent divines in contrast with their predecessors, some of the most distinguished Theological Professors in contrast with those now gone, whose very names should make them blush. One of the very worst illustrations may be found, in the frightful state of things produced by allowed tampering with words and phrases, concerning the holiest things and the most momentous concerns, until the uninitiated can never be certain they understand the intended sense—not uttered—but hidden rather, by what they read or hear. The faith of God's elect and the intimate convictions of the human soul, are alike paltered in a double sense. But we forbear to enlarge upon these most painful general illustrations; all the more readily, because we have at hand the means of exhibiting the doctrinal tendency we are considering, by events at once comparatively recent, narrow, precise, and of great publicity. It adds to their suitableness that they appertain to Connecticut—whose *professed* faith is nearly identical with our own, whose ministers once represented themselves to be so near to ours, and through whose highest ecclesiastical tribunal, about sixty years ago, that Plan of Union, under which Presbyterianism suffered so great evils, was successfully urged upon our too confiding Church.

During the year 1860 two ordinations took place in Connecticut, both of which were made subjects of discussion in the newspapers. The numerous publications to which the first of the two led, have been collected and printed in a stout pamphlet, with

notes, and a review of the case; at the end of which a statement, drawn from authentic publications, gives the main facts of the second ordination.* In so far as the two individuals who were ordained, are personally concerned, the cases are, of course, of no other importance to the Christian public than any other two cases of young ministers similarly situated would be—namely, as *specimen* cases of Congregational applicants for ordination over Congregational Churches in Connecticut. In this respect, they are of decided importance, as showing the tendency of opinion—the results of theological training—the character of the future ministers—and the present condition and tendencies of the Churches which insist on having such ministers. In so far as the ordinations involve the Councils,—composed of ministers and lay messengers of Churches, who, with knowledge of the state of mind of the candidates under their examination, proceed to set them apart as teachers called of God and duly qualified to be under-shepherds of Christ's flock—the cases assume a very wide and a very decided aspect; and become only more and more important, as the Councils are multiplied, as their members are numerous, are eminent, and are decided in the course they take. Other considerations, not necessarily involved in the particular cases, do, however, arise, to add greatly to the force of the foregoing suppositions—the whole of which suppositions were realized in these Councils, and the ordinations they made. For example, nothing is

* The title of the Pamphlet is "*The Hartford Ordination. Letters of Rev. Drs. HAWES, SPRING, and VERMILYE, and Rev. Messrs. CHILDS and PARKER: Re published from the New York Observer, with Notes, and a Review; to which is added, a Statement of the Manchester Case.*" Hartford, Conn. Alex. Calhoun & Co., Publishers. 1860." The compiler adds, in a foot note, on the Hartford Ordination, these words: "For the facts stated in this Pamphlet, which do not appear in the letters of the Observer, we are indebted chiefly to the Independent, the Boston Recorder, the Congregationalist, and the Presbyterian Expositor." He adds, in a foot note, on the Manchester Ordination, these words: "The facts in regard to this case are derived from the Hartford Daily Times, and the Boston Recorder. The articles in the former, were evidently written by some one friendly to Mr. Dorman. The articles of the Recorder appeared, one (July 12) over the signature H. R.; the other, (Aug. 9) signed by the Rev. G. A. Oviatt, Scribe of the Council which settled Mr. Dorman. The correctness of the statement has not been called in question."

more remarkable in the numerous publications to which the first case gave rise, than the habitual endeavor to give to the most decided conduct, such an aspect as to obscure the real motive of it; to give to the most explicit language a dubious sense; to endorse openly-avowed heresy, under the pretence that it is held merely as a doubt; to accept as sufficient, confessions of doubt, uncertainty, and ignorance, upon the pretext that unsound opinions are not avowed. In former days, plain-spoken men called this kind of dealing with any interest, human or divine, perfidious. We only signalize it here as one of the results, long ago pointed out, of the doctrinal tendency of Congregationalism—apparent in nearly all its modern theological literature—and practically developed very powerfully in the publications made in defence of this Hartford ordination. Here are eminent ministers who profess an orthodox creed, and desire to be considered in the faith of that creed: as an act in accordance with this state of case, they ordain a minister over a professedly orthodox church, who, besides other heresies, tells them he is not sure heaven and hell are the only places of departed souls, and rather believes, besides, that a certain class of souls, at least, may accept Christ after death, and be saved; then they excuse themselves under pressure to the public, by glosses upon the man's explicit language; then, when hardly pressed, they denounce the man's opinions as revolting to their moral sense; and then when hardly pressed on the other side, they explain that their moral sense revolted—not at the man's opinions—but at the opinions attributed to him!—Was there ever in this world, an enlightened, devoted, God-fearing, orthodox body of churches—except New England Congregational Churches—that could see such conduct as this to be consistent with the simplicity of the Gospel of Christ, and appropriate to a tribunal of His church? What Congregationalism does in such cases, besides ordaining the man, is to write in the newspapers, *pro* and *con*—and then, upon the first opportunity, do the thing over again; as was the fact here. But we ought to be more specific.

On the 11th of January, 1860, Mr. Edwin Pond Parker was ordained and installed Pastor of the South Congregational Church in Hartford. The Council that sat on his case, is said to have

been, "one of the ablest and most respectable that could be gathered in New England." It was composed of Pastors and Delegates from eleven Churches, and two Seminaries, making twenty-four members; amongst whom were Dr. Joel Hawes and Dr. Samuel Spring, Dr. Vermilye of East Windsor Seminary, and Dr. Harris of Bangor Seminary. It should be stated that Dr. Vermilye (formerly of the Dutch Reformed Church) voted against the ordination, and was the only member of the Council who did so; and, as we gather from various intimations scattered through the publications, Dr. Harris not only indorsed the candidate and his doctrines as he chose to understand them, but exerted considerable influence in inducing some hesitating members of the Council to favor his ordination. The conduct of these two Professors of Theology, is, we suppose, an indication of the state of opinion in the respective Schools of Bangor and East Windsor Hill. Taking the whole proof in the case, which is various and somewhat extensive—embracing written statements of Dr. Hawes, Dr. S. Spring, Dr. Vermilye, Rev. Mr. Childs, Mr. Parker (the candidate who was ordained), together with extracts from memoranda of Dr. Harris, and statements by the New York Observer—the following points, as to doctrine, seem to us to be established:

(1) *As to the Inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures*, Mr. Parker would not say whether that inspiration was or was not *Plenary*, but promptly rejected the idea of its being *Verbal*.

(2) *As to the doctrine of the Trinity*, he seems to have had no belief at all, no faith at all, and scarce any knowledge; as far as he had any opinion, it was Sabellian.

(3) *As to the nature of sin and holiness, and the nature and power of God and of the human soul, relevant thereto*, his doctrine seems to have been, that sin and holiness are merely and always voluntary—that God himself has no *holy nature*, nor man any *sinful nature*—that every man has adequate power to change his own heart, and obey every commandment of God, unto sinless perfection, in this life.

(4) *As to the means of salvation*, he held that the knowledge of Christ and his Gospel, in this life, are not absolutely necessary to salvation, and that some heathen are undoubtedly saved without it.

(5) *As to the sacrifice of Christ*, he held that Christ died with the same design for all men—and he made this emphatic by adding, “Christ died with the same design for Judas Iscariot as for the Apostle Paul.”

(6) *As to the future state of man, after death*; the testimony upon this subject is clear, on one side, against Mr. Parker, as borne by Dr. Vermilye and Mr. Childs; and on the other side, as borne by Dr. Hawes, Dr. S. Spring and Mr. Parker himself, it throws obscurity over the opinions of the candidate, as to what precisely, he did believe; but the whole of it concludes, we think, to this, namely, that it is certain he did *not* believe in accordance with the Scriptures, or with any evangelical creed in the world—certain also that he was either unwilling or unable to say precisely what he believed, and violently probable that his impulses, and his convictions, if he had any, were toward a state of probation, of a peculiar kind, after death. His notion as far as we can gather it, on this point, was not exactly either the Purgatory of the Papists, or the temporary hell of the Redemptionists, but a kind of heathen hades in which salvation through Christ, or in some other way, may be offered and accepted. *As to whom* offered, there is much apparent conflict in the testimony. And it is worthy of note, that after sifting the testimony, this question as to who may be recipients of a *post mortem* gospel, according to the theological system approved as sufficient by the large and respectable Council at Hartford, is in effect, the matter chiefly discussed in the published statements; the testimony, as to all the other points, beginning very much as if it meant at first to hold opposite sides, but ending virtually in a pretty common, though not very candid agreement, as to what his notions were on all other points. It is to be stated, also, that Mr. Parker had drawn up a private creed of his own—from which Dr. Hawes and Dr. S. Spring quote, in one of their joint publications, certain statements in explanation of his statements when under examination, and in defence of their own conduct, and that of the Council, in ordaining him. It seems to us that these most endurable parts of Mr. Parker's creed are beyond all endurance of any orthodox man; and the parts suppressed cannot fail to be as bad, if not worse than the parts published, on supposition that Mr. Parker is

able to follow a chain of connected thought. And the moral tendency of that declension which ends for the moment in these fundamental heresies, could hardly be more clearly or more painfully exhibited by good men, than in the shuffling of these distinguished clergymen about them—after ordaining, as sufficiently orthodox, a man who held them.

We will now briefly recapitulate the facts of a second and more recent, and possibly more aggravated case. But as Dr. Hawes and Dr. Spring—who took the lead in this, as well as in the Hartford case—had learned a sharp lesson in the public discussions which grew out of that case, they kept quiet after this second case: and no one else being, apparently, inclined to take their place in a second attempt exactly like theirs, the matter passed with less notoriety. A good deal, however, was written; and the author of the pamphlet whose title is given in a foot note on a previous page, has condensed into four or five pages, the statements contained in the *Boston Recorder*, in the *Hartford Daily Times*, and in certain communications made to both of those papers, during the summer of 1860—one of the communications in the former paper, bearing the signature of the Rev. G. A. Oviatt, Scribe of the Council which settled the candidate. This candidate was a licentiate, of about two years standing, of the New School Third Presbytery of New York, named *L. M. Dorman*; and on the 31st of May, 1860, a Council met to ordain and install him Pastor of the Congregational Church in Manchester, Connecticut. The quality of Mr. Dorman's Presbyterianism may be guessed at, in part, from what is stated above, and more accurately, perhaps, from the fact, that he refused at his ordination, to give his assent to the same Westminster Confession of Faith, he had accepted at his licensure. The quality of his Congregationalism will appear from what follows. And thus by the nature of what he rejects, and by the nature of what he professes, and by the nature of the New School *via media* between Presbyterianism and Congregationalism, we have another picture of the tendencies we are herein tracing, and of their results.

The first Council which met to settle Mr. Dorman, the one just spoken of, failed; that is, his lax views on inspiration, election, depravity, probation after death, the doctrine of the Trinity, &c.,

brought the Council to the unanimous judgment that it was impossible for it to proceed to his settlement. We mention, with respect, the names of Dr. Calhoun, and the Rev. Messrs. Cheesebore, Snow, L. Hyde, S. B. Forbes, and H. Day, who, with four or five lay delegates of churches, seem to have composed this Council. According to any idea of Church order, of ecclesiastical courtesy, of denominational unity, or of community in Christian doctrine, which any considerate person can have, the refusal of this Council to ordain Mr. Dorman, and especially on such grounds as those stated, would seem to be a rather serious obstacle to his farther progress. They who cherish such a delusion, have but small acquaintance with the turbulent and reckless spirit which lodges in the bosom of our modern Congregationalism, or of the resources for mischief which are at its command. On the 6th day of June, within one week from the meeting of the Council which unanimously rejected Mr. Dorman as a heretic, a second and larger Council convened in the same place, and after examining him three or four hours, determined by a majority of four out of twenty members to ordain him: whereupon, a part of the members withdrew—and the rest proceeded to his ordination. Dr. Hawes was the Moderator of this Council, and Dr. Spring, and the Mr. Parker whom the two former had endorsed in the Council of Hartford, as we have shown, were amongst the members of it. As far as we understand the testimony before us, Mr. Dorman held all the errors which Mr. Parker appeared to hold, or to favor, when examined at Hartford; and in some respects his heretical opinions seemed to be more decided than those of Mr. Parker. It is, therefore, needless to take up time with a new detail of particulars—once already clearly stated—which are both impious and absurd. Two things, however, are worth specifying. The first is—that even Mr. Oviatt, before mentioned as the Scribe of this Council, who was one of those who resisted the ordination of Mr. Dorman, in a publication giving account of the matter, has nothing more emphatic to say concerning the impiety of which he had been a witness, than this: “1, I seriously thought Mr. Dorman “unsound in *faith*, in some essential particulars; 2, I thought “he was too undetermined in the faith, was too full of doubts, “learned in too many different directions, to be set over the

"Church in Manchester." The second is—Mr. Dorman's curious and most suggestive answers, when asked about the doctrine of election, "I don't know, I am studying the Bible to find out;" and when asked if he believed the Assembly's Catechism, in the main, "I don't know—I don't know much about the Catechism." If it were not for the terrible wickedness of such proceedings, one might scoff at their preposterous folly.

Here then is the *present* resting place of the inherent doctrinal tendency of American Congregationalism. The van of the host at least takes breath here. How long that tendency, which has made shipwreck of the noblest standards of faith, will repose at the point herein demonstrated to be its actual posture, is not for us to determine. All along its pathway it has projected before, and scattered on every side of its progress, heresies more odious than any it tolerated within itself as endurable. But what it is not only tolerating, but propagating, nourishing and defending at the present period, seems absolutely incompatible with Christianity, whether it be considered as a doctrine, a power, or a life. A ministry, such as has been created with perfect knowledge of what it was, by two numerous Councils in the heart of Connecticut, within the past year, is the product of a system of doctrine, less coherent, and no more evangelical, than that of Arius, or of Pelagius, or of Sabellus, or of Socinus, which the universal Church of God has rejected as impious. Consider what is the sum of the heresies proved in these two cases, so widely affiliated, so openly displayed:

1. The Word of God, the only infallible rule of all religious belief, and all religious duty, is robbed of its infinite light, its infinite power, and its infinite authority.

2. The revealed nature of God, upon which, and the mode thereof, not only the reality but the possibility of salvation for sinners depends; is ignorantly denied, or wickedly disregarded.

3. The very nature of sin and of holiness is thoroughly perverted; and while God is degraded in a manner at which Deism would blush, man is exalted in a manner incompatible with the idea of his being either a creature or a sinner, either dependent or depraved.

4. The person, the work, and the glory of the Lord Jesus

Christ are stripped of all, whereon any one can predicate that He is the only Mediator between God and men—and as such the only Redeemer of God's elect, or that God ever had any elect at all.

5. The future state of retribution is subverted—the relation of this life to the life to come is abolished—the relevancy between grace and glory, redemption and salvation, faith and righteousness, holiness and blessedness is utterly confounded.

In what degree this dreadful condition of things is diffused amongst the whole body of Congregational Churches and ministers, we cannot say; nor do we suppose any means exist, whereby, under such a system of church order as theirs, the fact could be clearly ascertained, or any effectual remedy applied.—The fundamental evil lies in the very nature, and by consequence the organic tendency, of Congregationalism itself; so that to “lose hold upon the conservative and the thoughtful, and fall into the hands of the rash and the radical” is not only its ever impending peril, but is also its ever working tendency. How long and how completely the grace of God might hold this tendency in check, and make a body of Congregational Churches and ministers a mighty power for good on earth, can no more be conjectured than it could be, at what moment of declension the proportion of the unsound would be greater than that of the sound. That there are many Congregational Churches and ministers at the present time, eminent in all Christian graces, and worthy of the confidence and love of all the churches, no one will dispute. Nevertheless, no one doubts, we suppose, except the unsound portion of the Congregational ministers and churches, that there has been a widespread and woful declension in the Congregational body. To what extent this eating plague has polluted and defiled the portion still accepted as orthodox, must necessarily be a question of great doubt, as well as constant solicitude to all true followers of Christ—as long as this portion allows itself to be mixed and confounded with the mass of heresies and disorders, which seems to strengthen and fester around them. Touching the actual state of things, considered generally and from the point of view of the public discussion on the Hartford ordination, the following testimony from the closing letter of that discussion, written by the Rev. T. S. Childs of Hartford, (the Presbyterian minister who first called

the public attention to the facts connected with Mr. Parker's ordination there,) accords, we think, with the general impression of orthodox persons, out of New England, concerning the actual state of doctrinal truth in Congregationalism at large; and goes far to discharge those who speak or write on such subjects, from the necessity of apologizing either for general statements, or great plainness of speech:

"The fact is, the worst aspect of this whole case is not yet before the public; and with the exception of one point, it is not an uncommon case. I had heard the public examination of a member of this same Council, who was himself all unsettled as to a state of eternal punishment for any. Another member had declared on his examination, that there were parts of the Bible which were not inspired—had denied the Scripture doctrine of original sin—and asserted that man had natural ability to repent and believe independent of Christ and the Holy Spirit; and still another has recently said, while preaching in a *Universalist* pulpit, that "he hoped the day would come—and that day was not far distant—when all Christian denominations would overcome their prejudices, and be willing to listen to the preaching of any Christian minister without sacrificing their own ideas upon religious matters;" a sentiment, which if it meant any thing, distinctly recognized the Christian character and equal standing of Universalism. I have it also from a responsible source, that a member of this Council has publicly, in his pulpit, given thanks to God that there were such denominations as the Universalist and Unitarian, to modify the views others have of God. It stands uncontradicted that five of the students of Andover, last year, lapsed into Universalism. In these cases we have representatives from three of the Theological Schools of New England, viz.: Bangor, New Haven, and Andover. These are the fearful facts. As a New England man, I have no pleasure, but profound grief in stating them. How such good men as Dr. Spring, can look upon them with indifference—how, in view of the awful issues involved and their own near judgment, they can ever appear as the defenders of those who hold any such views, is to me amazing.—(pp.43-4.)

There are, probably, about forty ministers of the Gospel connected with the Presbyterian Church (O. S.), and perhaps half that number of congregations, scattered over New England.—This is the actual result left to Presbyterianism in that important field of Christian effort—after nearly two centuries have passed

since Presbyterianism was planted on this continent. It is a result, in every respect shameful to the Presbyterian Church; and all the more, that in order to bring it to pass, she had to neglect important interests she had in New England at a comparatively early period; she had to omit, habitually, for successive generations to spread her faith and order in that region; and on the general outbreak with Congregationalism during the New School controversy, she had to turn her back upon the most urgent opportunity to perform there a great work of evangelization, demanded not only by the glory of Christ, but also both by her own safety and self-respect. In proportion as Presbyterianism came short of her duty in efforts to plant and sustain her institutions in New England, Congregationalism became urgent in her endeavors, first to subvert Presbyterianism by means of organic union with it; and, when that had wrought evil till it was no longer endurable, then by ceaseless rivalry and opposition alike in every great mart of population on this continent, and in every new and growing settlement of the North and North-west, and in every general enterprise of benevolence concerning which it was possible for a central society to be organized. Even in the work of foreign missions, this instinctive sense of aversion to Presbyterianism may be traced clearly, just in proportion as the results have been distinct. Nor is it easy to understand how all this should fail to occur, under the organic and ever-working tendency of Congregationalism which we have traced. It seems to us that no alternative is left to Presbyterianism, but to lay out her strength in spreading the pure gospel through New England. No more imperative obligation, in our own judgment, has rested on her for many years past. And while we are fully aware of the derision with which such a suggestion has been all along met, by those who the most needed such efforts to reclaim them to the simplicity of Christ, we are as fully persuaded that abundant success would ultimately crown the work. Already, every other evangelical denomination—and nearly every form of pestilent heresy besides—has taken root there. It is in the most vague sense that New England can any longer be called Congregational; nor can it much longer be called Congregational at all, in any sense that our fathers recognized. Good men who

are identified with the soundest type of Congregationalism now existing there, may not see things in so dark an aspect; and may even resent such ideas as we have advanced. But, probably no conviction is more deeply or universally settled in all thoughtful minds out of New England, than that it is a great necessity of our times, both Christian and national, to curb and rectify the existing spirit of Congregationalism. Nor is there, probably, one such person, who is not thoroughly convinced that if this had been done long ago, our condition, both national and Christian, would have been, to-day, widely different from what it is. Nor will it be a light task for the faithful historian of these sad times, clearly to determine, whether the Congregational tendency to heresy and fanaticism, or the Presbyterian tendency against both, was the most steadfast. That there are causes, profound in their nature and powerful in their operation, from which these opposite tendencies arise, must necessarily be as certain as that such tendencies exist. At present, we have contented ourselves with tracing the doctrinal history of those opposite tendencies: though, possibly, thoughtful readers may find somewhat suggestive of the true causes, if they will reflect upon effects so striking, so constant, and so opposite, during so many and such eventful years.

* *
*

ART. II.—*The Relation which Reason and Philosophy sustain to the Theology of Revelation.*

The notion of the sufficiency of unaided human reason, or the light of nature, as a guide to the attainment of theological truth, never seems to have entered the mind of the Pagan world; and is met with only since the publication of Revelation itself. It is avowed only by those who having become acquainted, at least to some extent, with the announcements of Revelation, have availed themselves of the light which it imparts, for the purpose of disproving its necessity. Its contents, upon the whole, are not only such as the unregenerate heart cannot find pleasure in; but such as provoke its determined hostility. And hence, while a portion of its light is willingly accepted, the acknowledgment is not only denied, but the light itself employed for the purpose of superseding Revelation, and of disproving its claims; in order to ignore those portions of its announcements which are disrelished by the heart that is estranged from God.

That a revelation from God to a fallen and sinful world, and designed to recover it from sin and restore it to happiness and the favor of heaven, must, in the very necessity of the case, announce not only what is important and needful to be known; but that also which could scarcely have been known without it; seems to be a truth too obvious to require argument. And this being admitted, it would scarcely seem to be a very rational procedure, should any individual of the race thus favored demand, as a prerequisite to his reception of the divinely attested and authorised message, that he should be permitted to sit in judgment upon the truth of its contents themselves; and to decide thereon, upon the basis of the alleged facts of that very knowledge and philosophy which still left him in utter need of a revelation; and to accept only of that portion which he could explain and evince to be true by ascertaining its agreement with the ideas already in his possession, and the deductions already drawn by him from reason and the nature of things. To set up such a claim would be regarded, in the view of enlightened reason, as wholly incompatible with

either an admission of the need of a revelation from God, or with any sincere and honest acknowledgment of its claims.

Now the doctrines of Revelation are stated therein as facts, the truth of which is attested by the testimony of God himself.— And hence to claim the right to subject the question of their truth to the decision of our philosophy, as a necessary prerequisite to our reception of the Divine testimony; and the prerogative also to reject as false that which does not comport with our *à priori* notions of things; is not only incompatible with any intelligent recognition of a revelation from God at all, and therefore absurd, but it is treating the Divine testimony as no intelligent judicature ever ventures to treat any reliable testimony on which it is called to act. The reliability of the testimony, of course, depends upon the credibility of the witnesses; which being established, or admitted, the facts of the testimony, even though extraordinary in their nature, are received in evidence.

When God announces that his thoughts are not our thoughts, nor his ways our ways, it seems to be not only a very intelligible but a perfectly reasonable proposition; and just what we, from his providential administration, should expect the facts in the case to be; so much so, indeed, that a Revelation—purporting to come from an infinitely wise and holy Being, and relating to the future and unseen, not less than to the past, the present, and the visible—whose characteristics did not evince that such was truly the fact—would not comport with the deductions of enlightened reason itself, from the admitted fact of his infinite perfections.— But plain and obvious as all this appears to be, there is no subject on which there have been and still are, even in the church of God itself, more indefinite and unsettled principles than on the true relation which reason and philosophy sustain to Revelation. Nor is this the saddest feature in the picture, as will be seen presently. Not a little of the theological literature of the day teems with indiscriminating laudations of reason and philosophy. No intelligent man ever questions the importance of both to human welfare; nor doubts the necessity for their use in scanning and deciding upon the proffered evidence of the divine origin and authenticity of the Scriptures; and no one doubts the high importance of rightly using our rational powers in the interpretation of the

language employed as the medium of Revelation. But the laudations referred to aim not to set forth and illustrate this, the proper province of reason and philosophy in their relation to the subject; but, under the cover of indiscriminating panegyric, to lead them out of their proper sphere, to occupy the chair of a Judge, whose duty it shall be to say whether the testimony which God confessedly has given is true or false — whether he ought to be believed or not — and whether what he has alleged to be matter of fact, ought to be received as such; especially by certain keen-sighted and knowing ones, who have been studying Botany and Astronomy, and Physiology, and Psychology, and Geology, and German Philosophy. For if the unreasonable supposition should be entertained that persons so eminently enlightened might possibly arrive at any increase of knowledge, the question would still arise, who is able to impart it? Are we to suppose that they would consent to degrade their rational powers by believing even God himself in relation to a matter of fact which they could not fully comprehend? Such is the real aspect of the case; and that any serious, intelligent mind could become so involved in the fog of its own metaphysical theories, as to be led to the logical occupancy of a position like this, would seem to be impossible. But that many who still claim to be evangelical have assumed, and do still occupy it, in common with the Rationalist and avowed Infidel, is known to every one who has paid any adequate attention to the subject.

Before entering fully into the discussion of our topic, it will be proper here to offer a few remarks on the subject of Theology itself. In the general acceptance of the term it signifies a *discourse concerning God*, ῥῶγον περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ. The abstract term is derived from the concrete θεολόγος; which is found in the epigraph of the Apocalypse — Ἀποκάλυψις Ἰωάννου τοῦ θεολόγου; and which was anciently applied to designate one who discourses on divine things. The name, in fact, was not unfamiliar to ancient Pagan literature. Varro, (according to Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, vi. 5.) treats of a threefold method of theology: the *mythical*, or that which treated of the fables of the poets concerning the gods; the *civil*, which treated of the public worship of the gods; and the *natural*, (*physica*), or that which the philos-

ophers taught respecting the gods. The term came early into use in the Christian church, (whatever date be assigned to *θεόλογος*, in the title of the Apocalypse.) Justin uses *θεολογεῖν*; and in later centuries the term was employed sometimes in a wider and sometimes in a more restricted sense—as when, for example, the defenders of the doctrine of the Divine Nature of Christ were *par eminence* so designated. Augustine defines it to be either a discourse and method of treating upon divine subjects, or a discourse proceeding from God himself.* But Peter Abelard, (born in Palais near Nantes, in Brittany, A. D. 1079,) appears to have originated the phrase *Theologia Christiana*.

From the time in which that remarkable man issued under this title his *Compendium*, (which originated the so-called “Scholastic Theology,”) incessant efforts have been made by the Schoolmen, and subsequently by the Papal and Reformed Divines, to present in a scientific form or method the knowledge which God has directly imparted to mankind,—till now, under the general designation of *theology* we have almost innumerable distinctions: Scholastic, Speculative, Biblical, Revealed, Practical, Moral, Dogmatic, Polemic, &c., &c. And then again, the import of the terms themselves becomes the subject of warm discussion, and the boundaries of the various departments are thus thrown into confusion and uncertainty. And what is still worse, there seems to be but little hope of adjusting these matters upon the principles of distinction and classification of topics hitherto adopted. And it is scarcely necessary to remark that all such terms, and all modes of presenting the subject, become worthless when they fail to be really subsidiary to a plain and intelligible presentation of its truths. This rule is promptly recognized in all science; and it seems strange that the recognition of theology as a science should not have suggested long ago the idea of presenting it in a form analogous to that which true science herself both suggests and has adopted, in every other department of her true domain without a solitary exception.

*Theologia est aut sermo Dei, aut de divinitate sermo et ratio. *De Civitate Dei*, lib. viii. c. 1. See also, lib. xviii. 14, Poetæ Theologi dicerentur, quoniam de Dies carmina faciebant, &c. See also Lactantius, in cap. ii. of his book, *De Ira Dei*.

When we speak of revealed theology, or the theology of revelation, the idea is associated with that of religion itself—since the design of revelation is the recovery of apostate man to holiness and to God; and hence the terms *revealed religion* and *revealed theology* are popularly employed as synonymous. Religion, from *religo* (formed of *re* and *ligo*), is the practical reception of the truth which God has revealed. It is therefore essentially distinct from a mere speculative acknowledgment of the truth; which, standing apart from the practical element, is comparatively of little real moment, so far as relates to the design of God in making a revelation to man.

In considering the relation which reason and philosophy, or the deductions of human science, sustain to this Divine science, it will be proper, at the outset, to determine the import of the phrase *Divine Revelation* as thus employed; for the phrase has been often, of late years, like the term *supernatural*,* improperly used, and then misapplied to the support of innumerable vagaries; as when, for instance, we are told that God *reveals* himself to his creatures through his works, so that all nature is a revelation, (*to itself*, we presume,) and that therefore, there can be no difference between natural and revealed theology—since all is revealed. Such an abuse of common and well-ascertained terms seems hardly to result from ignorance. It has more the appearance of a preconceived intention to confuse the whole subject, and to perplex and mislead the mind. Yet a *formal* definition of the term *revelation* or the *theology of revelation* in this connection, is scarcely necessary, as the dispute is not a dispute of terms. The fact that God has made a direct communication of his will to man, and that the Holy Scriptures constitute that communication, is admitted by all Christians: and there are a few things implied herein, the intelligent appreciation of which will assist us in obtaining a correct view of the whole subject under discussion; and enable us to define the true and appropriate domain of theology; and of course the relation sustained to it by moral, intellectual and physical science; and to which we refer in this essay, by the general phrase, reason and philosophy. We need not

*See Dr. Bushnell's "Nature and the Supernatural," *passim*.

perplex the inquiry with questions about inspiration. The various theories on that subject have really nothing to do with the fact of inspiration itself; for leaving to God the manner in which he saw proper to communicate with man, we are in the fullest manner assured by himself that he is the Author of the Scriptures. This is the *fact* in the case. But to undertake to ascertain *how* he communicated with the minds of his prophets and scribes; and to claim, moreover that our understanding of this point is a prerequisite to the admission of the fact that he did so communicate; is not more reasonable than to claim to know *how* He created the heavens and the earth before we will admit that he did create them: or to know how God is one in one sense and three in another, before we shall consent to receive the divine testimony which assures us of the fact.

Now the admitted fact that God has disclosed his will, or made a revelation of himself to man, implies, of course, that such a revelation was necessary in order to the accomplishment of his merciful designs toward our race; as the fact that he gave his Son for human redemption, proves our need of being thus redeemed. The fact of this necessity should be here considered; for, if rightly viewed, it will greatly assist in the prosecution of our main inquiry. It may be found

1. In the universal prevalence of error respecting God—his character, will and worship; for whatever of such knowledge was announced originally, had become obscure and uncertain, and was rapidly fading away. Then when false systems sprung up, as they did every where, they each claimed for itself a divine origin. Thus inextricable perplexity involved all our race. The lawgivers all asserted the divine origin of their laws; rulers claimed to derive their pedigree from the gods; and even the best of the philosophers, such as Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato, claimed to be divinely taught and directed—and so brought the divine sanction in support of all their vagaries and inconsistencies. The Oracles exacted the same deference of all who consulted them.—And the confusion thus accruing; and the utter impracticability of determining what is truth; evince the necessity not only that God should reveal a knowledge of himself and of his will, for our direction; but that this revelation should be divinely attested.

2. The same necessity is equally apparent from the fact that God's ways are not as our ways, nor his thoughts as our thoughts. This fact though so fully announced in the Bible, is very apparent also from nature and Providence. What human wisdom would ever govern the world as God governs it? Witness the history of Joseph and the events connected therewith; and the revolutions of empires, and other events in the moral world; and in nature's kingdom the storm, tempest, pestilence, earthquake, &c. These things confound and ever have confounded all human wisdom. In relation to his administration we are taught that "It is the glory of God to *conceal* a thing," Proverbs xxv: 2. And an inspired apostle in view of the whole matter has expressed himself as follows: "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! for who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?" Rom. xi: 33, 34.—If these things are so, (and what serious mind will doubt them?) then what could we hope to know of God, of his works and ways, save so far as he has seen proper to reveal them to us? And, therefore, can any thing be more absurd than to attempt to judge of God by ourselves? or of the facts which he announces by our knowledge and philosophy? or to adjust the truths of revelation to our notions of reason and common sense? We shall refer to the facts of revealed theology presently; in the light of which we shall be able to form an estimate of the probability that exists for hoping that unaided reason and philosophy may be competent to decide on their truthfulness or the contrary; but here we wish to consider this point in the light of the then existing necessity which required a revelation to be made. And on this point it is quite proper, in reasoning with professed Christians, to refer to the testimony of Revelation itself on the subject. Even Episcopius, the great Arminian champion of philosophy, concedes that philosophy is out of her province when she assays to meddle with the facts of Revelation. *

On what ground, therefore, can mere human philosophy, which

* "*Res ipsas quas Theologia tractat non attinget Philosophus: Hæ supra naturæ sunt, nec cognoscuntur nisi doceantur cœlitus.*" Opp. Tom. 1, p. 583, folio.

makes no account of the fall, or of a mediator, or of the necessity for regeneration, undertake to sit as a judge upon the facts announced in a revelation given by God; and undertake to say whether they are consistent with his nature or with truth itself? when that very revelation announces such canons on the subject as the following: "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned." "Men love darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil." "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes." And in view of God's omnipresence, the Psalmist exclaims, "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it." If these things be so, what can man of himself, with all his powers and faculties, know of those truths which it was the design of revelation to announce? And then again we are assured that "the world by (its) wisdom knew not God;" and that "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath entered the heart of man the things which God has prepared for them that love him." "The wise men — have rejected the word of the Lord; and what wisdom is in them?" Surely facts like these are sufficient to settle the point. And how are we without assistance from God to arrive at a knowledge of the truths thus adverted to? Human wisdom, philosophy, reason, not only fail us here, but positively regard those truths as foolishness when announced; and hate, and receive them not. On what principle then may fallen man be supposed able to discover them, or claim to decide whether they are true or false, when God has declared them to be true? "To the law and to the testimony; if they speak not according to these, it is because there is no truth in them." The principle is rationalistic and dangerous which would subordinate the authority of Scripture to reason, to philosophy, or to the intuitional consciousness. "It is very like sending the statute-book of the commonwealth to the state-prison, to be revised and amended to suit such principles of honor and right as are in vogue among its guilty inmates." *

* Presbyterian Review, for 1854, p. 569.

Such, then, is the utter weakness and insufficiency of unaided human reason to discover those peculiar truths which it was the design of God by his word to make known to mankind. And hence revelation was needed to teach us not only what reason and philosophy never could have taught; but likewise to confirm the right and the true already existing amongst men.

3. In order to estimate properly what may be accomplished by reason and philosophy either in discovering or in modifying the truths which are the subject-matter of revelation, it is neither unfair nor improper to advert to their achievements, in a department somewhat similar, anterior to the diffusion of Christianity. These have been so fully and accurately portrayed by Leland in his great work on the "Necessity of Revelation," that nothing need be added thereto; and a mere reference to that work is sufficient to warrant the declaration that in the hands of their ablest disciples, reason and philosophy utterly failed to attain to any true knowledge either of God or of man. And the same is true of their modern disciples who have rejected the testimony of revelation. What have they ever *determined* or settled — I will not say respecting those sublime truths which are the subject-matter of the Scriptures — but respecting the simplest points of morals? — the principles of duty and obligation; self-denial, the indulgence of the passions, and the like? Let Herbert, Hobbes, Shaftsbury, Bolingbroke, Hume, and the German rationalistic philosophers answer. They have unsettled many things, in the view of their adherents; and have settled nothing whatever, except the fact, so clearly intimated in the Scriptures, that philosophy becomes folly in every attempt she makes to modify or supersede the revelation which God has made to man. Such, then, were the necessities which required that God should either instruct man directly in the way of truth and duty, or abandon him to endless ruin and death. The fact that he has imparted instruction is admitted, as above stated. And that this instruction, in the very nature of the case, must contain the infallible truth on the subjects of which it treats, is likewise perfectly obvious. — A denial of this proposition is necessarily fraught with the consequence of denying Revelation itself.

And finally: The Scriptures themselves claim that the truth,

on the subjects of which they treat, can be learned only from God. The following are a few of their statements hereon: Isaiah iv: 8, 9, has been already referred to. In full it reads as follows: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts." Also chap. viii: 20. "To the law and to the testimony: (that is, to the law which is God's testimony,) if they speak not according to this word it is because there is no light in them." And in John v: 39, Jesus plainly intimates that by the Scriptures alone is the true way to eternal life to be learned. Compare also Luke xvi: 29, and 2 Timothy iii: 14-16.

Let us, therefore, in the next place, briefly glance at the subject-matter of revealed theology, that we may form an accurate idea of its true domain. Of course its proper elements are the teachings of the Bible; of which illustrations may be derived from the works and providence of God. The revelation He has made, however, is, of course, the true theology, as distinguished from all merely human philosophy, and all mere deductions from his works of creation and providence; since it cannot be presumed that he revealed either what was already known to man, or what was unnecessary to be known. And the admission, therefore, that the Scriptures are, in the true sense, a revelation from God, clearly involves the inference that they have a main design; and also a plain import in every thing relating to this design.

And then further: That God in the very beginning of the world communicated a knowledge of himself and of his will to man, will not be questioned by any believer of the Bible. Even after the Fall he communed with our first parents and instituted sacrifice. And the fact of such a revelation is, moreover, clearly announced in the recorded prophecy of Enoch, and implied also in the statements that Enoch and Noah *walked with God*. How much of this revealed knowledge was traditionally preserved until the time of Moses, we know not; but it is obviously fair to affirm that whatever traditionary knowledge, (such as that which related to man's originally happy state and subsequent fall, the institution of sacrifice, the immortality of the soul, &c.,) existed

among the nations, and is in accordance with the written revelation; owes its origin, not to philosophy (which would be absurd to suppose,) but to the revelation originally imparted to the race.—And it would be deeply interesting to take up and consider the manner in which Philosophy, from her first institution until now, has sought to dispose of those truths—now denying them, and then compelled to acknowledge their power; she has been forced to grapple with them in the vain endeavor either to ignore their existence, or to reconcile the principles implied therein with her own approved and vaunted utterances. And the effort, though continued now for more than two thousand years, leaves the matter still unadjusted; and the result no nearer its attainment than when the effort began;—an impressive illustration of her capability to modify, improve upon, or supersede the knowledge which God has communicated to man.

Now in the written revelation, called the Scriptures, we are taught that man was originally created in the image of God; and that through voluntary transgression he was brought into a state of sin, condemnation and death;—that there is a trinity in God—the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and that they entered into covenant to redeem man from sin and death; and that for this purpose the Son of God should become the Mediator between God and man, while the Spirit of God should assume the office of applying the redemption thus achieved to all the covenanted seed of Christ;—that the Son, in accomplishing his redeeming work, became man, and assumed the office of Teacher, Priest and King; and expiated sin by making satisfaction for sinners through the endurance of the penalty of the law—in consequence of which salvation is freely offered to the whole race of man. Then in connection with this is revealed the doctrine of God's eternal predestination and election; and those, too, of regeneration, repentance, justification by faith, self-denial, sanctification, adoption, &c., and the ordinances of baptism and the Lord's supper. Also the immortality of the soul; the resurrection of the body; the general judgment; and an eternal heaven and hell for the good and the bad of both men and angels; and the ultimate restoration of the earth to its pristine condition, after which it shall go on to accomplish its high destiny, as though sin and Sa-

tan had never made an inroad thereon — and so become the abode of righteousness. 2 Pr. iii: 13. And “we must remember,” as Edwards remarks, “that it is a revelation of what God knows to be the very truth concerning his own nature; of the acts and operations of his mind with respect to his creatures; of the great scheme of infinite wisdom in his works, especially with respect to the intelligent and moral world; a revelation of the spiritual and invisible world; a revelation of that invisible world which men shall belong to after this life; a revelation of the greatest works of God, the manner of his creating the world, and of his governing of it, especially with regard to the higher and more important parts of it,” &c. * This very brief abstract is sufficient for the purpose of illustration; for our design here is not to go into historical detail or topical discussion, but merely to illustrate what are the design and province of revealed theology. And in this connection we affirm the proposition that on all the aforesaid topics, at least, God has announced not only the infallible truth, but also all that is necessary to be known by man in order to secure his salvation from sin, death and hell. He only is the true theologian, whatever other knowledge he may claim to possess, who earnestly labors to understand the import of this revelation, and to cooperate with its design. His grand study must be of the Book, and by its words he is to be saved or to perish at last.

Such, then is revealed theology. And on what principle either of reason, common sense, “the intuitive consciousness,” or of true philosophy, is it to be claimed that human reason or philosophy is competent to sit in an *à priori* judgment on the grand themes thus announced? What can be alleged as a proper basis for such a claim? God has uttered his clear testimony to the facts in the case: And on what principle, therefore, can any man claim to be an honest recipient and believer of that testimony, and yet claim the prerogative to subject the question as to the truth of those averments to the test of his reason and philosophy; and to ignore, reject, or modify whatever will not comport therewith? And yet this is precisely the attitude which some men now, who claim to be evangelical Christians, sustain in reference to the rev-

* Works, vol. vii. p. 268. New York, 1830.

elation which God has made. Its averments are wholly beyond the reach of human reason and philosophy, and pertain to matters of which man in this world, and in his fallen and depraved condition, can know absolutely nothing except what God has revealed; and yet it is claimed by such men, that the truth of these averments may be rationally subjected to the scrutiny and decision of a reason and philosophy which, in the very nature of the case, can know nothing about them!

Before proceeding directly to point out the precise relation which human reason and philosophy sustain to this divine science, it may be in place therefore to remark that many things seem to indicate that the whole conflict in relation to the distinguishing doctrines of revelation, and especially of those known as the doctrines of grace, is to be gone over again. This is owing mainly to the fact of the prevalence of those extremely loose and vague views which are entertained of the true province of reason and philosophy in respect to revelation; and of the concessions which have been incautiously made either directly or by implication on the subject. Attempts not only to undermine revelation itself have been of late years renewed from almost every stand-point; but many, under the profession of receiving the Bible as the word of God, endeavor in every conceivable way to ignore all the distinguishing truths which it announces. The church doctrine of Inspiration, likewise, has been in every form assailed; and the shallow utterances of amateur geologists, and physiologists, and what not, are impertinently insisted on as furnishing ground for the demand that this idea of inspiration be essentially modified, if not wholly relinquished. A so-called philosophy must set up its claim, that revelation cannot possibly be so absurd as to teach the resurrection of "the disintegrated corporeal organism," even though it be admitted to teach the resurrection of the dead; and the philosophy of Socinus is brought forward, by men claiming to be evangelical, to explain away every thing in the doctrine of the Atonement which the perverted powers of our fallen nature cannot regard as reasonable; while that of Schleiermacher, is, in like manner introduced, to evince that the doctrine of the uninterrupted immortality and conscious existence of the human spirit between death and the resurrection

is a mere figment; and in a like spirit the exploded philosophies of former days are solicited to lend their aid to render the cardinal doctrine of Imputation sufficiently clear, but from such an explanation of the *modus* as must logically undermine our confidence in other averments of the Scriptures. We say nothing in disparagement of a true philosophy; but on the contrary claim, in the most decided manner, that she should not be undervalued while content with her appropriate domain. But when she oversteps the line, and undertakes to perform the functions of a judge where she should occupy the position of a humble disciple; and ventures not only to mingle her speculations with the holy utterances of God, but to palm them off as of equal importance, and even to ignore some of his plainest and most imperative announcements; she must expect to be treated as an intruder. The domain of revelation is too sacred to be thus tampered with.—What God has announced for the purpose of bringing us to salvation and to himself, is not to be treated in any such manner.—We devoutly believe, with old Hilary, that God cannot be known except by light imparted from himself.*

The positive domain of true theology, therefore, is the revelation which God has communicated to man. His eternal power and Godhead appear in the works of his hand; and are seen with sufficient clearness to render unbelief therein, and all forms of idolatry, inexcusable. Rom. i: 19–21. But human speculation has fully evinced in every age, that unassisted reason, or the human intellect without light from heaven, has failed to derive saving knowledge therefrom. And it is obvious that this must be so; since, were it otherwise, a revelation would scarcely have been necessary. Upon the same principle on which the apostle argues that if for fallen man there is a righteousness by law, Christ has died gratuitously, (Gal. ii: 21,) so it is equally obvious that if saving knowledge were obtained through the works of creation, revelation was unnecessary. Philosophy could never have learned the truths of revelation from the works of creation, as is fully apparent from the nature of those truths themselves which relate to things invisible and eternal; and to matters of which it

* *De Trinitate*, lib. 1, non potest Deus nisi per Deum intelligi.

is impossible that reason should know any thing until instructed from heaven. And how then shall she presume to sit in judgment upon those truths themselves; and undertake to decide whether the averments of the infinite and eternal God are consistent with themselves, and with his own character?

Upon the whole, then, it is obvious that revelation is the true and appropriate domain of positive theology; and of all our actual knowledge of God; and of the real position which man sustains to him, and to future and eternal things;—and the necessity for limiting our speculations in respect to the saving knowledge of God to this province, appears from the necessity which existed for a revelation itself. It was needed; for without it, man could not have been directed aright in the way to life and salvation. And if this be so, then it is further obvious that the true domain of human philosophy is wholly diverse from, though, in the true sense, not inconsistent with, that of theology; and, moreover, that whatever actual knowledge may be obtained from the works of creation and providence, from science, the light of nature, “the intuitional consciousness,” and the like, cannot be really inconsistent with revelation itself. The facts, or the actual knowledge, communicated by these various departments, *are not, however, to be confounded with the deductions which men may draw from those facts*, although this obvious distinction is perpetually ignored by all who attempt to make revelation subservient to philosophy and reason. The real facts of geology, for example, are one thing; the inferences, however, which are attempted to be deduced therefrom, are quite another thing. The former may be admitted to be true in all their length and breadth; while the latter may be utterly discarded as unsupported and false. The knowledge thus obtained, therefore, can be really only subsidiary to the higher knowledge communicated by God himself; and really can be regarded as illustrative only of the truth announced in revelation. The denial of this position logically necessitates the doubt whether God has really uttered a testimony to man. For to claim that he has done so—and at the same time to claim that this testimony may be contradicted by the testimony which he has uttered in his works—is too absurd a notion to be seriously entertained by any reflecting mind. And the man who will take such a position is

bound, in all honesty and consistency, to acknowledge that he does not receive the Bible as a revelation from God, in the true sense of the term. And on the contrary, where there is any apparent or real collision between the plain and undoubted averments of God in his word, and the deductions of our reason or philosophy; it is no surrendering of our rational powers, but truly consistent with their highest and best exercise, to admit that God has spoken truly, and that our own deductions are fallacious and wrong.

It is known to the intelligent reader, that not a few who profess to receive with deep reverence the Bible as a revelation from God, yet protest against this course; and denounce it a "blind faith," a "hoodwinking of the faculties," &c., very like the old skeptics, who, when the doctrine of the Trinity, or of original sin, or of predestination was asserted, used to exclaim, "You are trying to make asses of mankind." It is well worthy of note in this connection, that these very men who thus openly endorse the leading principle of the naturalism of the 17th century, and (as we shall see presently,) the rationalism of the 18th and 19th, do not hesitate to do the very same thing in other respects; and to ignore the clearest deductions of their reason and philosophy, whenever they come into collision with each other, and with common sense. In mathematics, for instance, we have axioms running directly athwart definitions and demonstrations; and the same is true in philosophy; and has been owned to be true ever since the time of Aristotle. And, to instance no others, the arguments against the very existence of a material world, and against the existence of motion and extension, continue to be wholly unanswerable on the acknowledged principles of reason and philosophy; — and yet these men believe in a material world, and in motion and extension, despite their reasoning and deductions. In such matters they receive the testimony of common sense, and reject the deductions of their reason and philosophy; and dream not that it is "hoodwinking" their rational powers to do so. And yet the same men will claim that it is hoodwinking their faculties and ignoring their reason to rely upon what they concede to be the unerring utterances of an infinitely wise God, when such utterances come into conflict with their deductions from the same reason and philosophy! If their

shallow inferences from geological assumptions, or from their dull and one-sided notions of human rights and freedom, square not with the divine testimony, then they openly announce that "man is not bound to receive the word of God as a Divine revelation." And this is called *believing the Divine testimony!* And in this way the baldest and most unblushing infidelity has crept into the very sanctuary of God.

The real domain of reason and philosophy, and their relation to revealed theology, cannot better be delineated than in the following words of the prince of philosophers, Lord Bacon. Every word deserves to be seriously pondered in this connection. "Divine philosophy," says he, "is that knowledge, or rudiment of knowledge, concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his creatures; which knowledge may be termed truly divine, in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light. The *bounds of this knowledge* are that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion; and, therefore, there was never a miracle wrought by God to convert an atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a God." "But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature or ground of human knowledge, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is, in my judgment, not safe. *Da fidei, quæ fidei sunt.* For the heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: 'That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven.' So AS WE OUGHT NOT TO ATTEMPT TO DRAW DOWN OR SUBMIT THE MYSTERIES OF GOD TO OUR REASON; BUT CONTRARIWISE TO RAISE AND ADVANCE OUR REASON TO THE DIVINE TRUTH. So as in this part of knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any deficiency, as I rather note an excess; whereunto I have digressed, *because of the extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy hath received, and may receive, by being commixed together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy.*"* Again in the same book he remarks that "*the prerogative of God extendeth as well to*

* *Advancement of Learning.* Book II. Works, vol. i. p. 34. London, 1838.

the reason as to the will of man; so that as we are to obey his law, though we find a reluctance in our will; so we are to believe his word, though we find a reluctance in our reason. For if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter, and not to the author, which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and discredited witness: but that faith which was 'accounted to Abraham for righteousness,' was of such a point, as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein was an image of natural reason."

Such, then, is the domain of true or divine philosophy; and in its relation to revealed theology, it has been illustrated by Bishop Butler with wonderful depth and precision. This philosophy admits the statements of revelation as facts, and seeks to illustrate their truth by reference to the operations of God in nature and providence. And it is a spurious and pretended philosophy; a mere strumpet, arrayed and bedecked with robes and gems stolen from the heavenly visitant; that while it professes to receive and accredit the testimony of God, questions its veracity at the besotted tribunal of an ignorant and perverted reason; pretending to find antagonisms to those truths in nature, and at the same time to admit them to be from God. To call such a procedure *philosophy*, and *philosophising*, is a perversion of language; and it can be pursued intelligently by no one who does not in fact, or in *thesi*, deny that the Scriptures are from God.

In order that the exact point may be fully and practically before us we shall proceed to illustrate the subject by a reference to fact. The experiment of commingling philosophy with revealed theology, so emphatically condemned in the foregoing language of Bacon, has been fully attempted in former times, and in other nations, and with some little show of reason, before the subject was fully understood; and before its practical bearings had developed the fatal results which cannot but accrue from such a procedure. But for professed adherents to the Gospel of Christ, to attempt it now, with those results fully and unequivocally before them, may justly be regarded as leaving them without excuse, save on the ground either of an utter want of acquaintance with the subject of their lucubrations; or on that of an actual intention to undermine the foundations of religion itself. Facts evince that

no other alternative remains to them, or is even possible in the case. To attempt to justify such a procedure now, on the ground that true progress in enquiry calls for it, is only trifling with the subject; and is no more reasonable than it would be for the Socinian to claim that the progress of inquiry demanded a reiteration of the exploded cavils of Socinus; or the infidel to claim the like in respect to the exploded follies of Hume and Voltaire and Paine.

Early in the 17th century, and soon after the publication of the *De veritate Christ. Religionis* of Hugo Grotius, skeptics began to realize the hopelessness of their attempt to call into question the truth of the historical records of the Word of God. And they subsequently varied their ground, and assumed the position that as the God of nature and providence is the true God, no revelation purporting to come from him could be antagonistic to, or inconsistent with, the knowledge of him which is obtained from his works. Lord Herbert in his *De Veritate*, and subsequently Woolston in his *Discourse on Miracles*, and Tindal, in his *Christianity as Old as the Creation*, argued this point with much learning; taking their own deductions from the works of nature as the true exponent of the character of God and of his claims upon man; and insisted that on this ground the claims of the Scriptures as a revelation from God should be tried and decided. The argument was elaborate, and in a measure new; and until its results were fairly and practically developed, not a few of the theologians and other friends of the Gospel, were short-sighted enough to assent to its reasonableness; of which we shall cite a few instances presently. They all (i. e. Herbert, Hobbes, Blount, Shaftsbury, Collins, Woolston, Tindal, Morgan, &c.,) professed to regard the Scriptures with great reverence; and some of them even asserting that they are the voice of God, and may have been given by immediate inspiration; and yet asserted that they were without authority, save so far as their utterances were sustained by the voice of nature;—which voice, according to Lord Herbert, taught that the indulgence of lust and anger were no more to be blamed than the thirst occasioned by dropsy; and according to Hobbes, taught that the civil law is the only foundation of right and wrong; and according to Bolingbroke, that ambition, sensuality, and avarice, may be

lawfully gratified if they can be safely gratified. And so of the whole series: for it is needless to particularize any further.

Now, as was remarked above, instead of denying the truth of this principle at the outset, and demanding that the Scriptures should be tried by the evidences which they proffered of their divine origin; the foregoing principle was admitted and even inculcated by many prominent Christians. Tillotson, for example, in the first of his Sermons on the education of Children * scruples not to say that the duty of the mother to nurse her child, "is a natural duty, and because it is so, of a more necessary and indispensable obligation than any positive precept of revealed religion." And in his sermon on Rom. i: 18, 19, that "The natural knowledge which men have of God, when all is done, is the surest and fastest hold that religion hath on human nature." And in his sermon on Joshua i: 13, 14, that "Every man ought to govern himself; in the interpretation of Scripture by those natural notions which men have of God and his perfections: for when all is done, this is one of the surest ways of reasoning in religion." Spencer (Dean of Ely, obiit 1693,) in his celebrated work, *De Legibus Heb. Ritualibus*, elaborated this conception in the fullest and most decided manner; and it was supported too by Locke, Clarke, Hoadley, and many others.

Thus emboldened, the skeptics renewed their assault with great vigor and high confidence; and claimed as a true and undoubted principle of philosophy, that the truths of Christianity should be tried and settled upon the basis of the utterances of reason, and the light of nature; and to sustain them herein quote and applaud the incautious admissions of her advocates. Tindal, in perfect consistency therewith, asserts that "The truth of all revelation is to be judged by its agreement with the religion of nature."† "The Gospel, since it is impossible for men at the same time to be under different obligations, cannot command those things which the law of nature forbids, or forbid what it commands." Such were their sentiments; and their next and obvious step was to divest the Bible of its miraculous and supernatural aspect altogether. Let one instance out of a thousand suffice, as it is a fair illustration of

* On Proverbs xxii: 6, Works vol. i, p. 606.

† See Christianity as Old as the Creation, chapters 4, 11, and 14.

the mode of the whole procedure. Toland, in the preface to his Dissertation on this subject, says: "My design in this publication is to make Moses better understood, and consequently more easily believed; which is as well to defend him against those who unreasonably believe him not at all, as also against those, who by their absurd belief render him incredible. The style of the Old Testament is extremely hyperbolical, even in the books that are written in prose," &c. And in the body of the work itself, he undertakes to prove that Hobab was "the angel of the Lord, who directed the pillar of cloud and fire," by carrying a smoking stick in advance of the army. "He was Jehovah the King of Israel's ambassador or messenger, to guide his subjects through the wilderness." Such were then the unavoidable results of attempting to judge of the truths of revelation on the basis of reason and philosophy; and surely the example might, with reason, have been regarded as sufficient to deter any serious and sober mind from a similar attempt: but it was not all that has been furnished for our admonition. A still more melancholy one, if possible, looms up before the mental vision; and the world has seen Germany transformed into a nation of infidels, from the adoption and assertion of the same principles. May the melancholy beacon serve as a warning to the Church of God, in our own land.*

In the earlier half of the last century, philosophy had asserted in Germany, that nothing in revelation could possibly be inconsistent with her deductions: and as many things in the Bible were found to be decidedly incompatible therewith, the principle of accommodation was subsequently resorted to, in order to bring the

* The results of the adoption of the same principle and modes of reasoning in France, Italy, and Switzerland, are thus succinctly and forcibly described by Dr. d'Aubigné: "I dread this subjective tendency in our times. I dread it, convinced that it cannot fail to have the same developments, and the same consequences, that it had in the sixteenth century. Châtillon simply taught the doctrine which substitutes the authority of the individual spirit, for the authority of Divine Scripture. But every seed bears its fruit. This doctrine, soon after professed by Servetus and Socinus, first overthrew all the doctrines of faith; then, interpreted by Coppin, Pocquet, Gruet, and the libertines, overthrows all the precepts of morality. It thus brought forward great heresies, and frightful irregularities. *The progression is terrible, but inevitable.* The foundation of Christian dogma and Christian morality, is involved in these opinions."—*Authority of God*, pp. 189, 190, cited by Pearson on Infidelity, p. 226.

two into harmony. But without attempting to enter into detail, it will be sufficient here to remark that Bretschneider and other Rationalists, frankly admit that the above named English skeptics were their real predecessors in the work of discarding the supernatural from revelation. The position adopted by rationalism, is thus defined by Röhr, perhaps the ablest of all its champions. Let the reader contemplate it; and compare it with the language above quoted from Tindal; and also with that which we shall presently cite from some reputedly evangelical divines in our own land; and their complete identity of sentiment will be at once apparent. Röhr says: "Christian Rationalism denies not the fact of an extraordinary revelation from God in the Holy Scriptures. It does not, in respect to finding and pursuing the way to eternal life, refer man to his own reason, as to the source of the highest ideas and truths; *but only claims for him the right, and imposes on him the duty of sifting and proving that which the Christian revelation makes known on the subject, by comparison with the religious ideas and principles of human reason; in order that in the concerns of his eternal salvation, he may show himself to be neither blind nor credulous.*" A man, therefore, according to this notion, may be both blind and credulous in believing what the infinitely wise God asserts to be true! Again he says: "With the rationalist it is reason alone which decides in matters of faith, and in the adoption of religious doctrines. He admits the authority of the Scriptures *only when they coincide with his own convictions, for these he regards as true on their own grounds of reason.*"

It certainly can require but few words to show the utter and hopeless absurdity of any attempt to reconcile such notions with any serious or intelligent reception of a revelation from God; for assuredly they constitute that a teacher and a judge, which God, by the very act of bestowing a revelation, designs should occupy the position of an humble learner and disciple. But while the foregoing is before the mind of the reader, we ask him to compare these utterances of rationalism, and this clear and accurate delineation of what constitutes the rationalizing theologian, with the following distinct and unambiguous utterances of some in our own country who would, in defiance of all propriety and consistency, still claim to be regarded as teachers of evangelical religion. The

first is from Dr. Edward Beecher; who, in his "Conflict of Ages," p. 29, uses the following language: "If any alleged actions of God come into collision with the natural and intuitive judgments of the human mind concerning what is honorable and right, on the points specified," (i. e. those which relate to human probation,) "there is better reason to call in question the alleged facts, than to suppose those principles false, which God has made the human mind intuitively to recognize as true." And on, p. 27. "To test any alleged acts of God by such principles, is not improper rationalizing. God not only authorizes, but even enjoins it as a sacred duty." It is of little consequence, therefore, how strongly God may allege that he performed the action in question; we are not bound to believe him, according to this notion, if we are unable to reconcile the action itself with what we conceive to be the principles of honor or right. It would be pleasant to hear the men who assert these things, explain the grounds on which they reconcile with their principles of "honor and right," or with "the intuitional consciousness," the slaughter of the children of the Canaanites by Joshua; and that of "the little ones" of the Midianites, together with the reduction of their young women to hopeless slavery; and also the utter destruction of the Amalekites for a crime perpetrated by their ancestors four hundred years before. We doubt, however, whether Dr. Beecher would condescend to attempt any explanation; for on p. 35, he expressly avers that "The principles of honor and right demand of God not so to charge the wrong conduct of one being to others, as to punish one person for the conduct of another, to which he did not consent, and in which he had no part." Of course, then, the foregoing facts, and the thousand others of similar character which the Bible ascribes to God, it falsely ascribes to him. And, therefore, the Scriptures assert what is utterly false; and neither ought to be nor can be regarded as the Word of God. Is there any way to avoid this plain and obvious inference? If not, then is there any way consistent with honor and right, and moral integrity, in which an individual who takes this ground can yet claim to be a minister of Christ, a preacher of his Gospel, and a member of his church? Do not the principles of the Gospel, and of honor and right, and moral honesty, demand that the Church of Christ should cease to hold fellow-

ship with such; and to regard them as enemies of the cross of Christ? Dr. Beecher, in the assertion of this principle, takes common ground with the infidel Paine, who adopted, and made it the basis for impugning the Divine origin of the Bible narrative, on the ground of its assertion of the facts above referred to. But let us advert to another instance.

A living commentator on the Bible, whose works before they were justly appreciated, found considerable favor with the Christian public; and in which is found under various forms the like insidious principles of infidelity; in a recent essay employs the ideas and almost the very language of Tindal and Paine on the same subject. We refer to the Rev. A. Barnes of Philadelphia; who, speaking of the institution of slavery, asserts the very principles on which the aforementioned infidels have sought to impugn the Divine origin of the Scriptures. He says: "There are great principles in our nature, as God has made us, *which can never be set aside by any authority of a professed revelation*. If a book claiming to be a revelation from God, by any fair interpretation defended slavery, or placed it on the same basis as the relation of husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, *such a book would not and could not be received by the mass of mankind as a Divine revelation*." Thus, on this subject also, Revelation is to be not only made subservient to reason, but its claim to a Divine origin must be tested and decided thereby. The principle here asserted is precisely that of Messrs. W. L. Garrison, Wendell Phillips, J. L. Giddings, Gerritt Smith, H. C. Wright, (formerly also a clergyman), and others; who, finding that the institution of slavery was recognized by the Bible, have consistently discarded it as a revelation from God.

It is unnecessary to lengthen out these illustrative details. The intelligent reader will remember that on precisely the same principle the doctrine of future punishment is got rid of by the Universalist. In fact, Bayle himself uses the following language on the subject: "*So long as a man shall adhere to his natural reason, and not humbly submit to some passages in the Gospel, he will look with abhorrence upon that doctrine of the infinite torments of the whole human race except a few only.*"* On the same prin-

* Critical and Hist. Dict., Vol. V., p. 175.

ciple, they have likewise rejected the doctrine respecting demoniacs and demons; while the Unitarians and Swedenborgians adopting it, have on the same basis discarded the doctrine of the Trinity, and the vicarious satisfaction of Christ. Let these instances suffice, for they are all-sufficient for illustration.

Such, then, are some of the results of attempting to obtrude a perverted human reason and philosophy into the sacred enclosure of revelation; and to constitute that a judge, which God has announced to be merely a learner. Reason and philosophy have their appropriate province, and that province is fully recognized and defined by revelation itself. It is acknowledged as a fundamental principle in all true philosophy that things may be incomprehensible and yet demonstrable. And the simple recognition of this rule will obviate the alleged difficulties aforesaid, and teach reason her true limits and proper position. It is true the Bible nowhere claims to be a system of natural science; of astronomy, geology, physiology, natural philosophy, and the like: but while it does claim to reveal all the fundamental truths which pertain to human redemption, as before remarked, it likewise claims that all its references to the subjects treated in natural science, are in strict accordance with truth. And it claims, moreover, that its utterances are to be received as true, even where they appear to be in conflict with the deductions of our reason, and with the so-called intuitional principles, or principles of honor and right, entertained by fallen and selfish creatures. Nor can any real force be allowed to the objection so persistently pleaded by the assertors of rationalism, that this would stultify reason itself in its relation to the inquiry, whether God has, or has not, imparted a revelation to man. For while the announcements of the Gospel commend themselves to every man's *conscience* in the sight of God, the evidence whether God has actually spoken, does not depend upon our being able to perceive that *what* he speaks is true on the grounds of our deductions from reason, or on the principles of honor and right, or on any thing of the kind; but is a mere question whether such testimony has been given and verified by God, as has been a thousand times shown. The question as to the truth of the allegations given in testimony is altogether different from the question whether the witness has given those allegations in testimony;

and yet this distinction, so plain and obvious, is perpetually confounded in all the discussions of the subject which we have had from rationalizing divines.

In every attempt which human philosophy has made to intermeddle with the theology of revelation, she has wrought only confusion and disaster, not to religion alone, but to herself. From the time of Abelard to the present, she has, for example, claimed the right to arrange the system of theology; and what strange work she has made of it, any one may see, who will cast a glance over but a portion of her innumerable systems. The plain and obvious method of inculcation, suggested alike by the Holy Spirit, and by true science, (which has adopted it in all her other departments,) was too plain and simple. To *begin* with man, seemed to be a reversing of the idea; though every thing in true theology has either a direct or indirect reference to man. And when a truly scriptural and scientific presentation of the whole is given, this vaunted philosophy, in exhibition of her utter unfitness and incapacity to meddle at all with the subject, undertakes to scoff and to sneer and ridicule; and to push forth her own claims in antagonism; and then, upon receiving a fair and frank and scholarly overture to join issue on the question of the validity of her pretensions, retires in silence from the field.

The true connection sustained by reason to revelation, can scarcely, in the present age, be misapprehended intelligently by the serious and devout mind. It is her undoubted right and duty to consider and determine upon the claims of that which purports to be a revelation from heaven: to examine rigidly and thoroughly, and then decide upon the evidence which it proffers of a Divine original; and, moreover, to settle and establish the true principles upon which the language employed in that revelation is to be interpreted. She may also compare the utterances of God in his word, with his utterances in his works, so far as these latter can be truly ascertained: (See Psalms viii and xix, and Rom. i: 20;) but having done all this, and having upon satisfactory grounds ascertained that the alleged utterance of God is indeed a revelation from himself to man; what is the next and appropriate duty of reason in the premises? Is it to sit in judgment upon the truth of the facts, to the verity of which God has

confessedly testified? and so to intimate that even though God has spoken, he may after all have spoken that which is incorrect and false? Will any serious mind undertake to aver this is the province of right reason. And if not, why do we find it so perpetually attempted by men who profess to receive the Sacred Scriptures as a revelation from God? To claim that reason justifies or requires such a procedure, is an outrage upon all the rational and moral powers of mankind, not less than an outrage against the infinitely wise and eternal God. No, the true and highest exercise of our rational powers would demand in such a case, that we deferentially and humbly receive the declarations of the infinitely wise and holy God as unerringly true; and regard as utterly false every thing which arrays itself against them. "Let the fair grammatical import of Scripture language be investigated; and whatever propositions are, by an easy and natural interpretation, deducible from thence, let them be received as the dictates of Infinite Wisdom, whatever aspect they may bear, or whatever difficulties they present."* "Let God be true, but every man a liar."

Upon the whole then it is obvious that every man who now assumes the opposite ground should honestly concede that he does not truly receive the Scriptures as the testimony of God. For since he positively refuses to receive their statements on a given subject, as consistent with truth and justice, he is brought to the alternative of either denying them to be the Word of God, or of asserting that God has testified to the truth of that which is irreconcilable with truth, and therefore false. And if those who are willing to assume logically such a position without either a disclaimer or an explanation, can be properly regarded as representatives of the Christian Church in this age and country, then, indeed, has the hitherto acknowledged division between skepticism and Christianity ceased to exist, and rationalism may be regarded as already having possession of the Church of Christ.

All attempts to rest upon a philosophical basis, the truth which God has revealed, should be regarded as unauthorised and unsafe: since that truth does not result from any perceptible relations in our ideas, but from the wisdom and authority of God himself. And it is to be regretted that too much countenance is still af-

* Robert Hall. Works, Vol. II, p. 309.

fording by men of undoubted intelligence and piety, to the tendency of the unsubdued and unregenerate heart to pry into the unknown and unsearchable: and it is one of the most remarkable of all developments in theological literature, that while all this is seen and acknowledged; and the importance of regarding the distinction between philosophy and theology is freely conceded and insisted on in relation to some of the utterances of revelation; it seems to be with difficulty apprehended in relation to others. For instance: When Philosophy enters the province of Revelation and ventures to pronounce dogmatically upon the truth of the trinity in God; or on the incarnation; or satisfaction of Christ; or the resurrection of the body; we feel that she is out of her province, and scruple not to tell her so; but on other points, where the principle equally applies, we hesitate to speak with decision. And the theological world is at present edified by the remarkable spectacle of several brethren of learning and ability exhibiting their skill in dialectics, metaphysics, and philosophy, and each in antagonism to the others; in the vain effort to subject the great cardinal doctrine of Imputation to philosophical analysis. The entire truth of the doctrine is of course admitted in all its fulness: but this does not satisfy these brethren; they must ascertain *how* and *why* it may be regarded as true. So, at it they go; the utterances of philosophy and logic are brought forward with great assurance; and yet all are at variance with each other.

Now we have no disposition to add to the number of these combatants, by entering the lists with either or with all of them, but we must be permitted to say that we can see no sufficient reason for making the doctrine of imputation an exception to the other doctrines of revealed religion, on the score of any peculiar adapt-
edness, to be the subject of philosophical analysis; and we should have been better entertained with the discussion itself if either one or all of the three brethren engaged in it had, at the outset, favored the world with a discriminating characterization of those features thereof which render it exceptional. Why bring in our philosophy to explain the *how*, to understand the *why*, and to exhibit the *modus*, in relation to this doctrine, rather than in that of the hypostatical union? or any other of the great announcements

of the Word of God? This should be explained, and the principles on which it is justified brought forward, before the thing is seriously attempted. And until it is done we must protest against every such procedure. It embroils the Church in a useless controversy; which, while it tends to waste and exhaust her energies, suggests no plausible or even probable ground on which the dispute can be adjusted; and not the slightest prospect of ever arriving at even a proximate knowledge of the *why*, *wherefore*, &c. Nor is this all: for if the *why* and the *modus* could be even elicited in the clangor of arms, and amidst the shoutings of the captains; and could we really ascertain all that these divergent and hostile philosophies endeavor to elicit; it would be of no practical benefit or available use. A moment's reflection will evince this to any reader who has intelligently observed the controversy. God has told us on the subject all that can be of real and practical benefit to man; and let us be content to leave the matter where he has left it; (Deut. xxix: 29 :) and while we reverentially seek to learn what he has said, endeavor to be satisfied with it, and to put it to the best practical use.

If the analysis of thought and of the subject of thought (or the mental powers,) be, as they are, the foundation of all true philosophy, (which is fully conceded by Descartes, Locke, Kant — inconsistent as he was hereon — Reid, Sir Wm. Hamilton, Cousin, and others of the best and ablest of her pupils;) then the true province of philosophy is as plain and apparent, as that of revealed theology itself: and no man professing an intelligent acquaintance with the subject can be held excusable for now disregarding those boundaries. Man may be competent to analyse his own thoughts and intellectual powers; but God alone is competent to the analysis of his. Of the true nature and character of God; of the principles which regulate the administration of his providence; and of the whole scheme of saving mercy through the mediator; as well as of the future stages and conditions of our being; we neither have nor can have any knowledge whatever, and know absolutely nothing, except that which God has communicated in his Word. The thoughts, therefore, which we have received on those subjects are not our thoughts, but the thoughts of God; and they are as far above the thoughts of fallen man in rela-

tion to such matters, as the heavens are above the earth. This is obvious; and is conceded by all who receive the Scriptures as a revelation from God. And such being the fact, on what principle of reason, or of common sense, can human philosophy pretend to claim that she is competent to the analysis of the thoughts which dwell in the bosom of the Infinite and Eternal God? and which pertain to his eternal purposes and plans: and only a few glimmerings of which have been communicated to us, incidently, as it were, in the revelation which he has made to direct us in the way of life and light and salvation? That we can truly and adequately criticise that only which we know as a whole, is an obvious maxim of common sense. And on what pretense therefore can reason or philosophy presume to say that any portion of those Divinely communicated thoughts is inconsistent with the nature, purposes, or character of God; or that any action attributed to him in his Word, is contrary to his character? So far from sanctioning any such procedure, true Philosophy disowns and scorns it; and rejects as a spurious brood—the merest pretenders to her fellowship—all who presume to plead her sanction of the posterous procedure.

The Apostle has pointed out the limits of human knowledge; and this certainly ought to be satisfactory to all who receive the Divine testimony. God only hath immortality, *dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto. For we know in part, and we prophecy in part.* But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. *For now we see through a glass darkly; but then face to face; now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known.* “When Philosophy succeeds in exhibiting in a clear and consistent form the Infinite Being of God; when her opposing schools are agreed among themselves as to the manner in which a knowledge of the Infinite takes place, or the marks by which it is to be discerned when known; then, and not till then, may she speak as one having authority in controversies of faith. But while she speaks with stammering lips and a double tongue; while she gropes her way in darkness, and stumbles at every step; while she has nothing to offer us but the alternatives of principles which abjure consciousness, or a consciousness which contradicts itself; we may well pause before

we appeal to her decisions as the gauge and measure of religious truth." * She is useful only as proving her own utter uselessness. L.

+ + +

ART. III. — *The Mystery of Iniquity.*

Romanism

1. *Canones et Decreta Concilii Tridentini*: Lipsiæ, 1854.
2. *Catechismus Concilii Tridentini*: Lipsiæ, 1854.
3. *Catholic Christian Instructed*: Challoner, Baltimore, 1852.
4. *Bulla in Cena Domini*: Baltimore Magazine, June, 1836.

No duty is more urgent upon the Church of the Living God than to contend earnestly for the faith delivered to the saints.

The questions at issue between the Church of Christ and the Papal Hierarchy are of long standing, and momentous import to every human being. In the controversy between Rome and us there can be no compromise, no peace; one or the other must be annihilated. If Papists hold and teach a system of truth, then we hold and teach a system of falsehood; if Rome be a true Church of Jesus Christ, then we are the Synagogue of Satan — on the other hand, if we hold and teach the truth, then Rome holds and teaches lies; if we are the true Church of Jesus, then Rome is the Synagogue of Satan. The statements herein made may be relied upon as correct; they have all been verified by a careful comparison with standard Papal authorities; and whoever will take the trouble to examine the citations here made, will find them accurate. The differences between Rome and us are too great to allow for one moment, the idea that both systems are from God: one or the other is from Satan. These differences are fundamental and may be thus stated, viz:

(a) As to God: — Rome teaches that God is a spirit to whom worship must be offered; that he may be truly worshipped by means of images and pictures; that divine worship is also due to

* Mansell, *Limits of Religious Thought*, p. 88.

the Virgin Mary, the True Cross, and the Consecrated Bread; that angels and saints are to be invoked, that religious adoration is to be paid to them, along with images, pictures and relics. We hold that the only Being to whom worship may be rendered is the Triune God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; that worship offered Him must be spiritual, not sensuous; nor by means of images or pictures; that all worship of Him by means of images or pictures, and adoration of other beings than God is idolatry. Concerning, then, the object of all religious worship the questions at issue are fundamental: if the Second Commandment, as we hold and believe it, be true, then Rome is guilty of idolatry, the most horrible of sins.

(b) As to the Word of God:—Rome teaches that the Word of God is not a perfect rule of faith or practice; that the traditions of the Church are of Divine authority; that the canons and decrees of the Councils, and the writings of the Fathers are to be received along with the Word of God; that no one shall believe the Scriptures in any other sense than that held by the Church in her Creeds, Canons, Bulls, and Fatherly writings; and to make sure work, forbids any one to read the Scriptures without a license from the Priest. On the other hand, we hold that the Word of God only is of Divine authority; that it is a perfect rule of faith and practice; that every man is bound to interpret it for himself, and that all not only have the right, but it is their duty to search the Scriptures.

(c) As to the Head of the Church:—Rome teaches that the Pope is the visible Head of the Church, is the Vicar of Christ, and as such must be venerated; that all Christians and churches are bound to recognise him as their visible Head and Lord. We hold that the only Head of the Church, visible or invisible, is the Lord Jesus Christ; that he only is to be recognized and venerated as such; and that the only Vicar of the Church is the Holy Ghost, the third person of the blessed Trinity.

(d) As to Sin:—Rome teaches that some sins are venial, others mortal; that disobedience to the Church is more horrible than disobedience to God; that sins must be confessed to the Priest, and that he may absolve the penitent; that the Church may grant indulgences, releasing the punishment of sins. We hold, that sin

is the transgression of the Law; that all sins are mortal; that sins must be confessed to God only, who only can absolve the penitent; that none but God can remove the punishment due to sins.

(e) As to the State of the Dead:—Rome teaches that beyond the grave there are three estates, Heaven, Hell, and Purgatory; that souls may be released from the pains of purgatory by the suffrages of the faithful. We hold that there are but two states, Heaven and Hell; that the souls of believers are with Jesus in Paradise as soon as separated from the body; that the souls of the wicked go, at once, to their own place; and that between these two estates, there is a great gulf fixed, which cannot be passed.

These differences, commencing with the object and mode of worship, terminating with the condition of the soul after death, are selected merely as specimens. They are fundamental, and cover a large portion of the field of religious controversy between Rome and us. It will be seen at once that both of these systems cannot be from God: one or the other must be destroyed.

Let us now pass in review, one by one, some of the most noteworthy features connected with this Mystery of Iniquity, proving each charge as made, from standard authorities.

1. *Rome in Prophecy.*—It was given to Daniel and John to see further into the future than to other men: and in the second and seventh chapters of Daniel, under the figure of an image, and the figure of four beasts, we have portrayed before us the rise and downfall of the four great Universal Empires, the Assyrian, the Medo-Persian, the Grecian and Roman. God himself gives the interpretation: These great beasts which are four, are four kings that shall arise out of the earth. [Dan. vii: 17.] And in the second chapter, Nebuchadnezzar is expressly told that he was the head of gold, the first king that should arise. Commentators, both Papal and Christian, have universally accepted this interpretation. The only one that now concerns us, is the fourth Beast, the Roman Empire. Daniel saw that this one was diverse from the other Beasts, and that it had ten horns; and the interpretation of these ten horns is given us—the ten horns of this kingdom are ten kings that shall arise. [Dan. vii: 24.] Now every reader of Roman history knows that out of the old Roman Empire, after it was

dismembered, there arose ten kingdoms, having ten kings: these ten kingdoms as given by every historian of this period, are the Anglo-Saxons, the Franks of Central France, the Ullman Franks of Eastern France, the Franks of Southern France, the Visigoths, the Suevi, the Bavarians, the Vandals, the Ostrogoths, and the Lombards: the last three will occupy our attention again. If we turn now to the thirteenth chapter of Revelation, more light will be given us. "I saw," says John, "a Beast having seven heads and ten horns, and upon his horns ten crowns." Now turn to the seventeenth chapter, and the interpretation is given: The seven heads are seven mountains. Now, every child knows that Rome is situated on seven hills or mountains, and is called the "Seven Hilled City." And the ten horns which thou sawest are ten kings. [Rev. vii: 12.] This much then is clear, the fourth Beast of Daniel is the Roman Empire; the ten horns are the ten kingdoms into which it was divided; the seven heads are the seven hills on which Rome is situated; the ten crowns are the ten kings who ruled over the ten kingdoms. While Daniel was considering these ten horns, behold there came up among them another little horn, before whom there were three of the first horns plucked up; and behold! in this horn were eyes like the eyes of a man, and a mouth speaking great things. [Dan. vii: 8.] What is the meaning of this little horn, and what interpretation does God himself give us? The ten horns are ten kings that shall arise, and another shall rise after them, and he shall subdue three kings. [Dan. vii: 24.] After the disruption of the Roman Empire, what other kingdom arose, *diverse* from the ten kingdoms into which Rome was divided, before which three of the first kingdoms were plucked up? Was it not the Papacy? the little horn with the eyes of a man, and speaking great words? There was no other kingdom so utterly *diverse* from the first ten kingdoms, as to have attracted the attention of Daniel, than the kingdom of the Papacy: that was *diverse*, and it came up *after* the ten kingdoms; and three of the first kingdoms were rooted out by this diverse kingdom. The three kingdoms plucked up by the little horn of the Papacy, were the Lombards, the Vandals, and the Ostrogoths. Let the appeal be made to Gibbon, the enemy of our religion, in proof of the true interpretation of these prophecies. Does history

show any thing answerable to these statements? "At the entreaties of Stephen, the Roman Pontiff, Pepin crossed the Alps at the head of a French army. The Lombards, after a weak resistance, obtained an ignominious peace, swore to restore the possessions and respect the rights of the Roman Church."* "The final battle which decided the fate of the Vandal Monarchy, was fought about twenty miles from Carthage. The Vandals were totally defeated. As soon as Justinian had received the messengers of victory, he proceeded without delay to the full establishment of the Catholic Church. Her jurisdiction, wealth and immunities, were restored and amplified with a liberal hand."† "The Goths were again defeated; Teias their last king slain: the remains of the Gothic nations evacuated the country, or mingled with the people. The civil state of Italy was fixed by a pragmatic sanction, which the emperor promulgated at the request of the Pope."‡ Can any one doubt that the little horn was the Papacy; that the three kingdoms plucked up by it were the Lombards, Vandals, and Goths?

John says, I saw a woman sit upon a scarlet colored Beast, full of names of blasphemy, having seven heads and ten horns. This Beast, as we have seen, is the Roman Empire; the ten horns are the ten kingdoms into which it was divided: now have we any interpretation of the Woman? The Woman which thou sawest is that great city, which reigneth over the kings of the earth, is the interpretation which God Himself gives us: [Rev. xvii: 18.] What city of all the cities of the earth has ruled over the kings of the earth? Is it not Rome? Can we hesitate to identify the Woman upon the Beast, with the city of Rome? This Woman is a whore. [Rev. xvii: 15.] Now the figure used throughout the Bible to represent the Church is a Woman; the apostasies of the Church are the whoredoms and adulteries of the Woman: || The Church of Rome is utterly and hopelessly apostate, and is therefore called the Whore. The true Church is a chaste woman — the apostate Church is a whore — on her forehead is written Mother of Harlots, and abominations of the earth; and to perfect the portrait of Rome, the Woman is arrayed in purple and scarlet — the official

* Student's Gibbon, p. 434.

† Idem, p. 312.

‡ Idem, p. 332, 333.

|| Old Test. passim.

colors of Popery — and drunk with the blood of the Saints, and with the blood of the Martyrs of Jesus: [Rev. xvii: 1-6.] The wayfaring man though a fool, need not err in identifying the Whore with the Church of Rome.

Another noteworthy prophecy is in the second epistle to the Thessalonians: For that day shall not come except there come a falling away first, and that Man of Sin be revealed, the Son of Perdition; who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he as God sitteth in the Temple of God, showing himself that he is God? [2 Thess. ii: 3-10.] Had the apostle lived in our day, and had he written a description of the Pope, he could not have better portrayed his character and claims, than he has in this chapter: for the Temple of God is his visible church; and in that, the Pope exalteth himself, even above God, and is even worshipped. Does he not claim to be the Head of the Church, the Vicar of Christ, ousting the Holy Ghost? Do not his followers bow in adoration before him? Do they not even kiss his toe? Has he not declared that the commands of God had better be violated than his? He has commanded abstinence from meats and marriage; exalted the words of the Pope above the words of God; and in a hundred ways proves, by his arrogance and presumption, his perfect right to the title of the Man of Sin, and Son of Perdition. From these testimonies we are in no doubt as to the character of this body. To call it the Synagogue of Satan, the Mother of Harlots, the Whore of Babylon drunk with blood, the Man of Sin, the Son of Perdition, is but using the words of the Holy Ghost, to express the nature of this horrible caricature of the religion of Jesus; this Bastard that has thrust himself into the heritage of the Lord; this mingled combination of God-defying blasphemy and bloodthirsty ferocity; this sworn hater of all truth, freedom and righteousness; this enemy of God and man, triple crowned and triple cursed, whose end is everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, when he shall be revealed from heaven, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on his enemies.

2. *The Structure of Popery.* — When we compare the form or structure of Popery with the form given by God to His Church, we find scarcely the appearance of a resemblance. In the original structure of the Christian Church, it was entirely separated from

the State. Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's! there was no connection between the spiritual kingdom of Christ and the temporal kingdom of Cæsar. The Church had entrusted to her, the keys of a spiritual kingdom; the State had given her the sword of civil power and authority. When we turn to the Church of Rome, we behold the successor of Peter with the keys of the kingdom of Heaven on his girdle; with the sword of Cæsar in his hand, claiming not only spiritual but civil power. When we look for the cœqual Presbyters of the ancient Church we find them not; but in their stead an ascending grade of civil and spiritual officers, from the parish Priest, up through Confessor, Bishop, Archbishop, Cardinal, Primate, and all terminating in one supreme Pontiff to whom all lower officers swear "*veram obedientiam*," and who claims to be the visible Head of the Church, the successor of Peter, the Vicar of Christ. So far as the people are concerned, they have no voice, no power whatever in the Church of Rome: Priests, Confessors, Bishops, and Prelates, are placed over them without their vote or consent. Every one who will be esteemed a good Catholic, must go to the confessional at least once every month, and there tell the Father Confessor every sin, of thought, word, and deed, upon pain of perdition: and unless he confesses once a year, he shall be excommunicated from the Church, anathematized, and handed over to the fires of purgatory. The combinations of power in the Papal Hierarchy are absolutely terrible; and woe unto the man who falls into the condemnation of the Church; they will shut the gates of Heaven upon him; send him to Purgatory; where they have temporal power, will confiscate his property to the Church, and send him to the dungeon or rack. Every person who joins the Church of Rome, and every spiritual officer in it, is compelled to swear that he will yield a true obedience to the Pope. The following is the form of the oath: it is taken from the Bull of Pius IV, and is found in the canons of the Council of Trent. *Romanoque Pontifici, beati Petri Apostolorum principis successoris ac Jesu Christi vicaris, veram obedientiam spondeo ac juro.* * (To the Roman Pontiff, the successor of the blessed Peter, the chief

* Cœc. Trent. Bulla super forma Juramenti, p. 228.

of the Apostles, and the vicar of Jesus Christ, I promise and swear a true obedience.) And thus every officer of the Romish Church is bound, body and soul, to the Pope by the most solemn oath.

The fearful powers combined in this Papal Hierarchy have been fully seen. The case of the Jewish child Mortara still lingers in the memory of men; the wails of the Madiai family, imprisoned for reading the Word of God, still ring in our ears; the bones of dead men in the Inquisition of Spain attest this terrible power; the blood of the Netherlanders, shed by Rome, for one hundred years, knows what the power of the Romish Church has been. We need not hesitate to affirm, that the Romish Hierarchy exhibits the most frightful and terrible combination of powers, for crushing down the souls of men, that man or Devil has ever imagined or devised. Not less than two hundred millions of the human race wait upon the nod of the Pope; and at his command, no matter what that command may be, are bound by a solemn oath to render him a true obedience. The Pope of Rome wields a power not inferior to that of any king on earth.

3. *The Idolatry of Popery.*—God wrote with his own finger upon the tables of stone the following command concerning his worship—Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them." No wonder that Rome has expunged these words of the Law, this Second Commandment from her books; and divided the Tenth, in order to make out the requisite number.

We charge the Church of Rome with Idolatry—she worships other Beings than the Triune God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; she worships the true God by means of images and pictures; she offers adoration to the Saints, and venerates their relics; while in all of her worship, the name of Mary occurs far oftener than does that of Jesus Christ. We are not making hearsay charges against Rome: her own canons and decrees say: *Similiter et sanctos una cum Christo regnantes venerandos atque invocandos esse, eosque orationes Deo pro nobis offerre, atque eorum reliquias esse venerandos. Firmiter assero imagines Christi ac Deiparæ semper Virginis, necnon*

aliorum sanctorum habendas et retinendas esse, atque eis debitum honorem ac venerationem impertiendam." * Saints are to be venerated and invoked; their relics are to be venerated; images of Christ, of the Virgin, of other Saints, are to be had, kept, honored, and venerated: and every Catholic is commanded to do these things. In vain does God tell us neither to make, bow down to, nor worship, images or pictures; Rome, in the face of this express statute of Jehovah, commands the Faithful to make, hold and bow down to images, and to worship God by means of them. If what Rome holds, teaches and acts, in this particular, is not Idolatry, according to the Law of God, then it is not competent for the human mind to say what is Idolatry. The Pater Noster is the Lord's prayer; the Ave Maria is the Hail Mary, the invocation to the Virgin; now the Catholic always repeats ten Ave Marias for one Pater Noster; why more invocation of the Virgin than prayer to Almighty God? Is it not because the Church of Rome worships Mary more than God.

But even the invocation of Saints and Angels, the worship of the Virgin, the use of images and pictures in the worship of God, does not constitute the highest form of the Idolatry of Rome. When the Priest has pronounced the words of consecration, the Bread and Wine are changed into the Blood, Body, and Divinity of Jesus Christ; it is then called the Consecrated Host; and offered in sacrifice to God. Now what does Rome herself say concerning this Bread and Wine over which the Priest has mumbled some Latin words? "*Nullus itaque dubitandi locus relinquitur quin omnes fideles pro more in Catholica ecclesia semper recepto Latriæ cultum, qui vero Deo debetur, huic sanctissimo sacramento in veneratione exhibeant.*" † There is no doubt, therefore, that all the Faithful, after the custom always received in the Catholic Church, should exhibit in veneration to this most holy Sacrament, that worship of Latria, which is due to the true God. "*Si quis dixerit in Sancto eucharistiæ Sacramento Christum Unigenitum Dei Filium non esse cultu Latriæ; et eius adoratores esse idolotras; anathema sit.*" ‡ Thus not only does Rome command all the Faithful, by

* Can. Trent, p. 227.

† Idem, Sess. xlii. C. v. p., 61.

‡ Idem, p. 64.

formal and infallible decree, to give the highest worship, the worship of Latria, to the Bread and Wine; but hands over to the fires of hell, and the tender mercies of the Devil, any poor Protestant who shall dare affirm that bowing down before and praying to a piece of bread is Idolatry. Thus by her own showing, by her own infallible decree, we have convicted the Church of Rome of the horrible sin of Idolatry; and this in several particulars, viz.: she worships the true God by means of images and pictures; she invokes and venerates Saints and Angels; she has declared the Virgin sinless, and has placed her in the seat of Christ, calls her "Queen of Heaven and Mother of God," and prays to her as such; and offers to a little bit of Consecrated Bread the highest worship of Latria, due to God only. When we pass through her temples and churches, we are amazed and horrified as we gaze upon the images and pictures of the Eternal Father, of the Incarnate Son, of the Saints and confessors that adorn Her walls: when the Host is elevated, the whole vast throng of worshipers bow in religious adoration before the Wafer. Such horrible Idolatry as this were too gross and revolting for belief, were it not transpiring before our very eyes. The Idolatry of Aaron and Israel when they made the Golden Calf, and worshiped Jehovah under that revolting form, is devout worship when compared with the insane and infernal Idolatry of Rome. The fetich worship of the besotted Africans, the divine worship paid to cows, lizards, reptiles, and serpents, becomes absolutely respectable when compared with the shameless and revolting worship of Roman Idolaters.

4. The Blasphemy of Popery. — When we charge the Church of Rome with the fearful sin of Blasphemy, for which there is no forgiveness in this world, neither in that which is to come, we must look to the Word of God for a definition of blasphemy. Jesus claimed that he was the Son of God; the Jews said, Thou blasphemest, because that thou, being a man, makest thyself God: [John x: 33] — they looked upon Jesus as a man. We define blasphemy, therefore, the usurpation on the part of man of the attributes and prerogatives of God; or his claiming to exercise the powers that belong to God. Now, has Rome ever claimed and usurped the attributes and prerogatives of God? She has, and in three particulars, viz.: (a) In granting Indulgences; (b) in forgiving

sins; (c) in adding to and taking from the Word of God. Rome claims and exercises the power of granting Indulgences. In the Bull of Pius IV., issued at the Council of Trent — and we quote from the Bulls of the Popes as often as possible, because they are held to be infallible — the following claim is made: “*Indulgentiarum etiam potestatem a Christo in ecclesia relictam fuisse;*” * the power of granting Indulgences was left by Christ in the Church. “*Quum potestas conferendi Indulgentias a Christo ecclesie concessa sit.*” † It only remains to find out from Papal authors what an Indulgence is. Protestants have believed that an Indulgence was a license to commit sin. Tetzel used to sell them, and said his were of such efficacy that who ever had one might “*deflower the Mother of God with impunity.*” Papists deny the Protestant view. Let us hear an American Papist. He asks “What is meant by a Plenary Indulgence? Ans. That which when obtained releases the whole punishment that remains due upon account of sin.” ‡ Now Papists may call Bishop Challoner’s definition of an Indulgence whatever they choose; but whoever undertakes to release the punishment due on account of sin, has usurped the power and prerogatives of God. If this be not blasphemy according to God’s own definition of blasphemy, then we defy any man to say what is blasphemy.

Another form of the Blasphemy of Rome is the doctrine of absolution. “Ques. Is then your doctrine that any man can forgive sin? Ans. We do not believe that any man can forgive sin by his own power; but we believe that God has been pleased to appoint that his ministers should, in virtue of his commission, as his instruments, and by *His power*, absolve repenting sinners.” || Of course, Bishop Challoner, no man would forgive sin by his own power; it would not be blasphemy if he did. We have never charged you with forgiving sin by your own power; — you do it “by the power of God” — you have usurped the power of God. This is what we charge upon you, and this is blasphemy. It is this high-handed and daring assumption of Divine Preroga-

* Can. Trent, page 228.

† Can. Trent, Sess. xxv.

‡ Challoner’s Catholic Christian Instructed. p. 130.

|| Challoner’s Catholic Christian, p. 116.

tive, that you claim constantly to exercise, that constitutes the very head and front of your offending and blasphemy. Well did the Jews say, and Jesus indorsed the truth, "Who can forgive sins but God?" The Jews charged him with blasphemy, for doing what Rome has always claimed and exercised the right of doing, viz.: forgiving sin.

The third particular of the blasphemy of Rome is, her additions to the Word of God. The Holy Ghost is the author of the sacred Scriptures; it is his province to reveal little or much, as Divine Wisdom may direct: no man dare add to his revelation, except by usurping his prerogative. Now what treatment has the Word of God received at the hands of Popery? By formal and infallible decree passed at the General Council of Trent, the following books have been added to the Canon of Inspired Scripture, viz: "Tobias, Judith, Sapientia, duo Machabæorum, primus et secundus."* These books have never been received by the Jews as any portion of the Word of God; while the books of Machabees were written after the canon of Old Testament Scripture had been closed. Not content with this wholesale blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, Rome has exalted Unwritten Traditions to equal authority with the written Scriptures inspired by the Spirit. "*Omnes libros tam veteris quam novi testamenti. nec non traditiones ipsas tum ad fidem, tum ad mores pertinentes pari pietatis affectu ac reverentia suscipit et veneratur.*"† Traditions, whether pertaining to faith or morals, shall be venerated with the same affection and piety as the books of the Old and New Testament. Thus does Rome exalt the words of man to equal authority with the words of the Holy Ghost; usurp the place of God, and assume the functions of the Eternal Spirit. Cardinal Hossius, who presided at this same Council of Trent, says: "*Multoque maxima pars Evangelii pervenit ad nos traditione; perexigua literis est mandata.*"‡ The greater part of the Gospel reached us by tradition. "*Creditum est ecclesie sine omni Scripturarum præsidio.*"|| The Canon Law of Rome affirms "That men do with such reverence respect the seat of Rome, that they rather desire to know the in-

* Can. Trent., Sess. IV. Decretum de Canonicis Scripturis.

† Idem, page 15.

‡ Hossius Confes. Fid. Cathol., ch. 92, p. 133 fol.

|| Idem, chap. 15.

stitutions of the Christian religion from the Pope's mouth than from the Holy Scriptures. They inquire what is his pleasure, and according to it they order their life and conversation." * And then, lest any man should read and interpret the Word of God for himself, they affirm by solemn decree: "*Nemo Scripturas contra eum sensum quin tenuit et tenet Sancta Mater ecclesiæ, cujus est judicare de vero sensu et interpretatione Scripturarum Sanctorum, aut etiam contra unanimen consensum Patrum ipsam Scripturam Sacram interpretari audeat.*" † ‡ No one shall dare interpret the Scriptures in any other sense than that held by the Church of Rome. And then they prohibit any man from printing or circulating any edition except the old Latin Vulgate — "*Vetus et Vulgata editio*" — and even for this he must get a permit from his priest. ‡ "*Probatique fuerint ab ordinario.*" Thus has Rome silenced the voice of God, and the words of the Holy Ghost in all of her assemblies; taken away all right of private judgment; bound the man over, body, mind and soul, to the Pope's councils and Fathers; exalted the authority of the Church far above the authority of God: and then anathematizes and binds over to hell forever all who will not unite with her in this atrocious blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, by which she has ousted God from His place in his blood-bought Church, and driven the Holy Ghost away from her Assemblies. Thus has the Man of Sin and the Son of Perdition — sitting in the Temple of God, and exalting himself above all that is called God, or that is worshiped, placing the authority of the Church above the authority of God, boasting then of his brazen blasphemy, and binding over to hell all who will not blaspheme with him — shown that He and his Church are of the number of those who receive not the truth in the love of it; upon whom God hath sent strong delusions, that blinded by their own blasphemous folly, they should believe a lie rather than the truth; that thus they might and ought to be damned, because they took pleasure in blasphemy and unrighteousness rather than in the truth.

5. *The Cannibalism of Popery.* — Let us pass still deeper into this sink of superstition, idolatry and blasphemy. Of all the

* Corpus Juris Canonis, Dist. 40, ch. 6.

† Can Trent. Sess. IV.

‡ Idem, Sess IV.

horrid and disgusting customs on earth, that of eating human flesh is the most revolting. When men reach this point of pollution and degradation, they seem almost to have passed the limits of humanity; devils in hell would look with disgust and aversion upon them; and hyenas and jackals would vie with them for mastery in their blood feasts. Turn now to the Church of Rome, and what do we behold? The Priest takes the bit of unleavened bread, called the Wafer, he pronounces the words of consecration—lo! according to their decree, faith and practice, the whole substance of the bread is changed into the Blood, Body, and Divinity of Jesus Christ. In each one of the pieces of bread there is a “Totum Christi,” a Whole Christ. This conversion of the Bread and Wine into Blood, Body, and Divinity of Christ is called by them Transubstantiation. This doctrine is so absurd and horrible that it must be stated in the very words of Rome herself: “*Si quis negaverit in Sanctissimæ eucharistiæ Sacramento contineri vere, realiter et substantialiter corpus et sanguinem una cum anima et divinitate Domini nostri Jesu Christi, ac proinde totum Christi, anathema sit.*”* These very words as quoted, also form part of the Bull of Pope Pius IV., wherein the form of profession of Faith is given.† According then to the creed, Councils and Bulls of Rome, a whole Christ, body, soul, and God-head, is contained in, or rather composes the Wafer—the Wafer is Christ! And now what do the Faithful do with this made Christ? They take the Wafer—the Blood and Body of Jesus; they receive it into their mouths; they melt it on their tongues; they receive it into their stomach; they pass it through their bowels. Great God! that such blasphemous cannibalism should pollute the earth! Were the most degraded heathen of the darkest and most besotted portion of Africa guilty of such blasphemy and cannibalism as to make and eat millions of Gods, we would cry out Away with such a fellow from the earth. Yet when such things are practiced by the highly respectable and ancient Church of Rome, we run the risk of being called bigoted old Presbyterians, for even indicating our horror at such besotted superstition and cannibalism. It may be affirmed that Rome, by her own confession and according

* Can. Trent. Sess. xiii, p.63.

† Can. Trent. p. 227.

to her own creed, has eaten more human bodies, drank more human blood, and made and murdered more Gods, than all the fiendish cannibals who have infested the earth from the creation of Adam down to the present moment. In this fearful climax of cannibalism, the superstition, blasphemy, and idolatry of Rome culminate: Satan himself grows disgusted at his own favorite institute for ruining souls, blaspheming God, and filling his dark domain with the spirits of the damned; and is now venting his spleen and amusing his infernal malice by seeing into what mingled depths of pollution and iniquity, he can plunge those who are led captive by him at his will, and whom God has given over to blindness of mind, to work uncleanness with greediness, to believe lies that they may be damned.

6. *The Corruptions of Popery.* — Among all the organizations of men on earth — whether Jewish or Christian, Pagan or Protestant, Papal or Infidel — the Church of Rome may safely claim the bad preëminence of being the most filthy, the most polluted, the most corrupt. Vices, crimes, and corruptions have doubtless existed in the bosom of other organizations, but these have existed along with redeeming virtues: Popery may well challenge the world to point out what redeeming features relieve the dark and gloomy portrait she has painted for herself. It were impossible in the space allotted to a Review Article to enumerate even the heads of the corruption of Popery: the reader who wishes details is referred to "Gavin's History of Popery," "Edgar's Variations of Popery," "Ranke's History of the Popes," and the works of Peter Dens, Bellarmino, and Baronius. We will confine ourselves to some of the crimes, vices, and corruptions of the Roman Pontiffs, the successors of Peter, the Vicars of Jesus Christ; we will hold up to view the lives of those who have been pronounced infallible, whose Bulls, decrees, and examples, are sent down to all generations for the obedience and imitation of men. The historians of Rome herself shall tell us of the lives of these men, their crimes and corruptions. Genebrard, Du Pin, Baronius, Platina, shall give evidence. Fifty Popes from John VIII. to Leo IX., covering a period of 150 years, says Genebrard, entirely degenerated from the sanctity of their ancestors, and were Apostates rather than Apostles: "*Apostatici potius quam Apostolici.*"* Many

* Genes. 10,

shocking monsters, says Baronius, "intruded into the Pontifical chair, who were guilty of robbery, assassination, simony, dissipation, tyranny, sacrilege, perjury, and all kinds of miscreancy." "The Church," says Giannone, "was then in a shocking disorder, in a chaos of iniquity," "L'église étoit plongée dans un chaos d'impietés." Barclay tells us that "the Pontifical chair was polluted with the filthiest immoralities." We can give but a few specimens. John XII ascended the Papal throne in 955, at the age of 18: his youth was characterized by barbarity and pollution. He surpassed, says Platina, "all of his predecessors in debauchery, and his Holiness was found guilty by a Roman Synod, of blasphemy, perjury, profanation, impiety, sacrilege, adultery, constipation and murder:" this villain was deposed by a Roman Council, afterwards regained the Holy See, was caught in the act of adultery and murdered. Boniface VII. is called by Baronius, a thief, a miscreant, and a murderer. Gregory VII. was pronounced by Benno and the Council of Worms, guilty of sacrilege, adultery, perjury, and murder. Boniface VIII. to all other sins added the horrible one for which Sodom perished. Sixtus IV. was a drunkard and an assassin. Julius II. was a Sodomite. We might continue to quote from Papal authors this filthy citation of facts until the pages of many Reviews the size of this had been filled; but the task is too revolting. These men were the Popes Infallible, the Vicars of Jesus Christ, the Successors of Peter. How awful must have been the condition of the masses when this was the character of the Heads! We shudder with horror when we see such men as these claiming to be the Visible Head of the Church of the Holy Jesus; in vain are we asked to recognise any Body as part of Christ's Church, having such a Head as these Popes. We cannot speak of the horrid crimes and corruptions of the priesthood, of the nuns, monks, and orders of the Romish Hierarchy; nor can we even point to the degraded and polluted condition of the people in all lands where the religion of Rome is dominant. You will search the annals of the human race in vain for such a picture of filth, pollution, incest, adultery, murder, and villany, as is presented in the lives of the Priests, Confessors, Monks, and Popes of Rome. The *Mother of Harlots and Abominations of the Earth*, is the name given to Rome by the Holy

Ghost: and well and truly does this name indicate her pollutions and corruptions.

7. *The Murders of Popery.*—We regret that this topic, so fruitful for investigation, must be condensed into a few lines. The Woman that rode forth upon the Beast, was drunk with the blood of the saints. If all the blood of the saints shed by Rome in her blind and brutal fury, could be collected into one vast reservoir, the navies of Europe could ride upon it. Rome claims the right to murder all who will not submit to her commands. The Bull Unigenitus was issued by Clement XI., and signed at Rome Sept. 8, 1713; it can be found in the Dublin Edition of Dens' Theology in the original Latin: a correct translation of this Bull will be found in the "Spirit of the XIX Century," for 1842, page 481-90. In that Bull the following command is issued, viz:—"We moreover charge our venerable brethren, the Patriarchs, Archbishops, Bishops, and other Ordinaries, and moreover the *Inquisitors of Heretical Wickedness*, utterly to *coerce and compel*, by the above mentioned censures and penalties, and by the other remedies of law and deed, all who oppose or resist the aid of the *Secular Arm being invoked for this purpose, if it be necessary.* In the Bull "In Cena Domini," the following sentence occurs: "*Excommunicamus et anathematizamus ex parte Dei Omnipotentis Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sanctus, auctoritate quoque Beatorum Apostolorum Petri et Pauli, ac nostra quoscunq; Hussitas, Lutheranos, Calvinistas.*" * That is, Rome excommunicates and curses all Lutherans and Calvinists. This much for the right claimed by Rome to curse and murder all who will not submit to her commands. If you wish to know what she means by Coercion, by the Secular Arm, by the Anathema, and Excommunication, then go ask John Huss, whose bones she burnt, and whose ashes she sprinkled upon Lake Constance; go ask Wicklif whose bones she dug up and burnt, and whose ashes she sprinkled upon the Avon; go ask the 5,000 Parisians and 50,000 Huguenots murdered by her upon the fatal night of St. Bartholomew; go ask the 18,000 heretics butchered by Alva in the Netherlands in six weeks; go ask those 38 Spanish noblemen burnt by order of Philip II., at the stake; go ask the Lombards, the Waldenses, the Albigenses, whose goods were confis-

* Balt. Mag., 1836, p. 225.

cated, whose houses were burnt, whose children and wives were massacred; go ask the 1641 Irish Protestants butchered on the 23d of Oct., 1641; go ask the 2,300 plague-stricken citizens of Harlem, who were murdered by Alva; go ask the 300,000 French people butchered by Rome's Agent, Charles IX.; go ask the 4,000 inhabitants of Ireland who were killed in the year 1641; go into the dark dungeons of the Inquisitions of Popery, and ask those bones that lie around you; ask those instruments of torture that hang upon the walls;—go ask all these what Rome means by the Secular Arm, by Coercion, by Anathema, by Excommunication? They will tell you, in words that will make the hair of your head to stand, and the blood in your veins to tingle. Alas, alas! the heart grows sick at such harrowing recitals. The blood of the Saints still cries unto God from the earth. The Woman is drunk with Blood.

There are those who think that the Church of Rome is melting away, before the light and the heat of the Church of the Living God; that she will perish by the light of civilization, and the increase of knowledge; that already her power is on the decline, and soon she will pass away, and be numbered with the things that were. For ourselves we indulge no such pleasing illusions of hope. We have no confidence that the instrumentalities now at work will ever destroy this Mystery of Iniquity. The Man of Sin is revealed, and must continue until he is consumed by the Spirit of the Lord's mouth, and destroyed by the Epiphany of his Personal Coming. The Son of Perdition must abide, during and unto the end of the thousand and two hundred and three score days; he must exalt himself until the end of the forty and two months of the down-treading of the people of God are ended. The end of Popery will not be easy and gradual, but sudden and terrible; and if, as Paul teaches in Second Thessalonians, its end shall be accomplished by the Personal Coming of Christ, what a day of awful judgment it will be upon the Drunken Whore, the Apostate Church of God. The relation of this question to the Personal Coming of Christ is clear. We can hope for no "Universal Reign of Righteousness," until Popery is destroyed from the earth; and Paul says plainly: That the Popery is revealed and will continue until destroyed by the Brightness of His *παρουσία*;—Personal

Coming. If this be true, does it not settle the question that Christ's Coming will precede and inaugurate the Millennium, and not follow it? Can there be any Millennium until Popery is destroyed? Will Popery be destroyed until consumed by the Spirit of his mouth, and destroyed by his Bright Appearing?

How solemn and abiding the duty of the Church of God to contend for the faith delivered to the Saints; to expose in all their hideousness the limbs of this Drunken Harlot; to proclaim to the world that the errors of Popery ruin the soul for evermore!

How utterly worthless and vicious any theory of the Church, whether Prelatical or Presbyterial, that leads logically to the recognition of the Church of Rome as a true Church of Christ, the reception of her baptism and ordination as valid baptism and ordination!

How infinite the folly and guilt of those Protestants who aid in establishing the power of Popery by sending their children to Papal Schools!

P.

By Dr. Robert J. Buckenridge, D.D.

ART. IV.—*Our Country—Its Peril—Its Deliverance.*

- I. THE SPIRIT OF ANARCHY: Its Rise—Progress—Present State—Nature—Tendency.
- II. GROUNDS OF HOPE AND EFFORT: Statement of the Facts, Principles, and Considerations, on which the Preservation of the Union depends.
- III. NEGRO SLAVERY: As the Cause or Occasion of Sedition, Anarchy, and Revolution—Considered in the light of our Civil and Political Institutions,—of the Law of Nature,—and of the Word of God.
- IV. AMICABLE SETTLEMENT: Statement of the Case—Relation of the North and the South to the Rendition of Fugitive Slaves, and to Slavery in the Territories,—Rights and Duties of both Parties,—Amicable Settlement as Simple and Equitable, as it is Wise and Patriotic.
- V. THE DOCTRINE OF COERCION: Its Abuse—Nature—Relation to the actual State of Affairs—The Power, Duty, and Responsibility of the General Government.

I. 1. What we propose is, *first*, to make such a statement of the condition of affairs as may be of use to upright men, in enabling them to determine what ought to be attempted, and what can be accomplished, in the way of preventing the ruin of their country; and, *secondly*, to make clear to all men, the position of a vast party in this country, who desire and who deserve, in all possible events, to be understood by posterity—and who, even if their principles are now overborne and their counsels are now rejected, may, if they are faithful to themselves, retrieve from the wreck of their country, whatever survives when the period of exhaustion shall come upon its destructive madness.

2. There is no lesson which the universal course of human affairs teaches so thoroughly, as their own instability. And yet there is no lesson so hard for men to learn; no lesson so pregnant of results, and so little heeded. How faithful ought men to be when overtaken by defeat and adversity—if they would consider that defeat and adversity, with courage and wisdom, are a preparation for triumph? How just and forbearing ought men to be in the midst of power and prosperity, if they would consider

that power and prosperity, in the degree that they are corrupt, make the road to destruction broad and sure? And how immense, how unexpected, how effectual are the resources of God, in the accomplishment of what he ordains to be results of human conduct?

3. Look at the actual position of public affairs throughout this great nation—consider whither they are tending—consider whence that tendency has arisen—consider by what means it is propagating itself: and then reflect upon the unexpected and extraordinary means by which ruin is overtaking every interest and hope of the country—and upon the absolute completeness of the ruin, when these means shall have worked their full effect. “In a state of security apparently perfect, and of prosperity apparently complete—a small and fierce party, scattered through some of the Northern States, commenced a systematic and persistent agitation connected with the Black Race on this continent; and in the heart of their system lay this idea, that laws and institutions and rights and duties and interests of every description, ought to give way, if there was need of it, to the accomplishment of their designs. In the progress of time and events, and the ruin of political parties, this fundamental idea—which is the essence of lawlessness and anarchy—attaches itself in the public mind of some of the Northern States, to that particular aspect of the question of the Black Race which relates to the obligation, under the Federal Constitution, of delivering fugitive slaves; and laws of various kinds are passed, throwing the weight of State authority against the obligation of the very highest national law. And so the idea and process of disintegration, as the tendency to lawlessness and anarchy strengthens, has thus risen from the condition of a fanaticism, to the dignity of a principle recognized by States and asserted in laws. As if to warn men of the breadth of the ruin involved in this tendency, and to mark the extremity of the peril arising from its connection with the question of the Black Race, one of the slave States had already, under a similar, but directly opposite tendency, formally asserted its right, not only to obstruct the execution of the laws of the United States, but to nullify them absolutely, and upon its own sole and sovereign discretion; so that the spirit of lawlessness and anarchy, in its

absolute and universal tendency to disintegrate all things—moved, though not first, yet more rapidly and by more decisive acts, at the South than at the North.

4. Once more in the progress of time and events, and the ruin of political parties—the whole nation finds itself arrayed, in the last Presidential election, into two opposite parties, (of which the defeated one is mad enough to sub-divide itself into three); and this same question of the Black Race, both in the aspect of the rendition of fugitive slaves, and in the aspect of slavery in the Territories—and these same questions of supreme law and of lawlessness as connected therewith—mounting to the highest national importance, and apparently swallowing up all other questions, are resolved, so far as that election could resolve them. But the solution is every way remarkable. For while Mr. Lincoln is elected President—the majority of the nation is so decidedly against him, that he would have been beaten if the power of Congress to create uniform electoral districts had ever been exercised; nay, would have been beaten under the existing system, if all opposed to him had been allowed by the corruption or folly of parties to unite on one opponent. Moreover the solution is further remarkable, in this, that both Houses of Congress, and, as is alleged, the Supreme Court of the United States, held his most dangerous opinions to be unconstitutional: and it is still further remarkable in this, that Mr. Lincoln himself, while representing the Northern section of the anarchical tendency of the times, is known to repudiate the original principle of that faction concerning the rendition of fugitive slaves,—and is by universal consent, even of his candid opponents, an able, honest, and patriotic man. At the end of thirty years of working of the spirit we have been tracing, a decisive event had thus put the country in a posture where it would clearly appear whether the hereditary law-abiding spirit of our race remained, the great prop and safeguard of all our institutions; or whether the spirit of anarchy, already so signally manifested at both extremities of the nation, had so far poisoned the national life of our race at its fountain, that the time had come for one of those great explosions of human passion which fill so many melancholy pages in the history of our race.

5. It is not easy to conjecture, and it is impossible to say with

certainty, what would have occurred if the late presidential election had terminated differently from what it did, — in any one of the various ways in which a different termination was possible. This far we may now speak with certainty, that in some form or other, the spirit of turbulent fanaticism which had pervaded the States of the extreme North so long and so deeply, would not without a miracle, such as history does not record, have been allayed or composed under any defeat that was possible, in the state of national parties as they are now known to have existed at that time. For there was this fatal element, long concealed — not generally believed — but openly avowed since the secession of South Carolina — that secession, as the final and deliberate choice of the extreme South, was the point to which political opinion had been long and carefully trained, and political parties long and singly directed. This fatal training, added to the widely diffused spirit of anarchy, smarting under a defeat equally signal and unnecessary, and stimulated by considerations of the very highest importance connected with the question of the Black Race in every aspect of that question — produced the apparently sudden revolution which has already, when these pages are written, led the six cotton States (South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia and Louisiana) to pass separate acts of secession from the United States of America. Here then is the consummation of this spirit of lawlessness and anarchy, working as we have already said it universally works, unto the disintegration — the morcelment of all things; — the consummation of it, so far as to embrace all the States producing cotton, sugar, and rice, as their great staples. What is next to be determined is, the fate of the mixed slave States — those divided between farming and planting, (North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Texas): and then the fate of the border slave States, (Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri): and then, we may confidently add, the fate of the nation. Whatever, in the meantime, it is of the last importance to bear in mind, shall be the conduct of the whole of the free States, and especially of the border free States (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa), may be decisive alike of their own fate, and of that of all the rest, and of the nation itself for many generations.

6. Is it possible for any thoughtful person to suppose, that this spirit of reckless disregard of all existing institutions, has already accomplished all the results of which it is capable? What shall prevent it from swallowing up all the remaining slave States? What shall, after that is accomplished, prevent a counter-revolution in every one of those slave States? What shall prevent its taking some new direction with still more vehement force, throughout the whole North? What shall prevent a counter-revolution in every Northern State? And who can venture to hope, that a spirit which everywhere tramples under foot those institutions which everywhere have been esteemed most sacred, and everywhere despises the most venerable and the most cherished traditions of our country and our race; will finally slake its thirst in any thing but human blood, or fail to assuage its insatiable rapacity by universal plunder? Cannot even the blind see, that when laws are violated in the name of morality and order, and constitutions are set at nought in the name of liberty and security, and revolutions are accomplished by terror and conducted under the guidance of irresistible fanaticism; that there can be no result to such a career, as long as it has way, but the destruction of everything that human governments are instituted to protect; and that at every step of the career, the overthrow of every salutary power and the disintegration of every healthful force of society, more and more confirms the existence and the reign of universal anarchy? It is as if God should destroy every principle of cohesion in the physical universe, and leave every separate force in it working to the destruction of all things. It is as if he should destroy every idea of subjection in the moral universe, and leave the passions of men to work out all the horrors of an infinite disorder. It is as the steady working of omnipotent force, unto the production of universal helplessness. It is, when it shall pervade the earth, the realization of the conjectures of those who expound the divine predictions concerning the condition in which *The Son of Man* will find all nations at his second coming — the universal reign of lawlessness after the universal disintegration of every element capable of restraining it. What we say is — not that these results are inevitable: God forbid! But we do say they are natural — they are imminent — they are far more

to be apprehended, than what has already occurred, both in the North and in the South, was to be apprehended thirty years ago. And we may say these things with a greater confidence of an insight of the terrible future, and a more eager beseeching of our generation to beware; since during more than thirty years we have not ceased to lift up an unheeded testimony, both against the principles and the proceedings, both at the North and at the South—whose frightful results the country is now beginning to realize.

II. 1. Let us now seek, amidst this chaos, for some ground of hope and effort. Throughout the eighteen free States, society is supposed to be under the control of the Republican party. As indicated by the presidential election in November last, it may be conceded that the majority in all those States, did at that time, believe the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency, to be the best of the alternatives then offered to their choice; and it may be further conceded, though it is not strictly accurate, that, at present, the local political and military power, in all those States, is in the hands of the Republican party. But it is also true that a minority in those States, numerically almost as large as the entire voting population of the fifteen slave States, voted against Mr. Lincoln—and are thoroughly opposed to the distinctive principles of the Republican party. It is also undeniable that a very large number of those who voted for Mr. Lincoln, are far more Whigs or Americans than they are Republicans:—and it is equally certain that a very large number of the Republican party itself, strictly speaking, are patriotic men, who, while they preferred the success of their party to the success of any other party, prefer the peace, the prosperity, and the security of their country above anything that could be obtained by the triumph of their party. If any political result in the future, therefore, can be considered certain, it is certain, that a revolution in opinion, more or less decided, will manifest itself throughout the free States, whenever the issue is clearly put to them between their country and any political party. And it is equally certain, that whatever party shall hurry those States, by whatever means, into the horrors of civil war, and the anguish of that impending anarchy of which we have spoken; will perish by a counter-revolu-

tion, just as apt to be bloody there as in any other portion of the nation.

2. In the position of all the slave States there are peculiar circumstances much overlooked, both amongst themselves and others; but nevertheless decisive in the long run. No force, however small, but will accomplish its end, if sufficient time be allowed: even that which is infinitely minute, if it operates through an infinite period. The six cotton States appear to us to have taken their course in such a temper, with such purposes, upon such principles, and under such foregone conclusions, that they neither desire to return to their former position, nor would at present agree to anything that they believe would accomplish that result. It is, of course, possible that we are mistaken in this painful conclusion, and we should heartily rejoice to know that we are: but, seeing no ground on which we can doubt that the case stands thus, neither do we see any on which we can avoid stating our belief. It would be gross injustice to many thousands of patriotic men in all the cotton States, to suppose that either of those States would have been allowed to take the course it has pursued, without a desperate political struggle in its own bosom; if the circumstances of these men, in each of those States, had appeared to them to allow of resistance to the organized force which swept society away. There are 'also thousands of persons in all those States, who even now consider it a slander and a reproach, that ulterior designs are ascribed to those who direct this secession movement, which it seems apparent to all mankind, except themselves, are not only certain to be realized if the movement is permanently sustained, but which were amongst the earliest and most powerful causes of the long cherished desire to be relieved from the real restraints of the Federal Government, and the imaginary perils and injuries of the Federal Union. In the actual condition of the States which have already seceded, as we understand that condition and the manner in which it has been brought about, we deem it perfectly obvious that a counter-revolution must manifest itself in every one of them — equally as decided, and perhaps more violent, than the revolution which has already occurred. That counter-revolution may be in a direction more and more fatal — bringing into uncontrolled power, parties wholly unfit and

unworthy to possess it. It may be in a direction eminently favorable to the security and prosperity of those cotton States, and terminating in their restoration to the Union, under the lead of a party whose elements now lie scattered, or even as yet totally undeveloped. But the present revolution, in its very nature, its causes, and its designs — must go deeper, in one direction or the other. In *which* direction, depends in our opinion, in the first instance, in a great degree, upon these contingencies: 1. The conduct of the present ruling faction in those States; its forbearance on the one hand, or its violence on the other: 2. The conduct of the Federal Government towards those States; as it may be firm and yet temperate, or as it may be vacillating and timid: 3. The conduct of the slave States continuing in the Union; as they may share the madness of the six seceding States, or as they may arrest the pestilence at the cotton line, and by their wisdom and courage restore the Union: 4. The conduct of the free States, and especially those along the slave border; as they shall obstinately persist in fomenting opinions and performing acts touching the whole question of the Black Race, which they can now clearly see must involve the country in one common ruin, or as they, by a common consent, or by a counter-revolution in their own bosom, restore public opinion to a condition under which slave States may safely live in peace with them. Under such circumstances it is easy to see, how great and difficult is the task laid on true statesmen, everywhere, and how immense and how dubious are the issues submitted to them.

3. The remaining nine slave States, of which five are border States, and four are mixed slave States, have in each of these classes peculiarities as marked as those which distinguish the cotton States; yet as the whole nine occupy a similar position at the present moment, with regard to the revolution which has swept over the cotton States; they may, for the sake of brevity, be thrown together in developing the great ideas we are endeavoring to disclose. What the exact issue will be in these nine States — or whether it will be similar in them all — or in which direction the prevailing opinion will settle, if different courses are taken — are questions which it is impossible to determine at this time. But it is very obvious, that if the whole nine — or even the greater

part of them, embracing the leading and powerful States, refuse to unite in the movement taken by the six cotton States, that movement must necessarily prove a failure, both as to its avowed, and as to any concealed object; a counter-revolution in the cotton States becomes presently inevitable; and those cotton States must ultimately accommodate themselves to the policy, whatever it may be, adopted by the other and leading States, instead of being able to force those far more powerful than themselves, to follow blindly and servilely a course disapproved by them, and which rests for its ultimate reason, upon nothing better than the sudden caprice of South Carolina, or her chronic hatred of the National Union. There are immense considerations, altogether independent of the real merits of the great cause which is under trial — why the course dictated by South Carolina, and adopted by the other cotton States, should be steadfastly rejected. Amongst these are such as follow: 1. This method by secession annihilates the very idea of all force in permanent constitutional union, or common government over sovereign States, and establishes as inherent in all possible future unions, the idea of anarchy, and deprives liberty forever of the possibility of being either stable or strong: 2. The method of secession, by *separate* State action, is founded on illusions utterly fatal and absurd, that the American people are not a *nation* — the Federal Constitution not a government — the American people not bound to be loyal except to local authorities, which being assumed, condemns this continent to be the everlasting habitation of every thing feeble, factious, and extravagant: 3. The adoption of ordinances of secession, by conventions called by ordinary Legislatures — without allowing the people to determine by a previous sovereign act whether or not the convention shall exist, and by a subsequent sovereign act whether or not its proceedings shall have force — destroys the very idea of the sovereignty of the people, makes constitutional liberty and security impossible, and invites factions, in proportion as they are corrupt or incompetent, to usurp and to abuse sovereign power: 4. The utter refusal to consult with States, all of which were united by the highest human obligations — and many of which were involved in perils the very same in kind and higher in degree — is a line of conduct reckless in itself, insulting to all

others, apparently adopted with the purpose of rendering all peaceful, considerate, or even decorous arrangements impossible, and necessarily jeopard, in the result reached, the profitable continuance of slavery, if not its very existence, in the greater part of the slave States, and amongst them the most powerful, the most loyal, and the most enlightened of them all. At the present moment two most important truths are perfectly distinct. The *first* is, that the action hitherto taken in the States whose position we are now considering,—no matter what that action may lead to—involves a fundamental dissent from the conduct pursued by the six seceding States—and contemplates redress in a different way, and upon opposite principles. The *second* is, that a very great portion of each of these nine States, probably the majority of the people in most of them—possibly in all of them,—are warmly attached to the Union,—are resolutely determined to maintain their loyalty to the nation as their nation, at the same time that they maintain their loyalty to the particular States of which they are citizens, and are far more inclined to compose existing difficulties, than to drive matters to extremity in any direction.

4. These facts and considerations, taken in detail and taken all together, are worthy of the very highest consideration;—and whatever the issue of events may be, they reveal to the people and to those they trust, the grounds on which, and the manner in which, the country may be saved: and they disclose to posterity the pregnant and enduring truth, that at the utmost peril of the country the *people* would have saved it, if they had been bravely and wisely led. For under fair and true statesmanship, the chances are more than equal, in the *first* place, to rally the immense masses of the nine slave States whose people are now pondering their course, to such an action as will make their position secure in the Union, and satisfy them: in the *second* place, to secure such a treatment of the subject of secession by the Federal Administration, as will at once give efficacy to the laws, and avoid armed collision, except in repelling force by force: in the *third* place, to seek and to rely upon, such a reaction among the masses of the people in the free States, as will, by a common consent, or if it becomes necessary, by hurling from power those who stand

in the way, make manifest the determination of those masses to put an end to the reign of that atheistical and relentless fanaticism, which is the original cause of the ruin that stares us all in the face: and in the *fourth* place, to expect and await with confidence, the inevitable counter-revolution in the States which have already seceded, which will disabuse the minds of men of the delusion that the revolution there has been, as to the popular masses, either spontaneous or cordial, and restore those States to their true position in the confederacy. It is in this manner that results, equally indispensable and glorious, are attainable, — results capable also, no doubt, of being defeated; and that in ways far too various to be traced here. But when defeated, let us never forget that they who defeat them will share in full measure with us, all present evils, and will bear alone the execrations of posterity. And when defeated, what will remain for this generation, will be to realize the calamities of that frightful condition we have traced in the commencement of this paper; — or, as we have attempted to show on a former occasion, to construct even upon the line between the free and the slave States, a new and central power — competent at once to preserve all our institutions, to develop our national progress, and to direct the destinies of this continent.

5. Besides the special considerations which we have developed, as particularly relevant to the condition of our country, and the manner in which her destiny may be retrieved: there are many other considerations of a more general kind, and of the highest force, all pointing in the same direction, which it behooves every man to ponder deeply, before he despairs of his country, and before he lays his hands rudely on our existing institutions, in the vain hope of something better. Of these, there are two so præminent, that we ought to direct special attention to them. The *first* relates to that view of the subject which discloses the indestructible power of life in such a nation as this, and the length and depth and breadth of the agony which it can endure, and yet live. They who know the past of human affairs, and they who reflect on that eternal logic which is of the essence of things and events, know that a nation like this *cannot die*. It is hardly possible to conceive how it can *even be murdered*; but *die*

it cannot. It would be as easy to conceive that France could be blotted from the map of Europe as one of its greatest nations, and restored to the condition it occupied before its conquest by Cæsar; as to conceive of the American nation being annihilated, its sublime career cut short, its boundless possessions parcelled out, and an ignominious retinue of numberless aristocracies, democracies, dukedoms, and principalities, permanently filling its seat of empire and of glory. After eighteen centuries of anguish, Italy, hailed by the acclamations of mankind, is purging herself in a baptism of blood from the very condition which men are preparing for us; and the consuming instinct of her restored life is for that very *national unity* which we are expected to sacrifice, and in default of which she has suffered every form of evil, in every stage of civilization, under every kind of government. What have they to offer us, in exchange for our national unity, but sorrow without an object—and degradation without a limit—accompanied with struggles and suffering for its recovery, renewed, and suppressed in blood, and renewed for evermore—until in some distant age, perhaps, it shall be restored amidst the rejoicings of all peoples! This blind and fierce spirit of anarchy which has fastened upon the extremities of the nation, and is threatening to eat into its heart, has no aspect more startling, than its frightful antagonism to the absolute tendency and the total civilization of the age, in which it has made itself manifest. The *second* of the two great considerations alluded to, relates to the dominion and purpose of God over and concerning our country. The revolting disregard which this whole movement towards destruction exhibits towards God's dealings with our country, the shocking conceptions it proclaims of our mission as a people, compared with the conception of that mission as indicated by God himself, present almost the saddest aspect of the case. Nor is it the least remarkable feature of the lawless spirit which underlies the entire revolution, that while in both extremities of the nation it fastens upon the same idea—the slavery of the African race—as the controlling idea of God in all his purposes concerning us; it should give that idea its utmost destructiveness to us, and its utmost offensiveness to God, by making it work in directions precisely opposite. Is it conceivable that God should teach his

children at the North, that his highest purpose concerning the American people is, that they should extinguish African slavery; and at the same moment teach his children at the South, that his highest purpose concerning the American people is, that they should perpetuate African slavery? Rather is it not utterly inconceivable, that he should have taught any of them that his purposes concerning African slavery, or the African race, in any way whatever contain his chief purposes concerning the white race on this continent? A more melancholy instance can scarcely be produced in all history, of the destructive extent to which religious opinion can be made to take the prevailing hue of a fierce enthusiasm, or an intolerant fanaticism, which reigns around it. It is not in this manner, on the one side or the other, that the tens of thousands of God's children, scattered over this great empire like salt which has *not* lost its savour, interpret the teachings of his word, the indications of his providence, or the tokens of his infinite mercy towards us. It is not in any such sense of the mission of our country, or our race, that the people everywhere, have so lately come before God, in a great service of national humiliation, confessing their sins, and praying for his gracious interposition in this time of sore need. Who is authorized to say, that God has not heard the cry of his people? Who will dare to say, that God is not able to save? In the utmost extremity of Israel, God said to them by Moses, Fear ye not, stand still, and see the salvation of God, which he will shew to you to-day.

III. 1. At present, and during a long course of preceding years, it has been the very general impression that Negro slavery was the *direct*, if not the *single* difficulty, in all the commotions of which we have been speaking. As far as these commotions have had a moral and religious element, and have manifested themselves in the bosom of the different Christian denominations, this wide-spread impression has probably been true. But in other respects the connection of Negro slavery with these commotions, throughout, has been *indirect*; and its moral and religious aspect has had little significance, except as the abolition movement has been *free-thinking* in religion, and as political and sectional parties have coerced religious opinion in particular directions, for party and sectional purposes. The nullification movement many years

ago, in South Carolina, related to slavery only in the most indirect way — and in no connection with any moral or religious question. It was a question of revenue, taxation, commerce, tariffs, wealth : a false theory of political economy enraged by the peculiar condition of labor. More recently, the commotion about slavery in the Territories, has been a struggle for political power, aggravated on the side of the North by the urgency of its numerous emigrant population for cheap homes in fertile regions. And at the present moment, the States which have seceded, are of all the slave States the very ones which would not have seceded, and the slave States which are most anxious to preserve the Union are the very ones which would have promptly seceded, if the current impression of the case was true and complete. If at any time within the last thirty years, a revolution in production, in trade, in commerce, in any thing, had wrought a thorough change in the general opinion of the South, touching — not the essential nature — but the incidental advantages of slavery in a political and a financial point of view ; of course, no one would ever have heard of secession in the South — or even seen the remotest approach to the existing state of opinion at the North. It is the idea of power — power to be diminished by remaining in the Union and to be incalculably augmented by leaving it ; the idea of wealth, of conquest, of advancement — all of them, we are thoroughly convinced, in the highest degree illusive and fatal ; but it is these ideas — far more than any disgust that the North condemns slavery as immoral, or any apprehension that slavery will be disturbed, or slaves stolen, or the South annoyed in the Union — that pervades the present dominant party in the cotton States, and enabled it to precipitate them into revolution. How far this aspect of the case aggravates or alleviates the difficulty of dealing with it, in any hope of such an issue as we consider fortunate, must depend on many considerations which can not be discussed here. In any event, it seems clear that they who would heal a malady must understand its exact nature. And if it is never healed, they who eagerly desire that it should be, owe to themselves and to posterity a fair and complete statement of the case, and of the remedy they propose for it.

2. Human servitude, considered in its widest sense, and of

which hereditary slavery as it exists in our slave States is the extreme form — may be discussed in the light of Divine Revelation — or in the light of the Law of Nature — or in the light of the political and municipal institutions of the countries where it exists. Considered in this last aspect — there ought to be no dispute concerning it, and there can be none fairly, in this country, except in a single point of view — namely, its existence in the national territory, which we will speak of separately. For, undeniably, each State has the complete and exclusive right, to determine concerning it as a strictly domestic institution; and, undeniably, neither any other State, nor the government which is common to all the States, has any power to interfere with it, or concerning it, in any State. And this is not only matter of constitutional obligation on one side, and uncontrolled right on the other; but the plainest dictates of prudence, and the clearest obligations of morality, impose upon the States, and the general government, the duty of a simple, sincere, and faithful observance of all that is implied, as well as all that is expressed, in these restrictions. Massachusetts has no right, of any kind, to assail slavery in South Carolina, — nor has South Carolina any right of any sort to encourage the introduction of slavery into Massachusetts: and any attempt on the part of the General Government, directly or indirectly, to favour any such endeavour on the part of either of them, is a foolish and wicked perversion of its own nature. Nor is there any plea that can be offered, either by the General Government, or by any State, for departing from this clear line of mutual duty, which is not immoral in itself, and revolutionary in its tendency. Moreover the prompt and cordial performance by all parties, towards each other, of all the mutual duties binding upon them under the Federal Constitution touching every subject, and amongst the rest the subject of slavery, and amongst the duties connected with slavery the rendition of fugitive slaves, of which we will speak separately; besides being every way binding before God and man, is the sure, the wise, and the peaceful way to promote all the interests of all the parties, and to secure the lasting glory and prosperity of the country.

3. When we undertake to determine this, or indeed any question, under what we call the Law of Nature, we encounter the

most serious difficulties at every step. What we shall say, therefore, on this topic, must be in subordination to what has just been said under the aspect of our civil and political obligations, and what we shall say presently under the aspect of revealed truth and duty. Besides the statement of the Law of Nature, recorded and reiterated in the Word of God, of which we do not speak at present, there are other — perhaps numerous, but certainly indistinct, and perhaps contradictory utterances of that great and permanent law. At the head of these utterances we may place that which the human reason discloses: next to that, perhaps, the common impulses of the human soul: then, perhaps, the current opinions and beliefs of the human race: and then, which in some respects ought to be held most valid of all — the common and apparently inevitable, if not voluntary state of our race in all ages — as the best concrete expression of its reason, its impulses, and its current belief — and therefore of the Law of its Nature in its present state. If we will reflect carefully on each of these utterances of the Law of Nature touching this vast topic of human servitude, we will perceive how narrow is the foothold they afford to support us in disloyalty towards the civil and political institutions of our country, much less to sustain us in rejecting the revealed will of God. (1.) The *human reason* teaches with clearness, that if there can be such a thing, or such an idea, as *property*, the highest form of it — nay, the very basis of it — is the right which every one has to himself: and just as clearly, that the claim of property by the Law of Nature, on the part of one person in another person, is founded in the rejection of the very foundation of the idea of property, since my right to have another rests on my previous right to myself. On the other hand, human reason teaches us that property in ourself is as capable of being forfeited, limited, or alienated, as any other property. For example, the right of existence is higher than our property in ourself; and it is as absurd to say that I may not part absolutely with the latter, in order to secure the former, as it is to say I may not limit my property in myself, in order to make my existence more endurable, or even more comfortable. And the very nature of human society is such, that the liberty, as well as the life and property of every one, passes by the fact of the existence of

society, from its absolute personal form, into a modified form determinable only by the aggregate will—which will *ought* to be determined by the will of God. But as the human race is in rebellion against God—human reason lands the problem very nearly in a paradox. (2.) If we appeal next for guidance to the *common impulses of the human soul*, in order to have this great question of human servitude interpreted, we obtain a response equally vague, but far more vehement than before. Surely it is, and it has always been, the desire of every human being to be free from restraint—the passionate desire of our race to possess what each member of it, in his particular condition, meant by liberty. And the aggregate impulse of the race in that direction, is more powerful and is better regulated to-day than it ever was before,—and the hope of true, and stable, and universal freedom, as the final inheritance of all mankind, may be more rationally cherished, than at any former period. But the wisest men and the freest people know the best—that this personal desire of freedom from restraint is no evidence whatever that restraint is wrong; and that this universal impulse towards what they mean by liberty, totally fails—of itself—in proving that they who cherish it would do aught but mischief, if God were to gratify all their desires. It is one of the most sorrowful aspects of human nature—this consuming impulse towards liberty and equality—this lasting desire of the good and the wise that it might be gratified—this total impossibility of its gratification, except under special conditions of advancement, reached as yet by comparatively small portions of our race. (3.) And now if we turn to the *common opinion and belief of the human race*, as the true expositor of that law of their nature under the light of which the institutions of the most civilized states are to be abolished and the inspired teachings of God are to be silenced; we may take one firm step, and then all is chaos, which thickens as we advance. Assuredly there is a sense of good and of true—and therefore of right and just—universal in our race; and a sense, moreover, that these things apply to, and ought to regulate, all the conditions and relations of man—servitude in all its forms amongst the rest. If there was ever an opinion and belief common to our race, that servitude in its widest sense was contrary to the nature of man; then the

race had before it always, in the actual condition of the larger part of it, the clearest proof that the belief was absurd. If there had ever been such a common belief strong enough to form the basis of practical life; then half the race would have immediately perished from want — or universal rapine would have become its habitual condition. The belief has, no doubt, been common to our race in all time, that every one ought to enjoy all the gifts of God, and amongst the rest the inestimable one of personal freedom, so far as was compatible with the circumstances in which God's providence had placed each person — that is, so far as was compatible with the will of the Giver of all good, thus made known to every person. And this belief is true and just. But what is established by it is, that according to the Law of Nature as explained by the spontaneous belief of mankind, servitude in every form may, though of itself indifferent, become right or wrong, good or bad, according to the circumstances of each particular case. And beyond this unquestionable truth — he who will enquire will get no intelligible response. (4.) The last of the four utterances of the Law of Nature which we have specified, is *the actual execution of the law*, as that is exhibited to us in the common state of the human race, in all ages, and in every stage of civilization. Here there is no possibility of mistake. The testimony is as unanimous, as it is frightful and universal. The different races, the different nations, the different tribes, the different families, the different individuals — all, every where, have felt themselves to be naturally impelled to reduce each other into a condition of subjection — and have felt themselves to be naturally permitted, upon a change of fortune, to submit to a state of subjection. Nor is it possible to doubt that the natural and universal conduct of mankind, as clearly proves that men are as thoroughly convinced they ought to be masters, as their conduct could possibly prove they were convinced that they ought not to be slaves. Those conditions of mankind which are alledged to resemble most nearly the condition claimed to be natural to man, are the very conditions in which servitude, in some form or other, is the most spontaneous and complete; and it is in conditions of advanced civilization that the extreme forms of servitude gradually expire — unless some peculiar element in the

state of society opposes an insuperable barrier to its extinction. It takes nothing from this boundless testimony, to assert that the dreary conclusion it establishes is contrary to the reason, the impulses, and the beliefs of mankind: for if the assertion were true, it only shows that mankind cannot be, what mankind asserts, desires, and believes it should be. And the more desolate the conviction thus begotten may be, the more are we compelled to look — for the mitigation of human servitude — not to revolution based on our notions of the Law of Nature, but to the wise and temperate amelioration of existing institutions, under the influence of the love of God. And the more all other rules of judgment and conduct fail us, the more ought we to feel obliged to submit ourselves to the guidance of God, in matters which concern us so nearly as these now do. What remains, therefore, is to consider the question of human servitude in the light of divine revelation.

4. It is in the Word of God that this great problem is completely solved. Human servitude, in all its forms, is one of the badges of the fallen condition of the human race; and every incident of it, that aggravates any particular form of it, or that augments the severity of all the forms of it from the very lightest to the very heaviest, is a separate proof that our natural condition is one of sin and misery. And whatever revolt there may be in human nature against any form of servitude, is a kind of testimony to the original freedom in which man was created in the image of God, and to the remaining susceptibility of his depraved nature to be restored; while the utter inability of the race to escape this part of its deplorable condition, shows how deeply the grounds and reasons of that condition are laid in its nature. A fallen race, lying under the wrath of God and the condemnation of his holy law — but having his promise of deliverance even in this life and of immortal blessedness in a better life to come — is making its way, in this condition of probation, through the ages and across the earth. The accumulated experience of the entire existence of the race, and the uniform course of divine providence, and the explicit declarations of God's Word, show us in the clearest manner, that the career of such a race, in such a state, and yet under such a probation, must necessarily exhibit

much that is, so to speak, unavoidably *incident* to such a case, in some respects alleviating, and in some respects aggravating its ordinary, average condition. War is inevitable; sometimes in its result glorious and blessed, sometimes frightful in all its issues; but war, so far from being of itself, and to all who engage in it either just or sinful, is often atrocious, and often amongst the highest duties of mankind. Sickness is the product of God's just sentence of death upon our sinful race, and is of itself a temporal evil covering the whole earth; yet it is often made an unspeakable blessing, and no one ventures to say is of itself sinful. Sorrow and affliction are brought on us in innumerable forms, and from every quarter, and often by means of our truest, and noblest, and wisest impulses;—in every instance they are incidents of sin, direct or remote, but perhaps not in one instance of a million of the sin of him who suffers. Poverty, and its consequent, suffering, is of itself one of the direst and most universal calamities of mankind; and yet it is the parent of many of our highest virtues and attainments—and so far from being sinful of itself, is the subject of many of the most tender and urgent provisions both of the law of God and the Gospel of Christ. It is to this great class of *incidents* of the actual condition of our race, that human servitude in all its forms belongs. Existing, like all we have named, and multitudes besides, because our condition is just what it is—a condition of sin and misery in a state of probation; wrought out inevitably, in some form or other, in the bosom of such a condition; modified indefinitely, by every circumstance that affects any considerable portion of the race; but utterly incapable of being permanently and universally abolished, while our race continues in a state of sin and misery, attended with probation. It seems to us as absurd to call the relation of master and servant (in any form of servitude) sinful of itself, or to expect the relation to cease upon earth; as it is to call the relation between a sick man and a well one, an afflicted man and a happy man, a rich man and a poor one, sinful of itself, or expect either of them to come to an end. And this, it seems to us, is the simple, the rational, and the scriptural account of human servitude in all its possible aspects, and in its essential nature in the sight of God.

5. If we acknowledge the sacred Scriptures to be the divine

rule of our faith and our practice, there ought to be an end to all extreme opinions, and all violent proceedings, on this entire subject. From the days of Abraham, to the death of the last inspired Apostle, there is one uniform doctrine, one uniform practice, one unchanging aspect of the whole matter — presented by God for the guidance of mankind. Throughout the total revelation which God has made to man — throughout the immense period embracing the dispensations of Abraham, of Moses, and of Christ, — human servitude, Abrahamic, Jewish, Christian, and heathen — and the heathen aspect of it, such as was presented in every nation of antiquity, Asiatic, African and European, down to and after the period of universal dominion by the Romans; we have this immense subject exhibited to us, in all its possible bearings, by God himself. Never, in a single instance, is it represented to us as a thing good in itself: never, in a single instance, as a thing sinful in itself: always as a thing actually existing, always to be expected, allowed by God, considered and treated in his law, regulated by his providence, wholly indifferent as concerning his grace, and to enter into our final account to him, both as we may be masters and as we may be servants, in the light of our faithful discharge or our wicked neglect of our duties to each other in that relation. As masters, the measure of our authority is the measure of our guilt, if we neglect the duties binding on us, or abuse the power we possess: so that the slavery which exists amongst us, carries this responsibility to a height which, to all thoughtful Christian persons, gives the institution one of its heaviest burdens. To consider the relation, on the side of the master, one merely of profit to himself, is to forfeit at once every justification for its continuance; while, on the other hand, to rob the relation wholly of that aspect, can be founded only on the notion that all servitude is sinful, or else on some fanatical idea of justice or charity, which if rendered practical would put an end to society, by putting an end to all motive for any one to obtain any sort of service from another. That every form of servitude ought to be ameliorated continually, even if we are sure it can never be abolished, is as clear as that poverty should be alleviated though we know it can never be prevented, or that sickness should be relieved, though it is certain it will recur forever. Clear as may be the

justification of every form of servitude so far as the mere question of *sin* is concerned — and perfect as may be the right to persist in the extreme form of it, so far as the civil power is concerned — there are a thousand considerations, personal and public, moral and political, which may so bear upon individuals and communities, as to make it their clear duty, under given circumstances, to put an end to the hereditary slavery which exists amongst us, or under given circumstances to make it improper to attempt it, or impossible to accomplish it. It is absurd, therefore, if not monstrous, to contend that vast regions of our country are morally bound to the last extremity and as their chief duty, to labour for the more secure establishment and the more effectual perpetuation of negro slavery; and equally so to array public opinion, and to direct political parties, in other vast portions of the country, to the repression or the destruction of it, on any pretext at all, much less any connected with its moral nature. We have already shown that a faithful observance of our constitutional obligations would put an end to all such opinions and practices; and that there is no justification for any of the principles on which they rest, or the proceedings to which they lead, to be found in natural law. And now it seems clear, that the only infallible rule of conduct, God's blessed Word, condemns in the most positive manner, all the pretexts concerning negro slavery, whether at the North or the South, upon which the public mind has been lashed into madness. Slavery is an institution, which revolutions neither perpetuate nor abolish, except under conditions wholly accidental. And if the anarchical spirit, whose seditious career we have traced, finally triumphs and this nation is destroyed — the real problem to be afterwards worked out will be, the ultimate dominion of the White race, or of a mixed race essentially African, over the cotton region of this continent. Is the inaugurating of that problem, worth the ruin of this great nation?

IV. 1. In attempting to develop the topic which remains, we are fully aware of the difficulties of the task. Both at the North and at the South, there are great parties thoroughly organized and acting in precisely opposite directions as to opinion, but one direction as effective as the other toward the common object of their labors — namely, the tearing of the nation to pieces. They

who agree in nothing else, agree in the common desire for that result, which involves our national ruin. In the meantime, the immense popular masses at the North which have only partially coöperated with the organized party bent on destruction, or have fallen into minorities openly resisting that party — are neither organized in fact, nor of one accord amongst themselves, except upon the single point, that they are suddenly awakened to the extreme peril of the situation, and are rapidly settling into a resolute purpose to avert the danger, if it is still possible. In the whole South, the condition of affairs is similar, but more perilous. The disruption of the Democratic party at Charleston and at Baltimore, is susceptible of but three possible interpretations: it was an act of mere passion — or it was an act of deep intention, designed to produce exactly what has followed — or it was an act looking to the reconstruction of that party and to new endeavors for its permanent triumph as a national party. Recent events tend to show, that the disruption was made in the fixed sense of the second of these three possible interpretations; or at any rate, in the contemplation, and perfect preparation of many leading men to take that alternative, even if they are not chargeable with having intentionally procured it. What occurred was, that the cotton growing South suddenly awoke to a consciousness, that a great and perfectly organized party in her bosom, was precipitating state after state into secession; while in every seceding state — even in South Carolina — masses of the people, stunned by the suddenness and vehemence and thorough organization of the movement, were borne along by it, or made resistance only on collateral points, or remained in dissatisfied silence as the storm swept over them. And in all the remaining slave states, state after state became suddenly the theatre of a concerted agitation propagated originally from South Carolina, and tending everywhere to the same violent result, by the same seditious proceedings, in the venerable names of state sovereignty and constitutional power. In these latter states, the resistance on the part of the community to this revolutionary fanaticism, was more in accordance with what became a free people; and whatever the issue may be, the most of them, possibly every one of them, will reach it with a decorum, a gravity, and a public decency inseparable even in death itself

from all true greatness, on all great occasions. But these great popular masses throughout the fifteen slave states — embracing all men who were not ready to rush into immediate secession, and embracing, therefore, the immense majority of the people in that half of the nation — were taken by surprise — cut up into three mutually hostile political parties — disorganized by an infinite diversity of opinion — and destitute for the moment of great leaders to whom they could turn with a common consent. Rapidly, and by a movement almost spontaneous, public opinion, overborne for the moment in the six seceding states, and trembling in the balance in several other states, appears to us to be consolidating in the greater number and the most powerful of those states, in a determinate manner, and upon fixed points. In them there is none of that frantic hostility to the union which has been ostentatiously manifested in other places; but on the contrary, an avowed attachment to the union, and a declared purpose to maintain it, if it can be done consistently with their security, their honor, and their rights. In them, there is no disposition to contend for extreme rights, or to demand conditions which in changed circumstances they would not grant themselves, much less to fly to arms by way of preliminary menace, or to look to foreign nations for aid in the execution of any designs present or future; but on the contrary, there is an upright and an outspoken desire to adjust all existing troubles, and if possible to secure the future, upon terms of perfect equity and equality, such as ought to satisfy true men, and such as true men ought spontaneously to grant. Now it is not to confirmed Abolitionists of the North, nor is it to confirmed Secessionists of the South, that any suggestions of peace need be made, or any terms of honorable composition need be propounded, which look to the preservation of a country which they do not profess to love, and the salvation of institutions which they own they abhor. But it is to the great, true, and faithful people of the glorious American Nation that must not be destroyed, no matter of what sovereign state they may be citizens, and no matter how much they may now appear to be scattered and disorganized; that suggestions of peace, and justice, and fraternity, looking to endless and boundless glory and prosperity, may be offered, with a good hope through God, that they may enter into the mass of

human thought, and be felt according to the wisdom that may be in them.

2. Let it be observed, that the free states and the slave states occupy in some respects totally different positions, relatively to the difficulties about slavery, and to the ground on which those difficulties are to be adjusted. With the North, the whole affair is a sentiment — an opinion. With the South, it is an affair of life and death. The North has not one dollar of estate at stake — the South has four thousand millions of dollars invested in slaves. The North has not one dollar of income directly dependent on slavery — the South has an annual income of two hundred and fifty millions dependent directly on slave labour. Moreover, there are no negro slaves among the nineteen millions of people in the eighteen free states — so that all questions of a national aspect tending to influence slavery, are perfectly void of force as to the interior peace, quiet, and security, of all these eighteen states; whereas the fifteen slave states have four millions of slaves dispersed through their eight millions of white people, and every national question that can, in any of its bearings, either agitate or quiet this vast slave population, is of itself a question, between different nations, of war or peace. Still further, the institution of slavery has no necessary bearing whatever, upon the social, economical, personal or political condition of any state or individual at the North; whereas it is thoroughly interwoven with every fibre of society at the South — and as an institution is so pervading in its effects wherever it exists, that a community long trained in the forms of life connected with it, does not incur the change involved in its destruction, except under some most powerful impulse. And again, this nation was once a nation composed exclusively of slave states — and if in the progress of events the greater part of the states become free states — every consideration of decency and good faith obliges those thus changing their condition to be more and more, instead of less and less, observant of the duties and even the proprieties they owe to those who remain in the condition once common to all. And, to suggest nothing more, the preponderating power of the free states in the Union, added to the unscrupulous and disloyal principles avowed and propagated, to a greater or less extent, in every one of them

during the last thirty years; obliges the North, by every consideration of prudence, of equity, and of magnanimity, to concede to the South all that the spirit of their mutual engagements require, instead of striving to rob her of every security which is not expressed in the narrowest letter of the law. So clear is this controlling aspect of the subject, and so deeply does it enter into the convictions of all just men, that, on the one hand, the whole feeling of loyalty to the Union in the South, is connected with an abiding confidence that the North will act as becomes her in this emergency; and on the other hand, with an unshaken purpose, in the Union or out of it, to vindicate the security, the equality, and the rights, of slave States. It is upon these two points—can the South rely upon the North—and can the South maintain her vital interests in union—that public opinion in the slave States which have not seceded, is struggling at this moment. For our own part, thoroughly convinced that both of those questions ought to be answered in the affirmative, we must not disguise that the thousands of loyal and patriotic men who have reached an opposite conclusion, and under it have been precipitated, by the force of a trained and long organized conspiracy, unto fatal proceedings; are able to render reasons for their want of confidence, to which coming ages will say, the North ought to have given earlier and more considerate heed. It is idle to attempt here, a statement of particular aggressions, upon a case so large, so long continued, so aggravating, and so palpable. If there is one sentiment perfectly cordial, and perfectly unanimous throughout the fifteen slave States, it is that they have just cause of complaint; a sentiment in which it is extremely probable, that the actual majority of the entire North would to some extent concur. Nay, the very form of any amicable settlement that can ever be made, reveals the true nature of the case—as every possible statement of it must show.

3. There are two points upon which the South has made up its mind, and which are decisive, one way or the other, of the whole matter; and upon which the course which the North may take, will either arrest the farther spread of the secession pestilence, and under firm and temperate treatment, as we have before shown, will probably bring back the seceding States; or will probably throw the whole nation into a state of political convulsion, the

end of which no man can conjecture, and no living man will see. These two points relate, 1. To the fair and complete execution of the provisions of the Federal Constitution, made expressly in favor of property in slaves — and most especially the provision for the rendition of fugitive slaves: 2. To the recognition of the perfect equality of the slave States with the free States, under the Federal Constitution, in all things — and most especially in the matter of Federal Territories. We will briefly treat of each of these points separately. And as it appears to us very clear that adequate power exists under the Federal Constitution to settle both points in a fair, complete, and satisfactory manner — we will not enter upon the discussion of any of the proposed changes in that instrument. There are also several incidental questions, such as slavery in the District of Columbia, the migration of slaves from one slave State to another, and the like, which we shall not discuss; since, as we doubt not, the settlement of the real question will draw after it the settlement of the rest; and a refusal to settle them renders all discussion of the others idle.

4. If any one will compare the unquestionable right of the owners of slaves, secured by the Federal Constitution, to have them delivered to them in the States to which they may escape, with what has occurred during many past years with reference to the fair and sincere enforcement of this right, in any Northern State where its enforcement has been attempted, — or with the average aggregate conduct of the whole North upon the subject; he will be struck with astonishment, in proportion as he gets a complete idea of what the border slave States have suffered, and of the demoralized condition of opinion at the North on the whole subject, and of the utter wickedness of the organized robbery which has been systematically carried on. Mark — the Constitution of the nation expressly requires the rendition of slaves when they escape. Then observe, that along the border common to Ohio and Kentucky, slaves have been systematically enticed from their owners, by organized societies in Ohio, and carried off by arrangements so extensive, so complete, and so effectual, that along the entire border between those States, two or three counties deep, slavery is totally insecure in Kentucky. Along the frontier of

all the other border slave States, a similar system of organized plunder has been in active operation. To what extent the system penetrates the interior regions of the slave States, it is difficult to say; but it is known that emissaries from the North have systematically pervaded the entire South, in every imaginable disguise, schoolmaster, pedler, agent, quack, preacher, labourer — every thing — making known to the slaves the routes and methods of escape, and instilling into their minds principles that result in house-burning, poisoning, murder, and rape, if escape is impossible. What success has attended these diabolical proceedings, with regard to the whole number of slaves stolen, we have no better means of knowing than the published statement of journals that advocate the robbery: and after allowing for much boasting on their part, prompted by very obvious reasons, the number can hardly be set lower than a yearly average of ten thousand slaves — worth little short of ten millions of dollars — for some years past. Nor must it be forgotten, that although large sums of money are contributed by fanatics throughout the North, to the yearly support of these operations, yet the immediate agents of the work make it very profitable. We, and many hundred persons, have personal knowledge of a case which occurred a few years ago in Kentucky, in which between fifty and sixty negro men were attempted to be run off at one time, from Lexington and the surrounding region; in which the fee of the white organizer and leader of the company varied, according to the success of the negroes in stealing, from twenty-five to one hundred and fifty dollars, each. In that case the party was surprised when near the Ohio River, and the slaves recovered; and the white man is now in the Kentucky Penitentiary — instead of being lynched, as he would have been any where but in one of the finest communities in the world. Now let it be further observed, that this state of horrible perfidy, though notorious at the North, instead of awaking the universal horror of the community, finds the fundamental principles which underlie it, gradually penetrating in all directions; widely influential journals advocating them; supporters of them sitting in many State Legislatures, and in both Houses of Congress; political parties impregnated with them; the laws of many States changed so as to give them

security; the current literature deeply imbued with them; and to crown all, the ministers of religion, to the extent almost of whole sects and denominations, making them the chief themes of their instruction from the pulpit. We do not enumerate the election of Mr. Lincoln as the climax, and final triumph of these principles: on the contrary, it is clear to us that his nomination for the Presidency is to be accounted evidence of a réaction against them: and we know of little in the modern history of parties, braver, or more manly, than his unflinching and reiterated declarations, that the South is entitled to an effective law for the rendition of fugitive slaves, and to its effective execution.

5. That is precisely what the whole South demands. Planted on the Constitution — loyal to it and to the country — the evidence of the wrongs she has endured written on the whole face of society North and South, Mr. Lincoln himself has long ago spoken the brave and true word; the South is entitled to an effective law, and to its effective execution, whereby these outrages shall be put down forever. The time to discuss the propriety of putting such a clause in the Federal Constitution, terminated seventy years ago. The time to plead conscientious scruples for breach of faith founded on the alleged immorality of property in slaves, will come after it is shown that a nation can exist — much less that a free people can tranquilly sustain a common government, for the sake of enabling one half to plunder and degrade the other half. One of the worst symptoms of the case is manifested in the indirect manner in which many Northern States have endeavoured to defeat the execution of public law by unfriendly legislation, directed in some instances against their own citizens, in some against citizens of the South, and in some against both; and in, not only an apparent popular approval of such laws, and the most stolid indifference to the matter on the part of those who did not approve them, but even in their careful and well-considered defense by some of the ablest and best men in the North, as being without serious objection in principle. That is, all the people in Massachusetts being both citizens of that State and citizens of the United States, and there being nobody there to act in either capacity, except those who must act in both; what follows under this new political morality, and what is attempted under the pre-

text of religious scruples is—that the people of Massachusetts as citizens of the United States acknowledge the obligation resting on them under the Federal Constitution for the rendition of fugitive slaves in Massachusetts; and at the same moment as citizens of the State, they pass laws refusing the use of their prisons and making it criminal for their officers or even their citizens to assist, and contrive remedies whereby the owner who seeks to recover his slave may be arrested as a trespasser, or even imprisoned as a felon. It is an exceedingly palpable instance, on a large scale, of what resources were possessed by those fortunate and unscrupulous gentlemen of a past age, who were princes and bishops at the same time. In point of morals, such pretexts are simply scandalous. In private life, no man who resorts to them can be held to be a gentleman—or in pecuniary transactions, can be considered honest. In public life, such attempts are chargeable with the folly and wickedness of begetting conflicts of civil and political duties in mere wantonness—or with being, as we have before shown they are, the organized results of that seditious spirit of anarchy which is destroying our country, and which a better public sentiment must crush wherever it exists, before society can be safe in any part of it. The people of the free States, wherever and in so far as they have been seduced into such legislation, owe to public morality, to their own character, and to their highest interests, not less than to their constitutional obligations as citizens of the United States, and the mutual relations of the States to each other under our noble institutions; to erase at once all State enactments that cast obloquy on their own national obligations, or look towards the dishonor or the obstruction of the just and unquestionable claims of others upon them. And we rejoice with all our heart at the indication in so many portions of the North, that what is right will be promptly done in this matter; and by this means, one of the steps indispensable to the permanent maintainance of our institutions be firmly taken, and the friends of the Union every where, but especially in the South, have a noble vindication of their resolute confidence that the nation was still sound at heart.

6. The other point of the two which the whole nation perceives to be fundamental, relates to the equality of the States in the

Union, and especially as that bears upon the question of slavery in the Federal Territories, as we have already stated. The great idea of all our institutions, though complex, is perfectly clear. We constitute one nation, whose people, however, are divided into many sovereign States. We have no nation but as we have these States; and we have no States but as they make this nation; and our people are citizens both of the nation and of some particular State—and strictly speaking, to be one involves the other. The fundamental principle of our liberty is the sovereignty, not of governments, but of society itself—the people; and the deepest foundation of this sovereignty of the people, is their right to change, to order, and to interpret, their political and civil institutions, by voting; to do this as separate States where the matter relates *exclusively* to the particular State—to do it in concert where it relates to the nation. In the exercise of this sovereign power the people of this nation have made all their constitutions—the very oldest of which now existing is the Federal Constitution. And the broad distinction between that Constitution made for the nation, which by its nature and its terms is supreme over all in its proper sphere, and the Constitutions made for the States respectively, is simply this; that by the former no powers are conferred on the General Government created by it except such as are expressly enumerated and such as are incidental and necessary thereto; and that by the latter all powers residing in society are conferred on the State Governments created by them, except such as are expressly withheld by Bills of Right, or some similar device. We do not mean that these results are inherent and inevitable; but we mean that these are the facts—the great and wise things actually accomplished by our ancestors. In the balancing of the powers of the Federal and State Governments, and in defining and ordering their mutual spheres and extent, lies that wide debatable ground over which statesmen have fought their battles, and organized parties. Amongst these battles none have been more hotly fought, or more perilous to the country, than the one which has been waged over this question of Slavery in the Federal Territories. What we propose, is not to enter into a history of these difficulties—nor to discuss the soundness of any of the conflicting interpretations of the Constitution, upon which the extreme claims

of hostile parties or sections rest; but to accept the actual and notorious posture of the whole affair—and having pointed out, in the nature of our system of government, the ground and the character of the real difficulty, to state the principles on which alone, as it appears to us, the integrity of the Union between slave States and free States can be preserved.

7. There are three possible results to the matter, namely: all the Territories may become free States, or all may become slave States, or some may become one, and some may become the other. No one who has a grain of common sense, can suppose it to be possible for either of the first two results to occur, by any peaceful means, or that the general government can throw its influence systematically in favour of either of them, without breaking up the confederacy—or that extensive combinations of States on either side to secure either result, can terminate otherwise than in war. It follows, therefore, that the practical enforcement of the dogma on which Mr. Lincoln comes into power, namely, that there shall be no more slavery in the Territories, is impossible otherwise than by means of the dissolution of the Union, and the subsequent conquest of one portion of the country by the other. But Mr. Lincoln and his party, if they are insane enough to push their dogma to that terrible issue, will—to say nothing of their other perils—probably find themselves arrested, as soon as they show that they are in earnest, by a counter revolution at the North, which will crush the diabolical conspiracy. Admitting that the Congress of the United States has absolute power over the National Territories—and admitting that the Northern States had the permanent control of both Houses of Congress; we have not the least idea, that a congress and a national administration in this, or any other free country, would encounter the peril, and heap on themselves the degradation of attempting to rob numerous States and many millions of people, all subject to the same government, and all portions of the same nation with themselves, of their total share in an imperial inheritance. Such ideas may be made effectual in the organization of parties, and may assume prominence in popular movements; but when it becomes necessary to give them legal form and validity, to enforce them at the point of the bayonet, to risk counter-revolution in support of them, to

establish them upon the ruins of society, and cover either the triumph or the failure of the attempt with the detestation of mankind, their evasion, in some way or other, is one of those uncontrollable necessities of responsible power, before which human passions bow in reverent awe. In like manner, the opposite extreme opinion and claim, is in its nature equally incapable of being realized. Admitting it to be true, that by the Constitution of the United States, every Federal Territory is dedicated to slavery, until on becoming a State, the people abolish it by a sovereign act; and admitting that the Supreme Court has the power to establish, beyond reversal, this sense of the Constitution, and that it has done so in a case regularly before it, and demanding for its decision the settlement of this point; still the practical enforcement of the thing, is both morally and politically impossible. We have not the least idea, that a congress composed exclusively of Southern men, could be gathered by popular election, that would entertain a proposition to rob free States weaker than themselves, of their share of a common inheritance, upon any plea that can be imagined; we do not believe the majority of any slave State would enforce such a proposition; we do not believe that any Southern gentleman would execute such a scheme. Moreover, the political impossibility is complete; and in the actual state of the country as presented by the relative number and power of the free and slave States, and as exhibited by the state of opinion everywhere — the notion of establishing slavery in all the national Territories as of constitutional right, has about the same practical value as the notion of securing all those Territories for slavery, by secession. Now, let it be borne in mind, that we have taken these claims and the demands on the one side and the other, as being founded on truths that are undeniable, and rights that are unquestionable; and have pointed out the impossibility of any just, practical, or peaceful result, in the direction indicated on either side. How immeasurably is that conclusion strengthened, when it is considered that there is not a truth asserted, a principle laid down, or a claim advanced on either side, that is not vehemently repudiated by about half the population of the nation! Well may we assert the complete impossibility both of excluding slavery from all the Territories, and of establishing it in them all; and de-

nounce the wickedness of all parties who persist in such endeavors. Those Territories, if the nation survives, must necessarily be, and ought to be, partly slave and partly free. Political necessity demands it, public justice requires it, all true statesmanship points to that result, the undisturbed force of events would terminate in that issue, and all attempts to prevent it are founded in considerations forbidden alike by wisdom, by equity, and by patriotism; and will end in crime, and misery, and dishonour, precisely in the degree that they are successful. If the country shall be destroyed, the chief importance of the questions on which our ruin is brought about, will afterwards be, that all men may see how scandalous were the pretexts upon which the noblest product of human civilization was made desolate.

8. The national domain not embraced by the boundaries of any existing State, amounts to one and a half, or two millions of square miles; an area much greater than that covered by all the States lying between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mississippi River; not much less, perhaps, than the area covered by all the present States. That the people of the larger and more numerous free States should combine to exclude the people of the weaker and less numerous slave States, from the enjoyment of the whole of this immense inheritance, is an outrage so preposterous, that one is the less astonished that it should react in a counter combination to establish slavery in the whole of it; and while the pretext of conscientious scruples for seizing all was the natural, because the only one, however ignoble, which the strong could use—the counter resort of the weaker party was also natural, and the only one they could make but war, namely, extreme constitutional right, countenanced by their construction of a political judgment of the Supreme Court. In effect, as there are but three possible solutions of the case, as has just been shown, so there are but three possible methods in which the case can be solved. One is by an equitable partition of the common inheritance, founded on the mutual recognition by the parties of the undeniable fact that it is a common property: a second is, for the owners of the inheritance to determine to fight out their opposite claims in each particular Territory—somewhat after the manner of the Kansas affair: the third is, to dissolve the Union, and fight out the opposing claims

afterwards, leaving the Territories like every thing else, in a state of anarchy, useless to either party. It is indeed conceivable that after dissolving the Union, men might recover their senses, and be capable, as alien enemies to each other, of acting with a degree of mutual forbearance and justice, which if practiced when they were united by the most sacred bonds, would have kept them friends forever. The probability of such a miracle, every one will determine for himself; as well as the probability that the future inhabitants of the vast region thrown away by the nation in its disgraceful paroxysms, will put faith enough in such miracles to respect any partition of them amongst the fragments of a disbanded confederacy. It is in vain that we would evade the sacred duties which press us, and from whose performance there is no escape that does not at the same moment brand us with infamy, and hurry us towards destruction. There is but one possible result that is just and right—and there is but one possible way of reaching that result that is either sure, fair, or peaceful: but that result, and that way of reaching it, are perfectly obvious—and when once recognized and pursued, they remove whatever difficulty the fair and complete execution of the duty to restore fugitive slaves leaves to be removed. It is upon these two points, as we have tried in all fairness to show, that the nation is bound and obliged to set herself right—that the *people* are required to make their majestic voice audible above the clamor of factions, and that all good men are called of God, by word and by deed, to rebuke on every side the phrenzy of the hour.

9. The particular mode in which this recognition of the common right of all the States in the national Territories, should be made; and the particular way and extent to which practical efficacy shall, at the moment, be given to that recognition; do not appear to us to be matters of very high importance in themselves, or matters which it is necessary that we should discuss here. An effectual law, and its effectual execution, concerning the rendition of fugitive slaves; a sincere recognition of the common right of all the States in the national domain, and the mutual abandonment by the North and the South of all claim and attempt to make all the Territories either free or slave: it is upon these points that a good understanding, will settle all the rest—and that a refusal to

come to such an understanding, will throw upon those so acting the whole responsibility of all that may follow. The foregone conclusions of political parties, and the previous committals of public men, are utterly insignificant in any true appreciation of the interests now at stake. The propounding of particular theories, or of special lines of policy, or of lists of propositions, or any thing of the sort—by State Legislatures, by resolutions in Congress, by Conventions of the people, or in any other way—where the design or the effect is to embarrass or to obstruct the indispensable settlement, is either a great weakness, or a covert attempt to prevent any settlement. The demand of either party to have a division of the Territories that is grossly unequal, is that far unjust, and a manifestation of the same spirit of claiming all, which has already wrought so much mischief. And with a million or two of square miles of national domain, not yet embraced in any State, with a country large enough to contain fifty or a hundred times its present population—and with instant difficulties which have already produced the most terrible calamities, and whose early settlement may be indispensable to the prevention of universal revolution; the purpose to make that settlement depend upon an explicit agreement concerning the disposition we will hereafter make of foreign states, which we may possibly conquer or purchase at some future day; can be considered nothing else than a purpose of preventing the possibility of any settlement. Beyond all doubt, if the free States consider that the main use of our Constitutional Union and our continued national existence, is the extinction of negro slavery on this continent; or if the slave States consider that the chief value of those incalculable advantages, lies in the use of them for the indefinite extension of slavery; the knell of our destiny is struck—and our glory, our felicity, and our triumph are as a tale that has been told.

V. 1. We have said, on a previous page, that the revolution in the seceding States would not stop where it now is, and that the course it would hereafter take, depended upon causes in some degree appreciable now; of which causes we enumerated those which appeared to us most important in the production of such results as would restore those States to their former position in the nation. Amongst them, the conduct of the Federal government towards

the seceding States—according as it might be firm and yet temperate, or as it might be vacillating and timid, was enumerated as a decided element of the future. No one can doubt that this is true, or fail to experience great anxiety on the subject. We feel no disposition to speak confidently about proceedings of the general government not yet adequately explained; nor, under any circumstances, to judge the President harshly. We consider Mr. Buchanan to be situated just in that manner, that if he saves his country, posterity will forgive him much, and place his name high on the roll of history; but that if, either by his own fault, or by the fatal temper of the times, his administration is made the term of his country's grand career, he must be classed with the greatest victims of misfortune. Few have presided at obsequies that ought to have been so illustrious—and that threaten to be so ignominious. Apparently the sport of a Cabinet divided into factions, of which one was irresolute, another neither loyal to him nor to the country, and the isolated members without authority; the use made of the national administration seems to have been to promote the interest of the leaders of sedition; until the President found himself with no alternative but to sacrifice alike his official duty and his personal honour, or at a most perilous moment, to reconstruct his Cabinet on the basis of one or two faithful and able men, the remnant of his old advisers. There may be some ground for difference of opinion as to the probable result, if the same conduct had been pursued by the administration from the beginning, as has been since the reconstruction of the Cabinet. Nothing short of complete success, rendered only more difficult by his own previous conduct, can now avert from the President, the stern condemnation of posterity. And the secession party, prompt, diligent, and sagacious, after securing from Mr. Buchanan the utterance of such opinions, and the acquiescence in such proceedings, as rendered their first organized movements safe from interruption; and after treating all national rights that stood in the way of their subsequent movements as mere nullities, and all national property in their reach as lawful plunder; are now diligently engaged in propagating the sentiment, that all attempts of the nation even to expire with decency, much less to defend its dignity, its honour, its authority,

its military posts, or its property, should be esteemed outrages on sovereign States — and be condemned as acts of useless folly that can lead only to bloodshed; seeing that the premeditated work is done, and all composition is impossible. At the same critical moment, a signal change manifests itself in the bosom of the party in the North, which resists all fair settlement, and yet dreads popular revolution there. As long as threats of violence were particularly empty and insulting, they were hurled at the South. Now, when their disloyal hopes point in another direction, the method they take to avert the coming reaction which may save the country, is to unite in vehement protests against what they are pleased to designate as *coercion*. If the nation, first deluded and then disgraced, can be paralyzed — and the whole South driven into secession — the extreme party at the North, and the extreme party at the South, each gains its special ends; and the mass of the people every where, and especially in the great Central States, may, at their leisure, wake to the reality of a situation fatal and detestable to them — which it would have been far easier for them to have prevented, than it will be to correct. In short, it is to deter the national government from every act which can even tend to restore the supremacy of the Constitution, and the integrity of the nation, that the cry against what they call coercion, is substituted for the cry against what they called oppression, in the first stages of the revolt.

2. It is deplorable, in every stage and act of this sad drama, how an almost preternatural ingenuity of error has trifled with the noblest impulses of the people, and with the simplest truths which support all our institutions. Let the dominant party in South Carolina start with the political falsehood, that the people of that State are not citizens of the United States, except through the constitution and government of that State; and let the National Administration start with the corresponding political falsehood, that the supreme law of the land cannot be enforced towards the people of South Carolina, contrary to the wishes and acts of this dominant party; and let both parties concur in the additional political falsehood, that the ruin of society is better than the risk of collision with any body in enforcing the laws: then, of course, nullification, secession, sedition, revolution, anarchy —

are inevitable products of the organization of society, and public order, and regulated liberty, and the security of property and life become more and more impossible as the organization of society becomes more and more perfect. We pointed out, on a previous page — when exposing the perfidy of the pretext resorted to in justifying the conduct of dominant parties in some of the free States, touching the rendition of fugitive slaves — the simple and obvious refutation, founded in the double citizenship of the people of the United States; and here the refutation is just as clear, and is founded on the same truth. By the express terms, as well as by the very nature of the Federal Constitution, a secession ordinance in the South is as totally void as a personal liberty law in the North possibly can be. The Federal Government has no more need to deal with the South Carolina convention, in executing the post office laws, the revenue laws, or any other laws — than it has to deal with the Massachusetts Legislature in executing the fugitive slave law; and there was no more legal necessity, nor any more logical consistency, in diatribes about lack of power to *coerce a State*, in one case than the other. There was no need, nor any power, to *coerce a State*, in either case; but in both cases the need was urgent, and the power was complete, to execute the Laws of the United States upon *every citizen of the United States*, whatever relation he might happen to occupy towards any one of the States; and to enforce those laws against all wrong doers. Nor is there any consideration arising out of the nature or the form of the opposition, that may be made to the execution of the supreme law, which can go farther than to address itself to the sound discretion of the national government, in the way of determining the most proper and effectual, and at the same time the least arbitrary, perilous, and destructive method of overcoming the resistance that is made. If the President, in the exercise of this discretion, allows millions of dollars worth of national property in buildings, in cash, in munitions of war, to be seized and held by citizens of the United States in avowed revolt against the general government; if he permits them to take forcible possession of the national fortresses, and hold them in armed hostility to the nation; if he permits the officers and soldiers of the army of the United States, to be taken prisoners of

war, and treated by hostile commanders as captured enemies; if he permits armies to be organized, munitions of war to be collected, batteries to be directed against the national fortresses; if he permits the flag of the nation to be torn down from the public edifices and fortresses, and hostile flags to be planted on them—nay, permits that proud emblem of our national unity and force to be fired on with impunity, when it covers an armed force of the nation; if he allows the mail to be broken open and the correspondence of the government itself to be tampered with; the foreign commerce of the country to be interrupted and the revenue from it seized; the internal commerce to be menaced by batteries erected under State authority on our great water courses; if, to add no more, he permits ambassadors from secession conventions and assemblies to menace him with war in the capital of the nation, and conspirators plotting the military occupation of the Federal City, to go unpunished: it really appears to us that the most nervous secessionist might consider the question of coercion, as being about as offensive to the President as to himself. Every man who has any remaining loyalty to the nation, or any hope or desire for the restoration of the seceding States to the confederacy; must see that what is meant by the outcry against coercion is in the interest of secession, and that what is meant is in effect, that the Federal government must be terrified or seduced into complete cöoperation with the revolution, which it was its most binding duty to have used all its power and influence to prevent.

8. We believe it is the desire of the American people that the present revolution should be brought to such a conclusion that the seceding States shall all be restored to their position in the nation; and that to this end such a settlement of existing difficulties shall be made, as will effectually and peacefully secure this result. In order to that, it is impossible for the nation to permit anything to be done by the general government, which will take for granted that the state of exaggerated and disloyal opinion either in the extreme North or the extreme South, is irrevocably fixed as a final and sovereign expression. On the contrary, what the nation must take for granted, as the basis of every hope of peaceful success, is that a revolution in opinion must take place in both

quarters, in view of the imminent peril of our position. But beyond all doubt, every thing that can strengthen the hands of the party now dominant, either at the extreme North or the extreme South—must weaken every hope of any revolution in opinion—every hope of a solution at once peaceful and successful. Nothing could be so fatal as the conviction in the mind of loyal citizens, both in the extreme North and the extreme South, that the nation does not sympathise with them, and will abandon them. It is, therefore, sheer folly to weaken the posture of the general government towards the secession movement. The duties of that government, are perfectly clear as to their nature—no matter how difficult they may be as to the mode of their performance. The nation has no alternative, for the moment, but to abide the firm and sincere performance of those duties,—meantime striving for a settlement of the whole difficulty. If the seceding States follow up their past outrages by rushing into war with the nation, no matter on what pretext, that will only prove that the pestilence has already gone beyond the reach of peaceful remedies. On the other hand, let it be taken for granted that the nation cannot be saved—and that a peaceful separation, if that be possible, is the best hope of all parties. Even in that case, and with a view to that result, the position of the general government towards the seceding States should be one of forbearance and moderation indeed, but of unalterable firmness. The nation has an interest in the manner of this supposed separation, hardly inferior to its interest in preventing any separation: nor is the interest of the States that may go out, less permanent and fundamental in the right ordering of that great, and as we think terrible result, than any they may suppose they have in founding a new empire. That this particular constitutional government should fail, is dreadful enough; but we owe it to ourselves, to the glorious cause of constitutional government, and indeed to the human race, that we should not establish by our downfall the imbecility of republican freedom; but, on the contrary, that the very wreck of our institutions should exhibit the principles of constitutional liberty—in contrast with every aspect of anarchy—and in all their unalterable force and beauty. Let our ruin be the thousandth proof of the violence of human passions, and the instability of human

hopes: let it not be a damning evidence against constitutional government. To us nothing appears more certain, than that looking to either result, the nation has no necessity more imperative, as means to any endurable result, than that the Federal Government—instead of shrinking from its true position on the one hand, or resorting to needless violence on the other—should accept its true mission as the representative of the nation, and so to a great extent master of the situation, and pilot the ark in which such transcendent treasures are embarked, courageously amidst the howling waters. God will bring it to the right haven: for the prayers of many hundreds of thousands of his children—lie yet unanswered before his face.

4. It is from a single point of view that we have conducted this exposition, and it is unto one single result, that we have directed it. The point of view is that of one steadily beholding the imminent and deadly peril of his country—nay, its ruin, already in some degree accomplished, and hastening to be complete; and the single result developed, is the salvation of the country—the *whole* country. Many topics have, therefore, been passed in silence, which, from any other point of view, or in expounding any other result, would have required careful treatment; and many other topics eminently pertinent here, have been omitted, because we have already discussed them on a recent occasion.* It is of the last importance, that we should not be deceived by appearances, or misled either by our hopes or our terrors. The voice that can alone silence the storm that is raging around us—the hand that is alone competent to grasp and to crush every element of disorder—that voice has not yet spoken, that hand has not yet put forth its strength: it is the voice and the hand of this *great nation*. It is time for it to speak—time for it to act. If we may dare to trust all the lessons of the past, it will be true to itself—true to every one who is faithful to it. In that case we are safe; though we may suffer much and long before the end is reached. Our civili-

* See "*Discourse of DR. ROBERT J. BRECKENRIDGE. Delivered at Lexington, Ky., January 4th, 1861; on the Day of National Humiliation.*" It has been widely published in the Newspapers, both secular and religious, and in pamphlet form by *Hull & Brother*, Louisville, Ky.; *Faran & McLean*, Cincinnati, Ohio; *Woods*, Baltimore, Md.; and perhaps in other places by other persons. 4p379 of this vol.

zation, in its present form, is the growth of nearly a century—the growth of two centuries and a half on this continent—the growth of all preceding ages in the old world, before its best inhabitants came hither, to construct society afresh out of all the treasures of the past. The gigantic oaks of the forest are not planted more deeply—the everlasting mountains have not a surer foundation—than our American Civilization. Let the nation stir itself as a giant, waking from his slumber. Let the voice of God be heard amongst us, as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of a great thunder. Let us not hold our peace,—let us not rest, till the peril is overpassed, that we should be termed Forsaken and our land be termed Desolate—nor till our country be as a crown of glory in the hand of the Lord, and as a royal diadem in the hand of our God!

* *

*

ART. V.—*Immortality of the Soul.*

Phædo Platonis: Recensuit, Prolegomenis et Commentariis instruxit
G. Stallbaum. Editio tertia. Gotha, MDCCCL.

The *Phædo* of Plato is unquestionably one of the most important remains of classical Antiquity. The nature of the subject which this Dialogue discusses, the character of the chief speaker, and the time of its origin, all unite to invest it with deep interest. The question of the Patriarch, "If a man die, shall he live again?" is the expression of a felt desire for knowledge which has actuated every thinking man, alike among savage and civilized nations. The very conditions of our being suggest this interrogation; for the future must engage our thought, and the constant recurrence of bodily dissolution gives point to the inquiry whether our existence is bounded by the goal of visible mortality. Accordingly we find this subject agitated by the most profound thinkers the world has seen, who have brought the aid of their best powers to discover a solution to the question, which must be

answered in order to give rest to a justifiable curiosity. At the head of thinkers we do not hesitate to place Socrates, whose sentiments his almost equally celebrated pupil has given us. While other men may have possessed more accomplished minds, and thus have been enabled to deliver their opinions more systematically, there has never been any uninspired man whose doctrines have exerted such a pervading influence on the cultivated nations of the earth as the Athenian Sage. We are, therefore, justified in expecting the best results of the human mind, on a subject confessedly of the highest importance. Still further; the time when this Dialogue was uttered, was well adapted by its surroundings to excite the mind to the most vigorous efforts. Socrates is in the midst of his intimate friends, at a juncture of the greatest solemnity, and the conversation is directed to a subject befitting the occasion, and invested with great personal interest, whether we consider the duty which the master owed his scholars in his last lesson of wisdom, or their love for him whom they expected to see no more.

The result justifies the expectation; for the common voice of succeeding ages has admitted this to be the most complete and thorough vindication of the soul's Immortality that unaided human reason has ever achieved. All that strength of mind, earnestness, and ingenuity, incited by the deepest interest, could effect, has been done; so that we may well say, here, if any where, is the arena wherein are brought forth the strong arguments: and if the conclusion be not established, this is because of its impossibility from the nature of the subject. We grant even more. It is the storehouse from which has been drawn the material for every argument worth the name, that subsequent writers have employed, to prove by independent reasoning that we shall exist in another life. However disguised their attempts, still by examination, we find that the substance of their arguments consists only in changes rung upon those first developed by Plato, from the last conversation which his Master held.

A production then of such importance deserves careful consideration; and it will be our effort to give it a fair examination: granting full credit to all that it really proves. Nor is it improper to say that we came to this treatise prepossessed with the be-

lief that it did, as generally conceded by those who put confidence in speculations concerning matters of faith, really establish the soul's Immortality. So that it was our wish to find the reasoning conclusive; and thus prejudice at least was in favor of the position of our author.

When the friends of Socrates visit him in the morning preceding his execution, the conversation begins by some remarks touching the right which a man has to take his own life, which the philosopher opposes on the ground that we are subject to the disposal of the gods, and therefore should not leave the post they assign us; for that would be to exhibit pusillanimity, as not being able to meet the ills of life, and disobedience to our masters who have placed us here. But though this be true, it is, nevertheless, the real business of life to prepare for death, and philosophy is nothing else than a constant meditation how to die. For this reason all who seek to be guided aright, should endeavor without ceasing to separate the soul as much as possible from the body, by striving against appetites and passions which have a perpetual tendency to lead us astray. The more we are freed from the influence of our bodies the more pure we become, and the object to be striven for is entire deliverance from the corporeal nature; so that we may be able to view all things as they really are by the soul itself, without the intervention of any medium whose only tendency is to confuse and pervert.* Here we find much to admire, much that is worthy of a Christian philosophy, but is defective in that it considers the body only as an impediment, while in fact a rational view of man ought to take in his whole nature as composed of the two principles. We can here detect some of the Parsee system of two antagonistic elements, lurking under the garb of Socratic speculation; for the body is looked upon as essentially corrupting in its nature, and the spirit pure. Christianity accepts both parts of our being as necessary elements in man; both alike corrupt, but both to be purified and made partakers of a state of perfection. As Socrates speaks of the complete separation of the soul and body at death, this gives rise to the observation by one of his auditors, that the prevailing opinion is that both perish alike and are no more. This brings the subject fairly up, and

* 60 B.—68 B.

it is admitted to be an opportune time for its discussion.* Let us now examine the leading arguments in their order.

I. The first is drawn from the common tradition that souls exist in Hades, and are produced again from the dead. This is the argument from contraries, by which it is attempted to be shown that one extreme or opposite is naturally followed by its contrary. In support of this, the general law of nature is referred to, that one state is succeeded by its opposite. Day follows night. Expansion is succeeded by contraction. The frosts and gloom of winter, when all is chained under icy fetters, are the precursors of the warmth of spring, in whose genial rays the flowers bloom, and Nature smiles in her robe of loveliness. Still other examples are adduced, such as greatness being produced from smallness; strength, from weakness; the being awake, from sleep. By this method of inference Socrates says we prove that souls exist in Hades, and are produced from the dead, since life is the counterpart or contrary of death.† But if we look closely into this argument it is defective in many respects. For first: It is clearly a *petitio principii*; because if the soul does continue to exist in the unseen world, then it does not die, and of course lives; which is the very fact to be proved. But in order for this to be a legitimate argument, the soul must die that it may come to life again. For if the body alone dies, all that can be inferred according to this method of sequence, is that it must come to life again; but there is no reference whatever to the future existence of the spirit. So that this reasoning is vicious; because from the death of the one the life of the other is deduced, instead of its own, which ought to be the consequence resulting from the premises.

Again: This argument is untenable according to the ancient maxim, *Ex nihilo et nihil fit*; for here would be something produced without any cause; or, what is still more illogical, by a cause working in a direction contrary to its production. The little cannot produce the great, because its nature is to be little. Cold cannot produce heat, because its tendency is in a diametrically opposite direction. So also of darkness and light. But let us apply this principle a little further. If contraries produce

* 69 B.—70 C.

† 70 C.—72 D.

their opposites, then vice must beget virtue; sin produce holiness; corruption generate purity; which is not only absurd and false, but entirely subversive of our moral character. In the examples adduced by Socrates there certainly cannot be the order of causation; but at most, immediate succession. Even in the case of sleep, which, both in the language of poetry, and also to the scrutiny of reason, seems most nearly allied to death, there is no more than sequence between it and waking: both being states caused by the physical necessities of our nature. In the case of grain which is sown, (of which example the Apostle, enlightened by the Revelation of God, makes such beautiful application,) if we consult reason merely, there can be nothing proven to establish a future life. For there is an essential difference between the two cases. In the example of death, there is no evidence whatever of any life remaining, but on the contrary the most convincing proofs that no vitality is there; while in the grain of corn planted there is a visible living germ. If we make the cases parallel, the argument from analogy is against the Socratic position; for, if we destroy the germ of the grain so that there is no more life than in the dead body, we know assuredly that no plant will spring forth. But if it be said, Nay, but the soul, though it corresponds with the living principle in the plant, has disappeared and still lives, we then affirm that reason does not teach us this; and if it be assumed, then that is taking for granted the very thing to be proved.

Once more: We observe that death is here considered merely as a result of natural laws, while in truth it is an event contrary to nature, and inflicted as a special punishment for transgression; so that whatever we might infer from an observation of the physical world, we cannot reasonably apply our conclusions to a case contrary to the natural order of things. Revelation teaches us the cause of death, and gives us the blessed assurance that this "last enemy shall be destroyed;" yet this precious truth never was reached by the wisdom of man, but is made known by direct communication from God.

II. The second argument employed by Socrates is that deduced from reminiscence. By the association of ideas, when one of a pair of notions which have been previously viewed conjointly,

is presented, we are reminded of the other by a power of the mind natural to us. For example, when we see a garment belonging to a friend, or a picture representing his features, we are at once reminded of the possessor or original. Moreover, we are led by suggestion from the known and visible to the unknown and invisible. Thus we have certain ideas of magnitude, beauty, equality, etc., which are suggested to us by seeing things which possess these qualities in some degree, and have their proper nature because of their participation in these ideas. So when we see beautiful objects we are at once led to think of the abstract idea of the Beautiful. Yet we have never seen any such thing in this life as abstract beauty or equality. However, just as in the case of the picture of our friend, which by association with him at some previous time, causes the spontaneous remembrance of this person again, so the abstract notions or realities of things are brought to our minds by material objects which have been seen in conjunction with them, or arouse them by relative suggestion. So we must have seen these entities in a previous state of being; from whence it follows, according to this reasoning, our souls must have had an existence in a state prior to the present. *

Here it is necessary to observe that this whole argument rests upon the doctrine of Ideas as developed in the Socratic dialogues. For, it is maintained that abstract notions have a real existence, that Ideas are eternal, and the exemplars after which all visible forms are created. This doctrine is now exploded, and held by no metaphysician of the present day. True, we possess susceptibilities, sometimes improperly called innate ideas, which are natural to the mind; but it requires the presentation of phenomena before they are awakened into action. This internal power is so far only a counterpart of the external, in the production of these ideas; and all the Universals of the Platonic School, are the product of our power of abstraction and generalization. But the argument is lame in this respect also, that it has not the testimony of consciousness to accompany it; without which, we can accept no mental datum. In those cases where reminiscence holds good, we are fully conscious, when by the presentation of one object an-

* 72 D.—77 A.

other is suggested, that we have seen the two together before; otherwise the one could not recall the other. But in the case of universals, our consciousness does not tell us that we have seen them in conjunction with a particular individual, or even that we have ever known such an entity at all. Now, as personal identity cannot be conceived of as existing in a rational creature without consciousness, and as we have no knowledge of our living in a previous state, a contradiction arises in saying that our souls had a being before we were born, unless together with the ideas which we possessed, we had likewise the consciousness of our own existence. Nor will it do to affirm that all learning is the mere recollection of what we knew previously; for we are constantly acquiring information wholly new to us, such as facts of history; however true it be that much of our knowledge is suggested by that which we have already gained.

Even if it were true that universals were acquired in a previous state, that would only prove that our souls existed before we were born, not that they will still live after our death.* This objection is mooted in the Dialogue, and is met by reference to the preceding argument, whose inconclusiveness we have attempted to show. Again, admitting that the soul existed in a previous state, then we are led into the doctrine of transmigration, which only removes the difficulty without meeting it. For, though the soul had been born many times and it survived the deaths of the numerous bodies it had inhabited, this does not prove its immortality; for it may pass through any number of Avatars and yet perish at last. Unless it be eternal it must have had a beginning; and it cannot be eternal and yet finite. Hence, being finite, and having a beginning, it may reasonably have an end; for that which begins to exist may, for any thing in its own nature to the contrary, cease to exist; and nothing but the declaration of God can establish the contrary view.

III. A third argument is drawn from the nature of the soul as being un compounded.† It has always been a notion of philosophers that the ultimate particles of matter, (the Monads of Leibnitz,) are indestructible. Their definition includes this idea; for did they ad-

* 77.

† 78 A.—80 A.

mit a change of form or nature they would not be ultimate. According to this theory, therefore, if the soul can be shown to possess this character, the doctrine in question is claimed as proven. But it is no more than fair to admit that this assumption of the simple or uncompounded nature of the soul is gratuitous. Socrates does not prove it; but taking it for granted, as all have done who since borrowed his arguments, proceeds to found his third proof thereon. But to look closely at this subject, what real evidence have we of its conclusiveness? Does man act with singleness of purpose? Is his mind always free from distraction? Are there never contrary purposes so nearly balancing his mind that he with difficulty decides? Uncertainty of action and vacillation of character are the common bane of the species. So that an examination of the mind itself does not disclose a satisfactory proof of its simplicity. True, there is such a thing as personal identity; but what is a more vexed question than wherein this consists? Consciousness testifies to the fact that we possess it throughout our lives, yet we materially change in many respects. The same mind may possess more or less knowledge; it may increase in vigor and activity, all which increments or diminutions are truly parts of our being, and go to make up its character. The same man may have new avenues of information opened up to his soul; and different persons have various degrees of mental power; in all which cases it is not absolutely simple, else it could receive no addition nor suffer any diminution. The body acts as much like a unit as the mind. All its parts move in concerted action, they are members of one whole. By a beautiful figure the Church is compared in its oneness to the body; showing that its different members are not to be considered in their separate capacity, but as a unit, because actuated by a single purpose. Why then should the soul be assumed as uncompounded in order to prove its immortality? The truth is, we know nothing about this matter; and the conclusions drawn from any assumptions arbitrarily made, cannot but be uncertain. But if we admit the assumption, it will prove equally the immortality of brutes; for there is the same evidence, so far as we can know, that their spirits are as much uncompounded as our own. Again; the soul cannot any more be simple in its constitution, than the ultimate particles of matter of which man's body is composed.

If they were eternal, yet their existing in human form depends on a certain composition, and their action likewise on their union to a spirit. Is it not equally probable that the soul, whether simple or compound, depends on the organ for its existence as a soul? But it may be said: Nay, but the soul can act independently of any bodily organ; it can act on itself. How do we know this? Surely consciousness denies any example except in connection with the bodily nature. The union may be, for aught we know, and to all appearances is, the indispensable condition to mental action. So that we are driven to the extremity of admitting that though the soul were simple, it is no more so than the ultimate particles of matter of which the body is composed; and though it may exist, yet its being as a soul may depend wholly upon its union with matter. Consequently, at death it may cease to be, just as the corporeal man loses its identity, and become, as regards its personality, non-existent.

Our author recurs again to the doctrine of Universal Ideas as distinct, eternal, invisible, and indissoluble existences; and maintains that the mind by separating from contact with the body can grasp these, and by comprehending them shows its similarity to them! * But no argument can be more conclusive than its premises; consequently this is untenable. For besides the fact that these universals are no longer admitted, we can know but in part; and hence could not comprehend them, which would be necessary, according to the positions assumed, to be similar. Besides, we hold that knowledge of an object does not make the knowing subject similar in its attributes; for then would our acquaintance with God necessarily cause us to be like him.

In the course of this part of the subject we are told of the earnest efforts of good men to free themselves as much as possible from the corrupting influences of their bodies, with the hope that when they die they will be pure and happy, separated from all that is debasing, and therefore fit for the society of the gods. This desire and hope of a future state are powerful incentives to cause men to reason themselves into the belief of its existence. Yet this is a very weak argument; for nothing is more common

than mere desire leading persons to accept as true the most monstrous absurdities. Addison, in his *Cato*, expresses the common feeling :

It must be so ! Plato thou reasonest well ;
Else whence this pleasing hope, this fond desire,
This longing after immortality ?

And Addison's reasoning on this subject is little more than the developing of the notions above expressed. But if our hopes and desires were sufficient reasons for the truth of a doctrine, then truly we would have but little difficulty in persuading ourselves of its reality ; for what we greatly wish, we easily believe. But is the expectation of future existence no real ground for believing it ? Shall the anticipations which we make, the hopes which we cherish, be no evidence of their fulfillment ? In themselves they certainly are not, and this can be seen at once if we will contemplate the subject dispassionately. For there is no necessary connection between mere desire that a thing shall take place and its occurrence. Without an adequate cause no effect can follow ; and truly our hope of living in a future state is no more reason that we will, than our wish to prolong our days on earth is a proof of the fact. In the latter, men are constantly disappointed ; and in the nature of the case there is quite as little reason to infer the former. However, it is maintained that man does not accomplish his destiny on earth ; that he merely prepares himself for a higher sphere of action ; and therefore it would argue an imperfection inconsistent with the government of an all-wise God, if we should perish utterly, and all the preparation be lost. This argument is, however, more specious than real. It seems to ignore the fact open to the observation of all, that we live in a world of imperfection, and assumes from this imperfection and disorder that there must needs be a state of complete harmony. Disguise the fact as it may be, even the heathen cannot but see that the present is a state of misery ; and conclusive reasoning, destitute of the light of revelation or tradition, would either project this condition of things into the world to come, or expect utter annihilation. For what is more common than to see preparation for the employments of this life suddenly frustrated by misfortune or death ? How few dreams of youth are realized ! How many well concerted plans

of ambition prove abortive! Many are the unions formed in this life, and which we are taught to believe can only be enjoyed here, which are destroyed before they do more than give a taste of the happiness reasonably looked for from them. The mother leaves her infant child which never can be compensated for the loss; the child dies in infancy, and the world loses all that might naturally be expected from its life. So that from the numberless examples, where we cannot but feel certain that no theatre will be given for the exercise of those powers and affections which are here cut short, because their action belongs to this life, we would far more rationally expect that no future existence is in store for us. Again, there are myriads of cases in the irrational world and among the lower orders of organized beings, where nature does not appear to complete her work. For example, animals perish by starvation and innumerable other causes, where their life and its enjoyments are just begun, and where their death can be of no apparent use to their fellows. Of the countless seeds which possess the germs of life, only a moiety vegetate, and still smaller numbers grow to perfection. In a word, Nature seems to be imperfect; and hence this analogy, so far from leading us to expect a future state wherein to realize all hopes and fulfill the destinies begun here, would rather prove the contrary. Revelation makes this all clear; for it explains how this imperfection arose, and how it is to be remedied; but to the unassisted human reason^{*} there is no light to dispel the darkness which gathers around untimely death and disappointed hope.

Two objections are here interposed by some of the auditors.* One is, that the soul is nothing but harmony, depending on the nice arrangement of the several parts, like that in a musical instrument which is effected by a proper adjustment of the materials. This is answered by the argument to prove the præexistence of the soul; from which it would follow that it is not dependent upon the body. Moreover, there are affections in the soul, such as virtue and vice, existing at the same time, which is inconsistent with its being harmony; for then would one be more harmonized than another, which is inadmissible; because by this reasoning one soul

* 85 C.—86 D.

would be more a soul than another, which is absurd. The doctrine of præexistence has already been disposed of, and the existence of opposite moral affections in the mind to prove that it is not harmony, is equally fatal to the view that it is a simple principle. A second objection advanced is, that although the soul may have existed before the body, and may last longer, yet this is no evidence that it will not finally wear out.* This brings up the whole subject squarely again; showing distinctly that the preceding arguments had not been satisfactory. It is also clear from the tenor of the Dialogue at this point; that the faith of the auditors in the conclusiveness of the preceding proofs was shaken, and they trembled for the safety of their Master's position.† Socrates therefore again addresses himself to the subject, and adduces the proof upon which he evidently lays the most stress, and which is accepted as convincing by his auditors.

IV. The fourth argument asserts that contraries cannot co-exist contemporaneously in the same subject: adducing proofs from the nature of general ideas and the relations of numbers.‡ This is confessedly a difficult part of the subject to comprehend, both from the abstruseness of the reasoning, and the recondite meaning attached to the terms employed. But we will attempt by a careful examination to elucidate it, and weigh the proofs with candor. Admitting that there are general ideas, and that every particular object possesses its proper nature by participation in the qualities of its universal, therefore it is held to be impossible that any two of a contrary character should co-exist; since the one must exclude the other. Littleness and greatness, heat and cold, odd and even, belonging to contrary universals cannot possibly be present in the same subject. But is this the case? In regard to greatness and smallness, cold and heat, they are merely relative terms; and, according to any criteria we may fix can assuredly co-exist. Ice at 32° Fah. is cold, yet it may be —50°; and platina at a white heat may be made still hotter; and the difference of the temperatures show that both principles of heat and cold may be present. The Pythagorean notion in regard to the powers and relations of numbers, is but imperfectly, if at all, understood by

* 87 A.—88 C.

† 88 C.—E.

‡ 95 B.—105 A.

moderns; and hence it is with hesitancy that we venture to examine the argument based upon the connection of the even and the odd. But if we comprehend the meaning it is this: That τὸ πεπρωμένον, or the odd, and τὸ ἀπρωμένον, the even, cannot coëxist; but when one approaches, the other must recede. But it is clear that we may take two numbers that are prime to each other, the one containing oddity, and the other evenness, yet they coëxist in another number which equals their sum; or also in their product. But if it be said that the one number or nature cannot become the other, then we have only a truism. For it is impossible that one individual can become identical with another; for that would imply a transference of individuality which is an absurdity. However, by a metamorphosis, one object may take the place of another and be called by its name. So of all the contraries enumerated by Socrates, they may change and take each others' places; and this is all that is required to prove the insufficiency of the argument. For, granted that life and death are contrary, and that the soul is life, does it therefore follow that it cannot undergo some change and die? Life, it is true, cannot ever become death; for the former is an existence, and the latter an act or change; but this does not prevent one yielding to the influence of the other. And truly, in the bodily dissolution there is at least a change wrought in the manner of the soul's action, and we are not warranted in saying that this does not also extend to its being. And, besides, if there is no change in the soul, then it is absolute and eternal; never having been born, never dying, never affected by contact with matter, and always acting in precisely the same manner. Here, again, in assuming that the soul is life, and therefore does not admit the approach of death, the thing to be proven is taken for granted. Let us, however, try the principle of contraries by some examples and see whether it holds good. In the case of chemical elements of opposite natures, the very difference makes them unite with the greater activity. So also, the more intense the opposite states of electricity, in the same proportion do they tend to form a union. And besides, the soul most assuredly admits contraries within itself, as virtue and vice. The Christian in this life is neither wholly virtuous nor vicious; so that these two principles, diametrically opposite, admit each

other. Again; a very wicked man may become a good one; vice is then destroyed and virtue assumes its place. The beauty of youth is succeeded by the wrinkles and deformity of age; the beauty is thus destroyed. The germ of a plant may perish; life is here absorbed by death. Life exists as clearly in plants and animals as in men, yet no one supposes that dissolution in them merely sends away, but not actually destroys, the living principle. So that the logical consequences of the premises assumed do not justify the conclusion; neither do the deductions of experience favor it; and we are compelled to take leave of the formal part of this celebrated argument with the conviction that the case is not proven. Every candid inquirer is compelled at least to adopt the language of one of the auditors: "In consequence of the magnitude of our subject, and the humble opinion I hold of human weakness, I am compelled still to entertain incredulity in the argument."*

Socrates afterwards makes additional remarks on the ceremonies of religion, and instances the voice of tradition in defense of his positions. He maintains that the institutions of worship depend chiefly upon the notion of rewards and punishments in a future life. Now how far this idea did prevail, is not very well understood; for the opinions are so contradictory. It is declared in the beginning of the Dialogue, that the common opinion is that the soul is dissipated and destroyed at death. Many similar examples might be adduced, but we will refer only to the Idyls of Moschus,† where it is declared that there will be no awakening from the sleep of death. The responses from classical authors on this subject are as various and contradictory as those of the oracle at Delphi; and even if the opinion prevailed universally, this would not prove its truth, or strengthen the logic of the argument by which it is defended. Doubtless the popular belief depended far more on tradition than the arguments of philosophy; but it has not been our purpose to invalidate the former, but to examine carefully the force of the several positions by which human reason, in its highest representative, Socrates, attempted to establish on a rational basis the truth of this belief. That traditions were re-

* 107 C. sub fin.

† Dirge on Bion, 44-46.

ceived from the patriarchs is certain, from the resemblance between the mythology and the narrations of Holy Writ; such, for example, as the parallel between Isaac and Iphigenia; and the histories of Samson and Hercules. Besides, it is nearly certain that the learned men of Greece, in their numerous journeys to Egypt and the East, would meet with the Old Testament. This would account far more satisfactorily for the wide-spread popular notions on this subject, than the speculations of the philosophers. For, besides their abstruseness, which would prevent them from being understood by the multitude, they had comparatively little influence on those who uttered them. Even Socrates himself says, at the conclusion of the *Apology*: "But now it is time to depart—for me to death, for you to live; yet which of us will come to a better fate none but God knows."*

It seems to be clear then that the Immortality of the Soul was not proved by Socrates; and we further hold that if neither he nor any of the ancient philosophers, who all used much the same line of argumentation, did establish its truth, then there is no likelihood that human reason can do it. But we go so far as to say that the thing is not capable, from the nature of the case, to be proven. For it requires us to prove that for which we have no data to reason from. The nature of the soul is wholly unknown. It may be simple, or it may be compound. Death may change its nature just as much as it does the body; or even wholly annihilate it. We can follow the dying man down to the river of death, but we cannot cross with him; and "no traveller returns from that bourne" to tell us of "the undiscovered country." To a man destitute of all revelation, dependent entirely upon his own reason and observation, the spectacle of death would unquestionably appear as the termination of existence. The body of his friend is all that is left to him, and its speedy dissolution would soon compel him, from an instinct of nature, to bury his dead out of his sight. This would be the final act, as far as the senses or intellect could discover. It has been well said, "As there was no antecedent probability before death took place among men, that it would occur; so when it was realized,

* 42 A.

there was no antecedent probability that any other life would follow."

But it has been claimed that analogies drawn from the natural world clearly teach this doctrine. Analogy, in its proper sphere, is a valuable aid to probable reasoning; but is valid only to the extent that the cases compared are similar. Here, however, there is no known correspondence. For all examples stop short before they reach a point from which a comparison can be instituted. The condition of things beyond the grave are to mortal eye involved in perfect mystery. But did any plant or animal, after passing through death, revive and live again, then there would be room for analogy. Such is not the case to our knowledge, but quite the reverse: wherefore, if this method of proof be employed at all, it must have a damaging effect. But it is maintained that the idea of a moral government requires a future state in order to mete out the justice not dispensed here. However, we look at this question influenced by our ideas of retributive justice and perfect administration, gleaned from revelation; and we cannot think of this subject at all without being affected by this knowledge. The same may be said with proper qualification of all the heathen who had some of the same light from tradition. Yet when we consider the universal prevalence of injustice; the triumph of might over right; the enormous and unavoidable amount of suffering in sentient nature; if we project the past into the future, which, when destitute of light from heaven, is all we can do, we can see no reason to expect a future state for dispensing justice; since there is no likelihood that it will be done. Better, indeed, that there be no future at all than for a state of misery to be renewed; and past experience could give us no other hope. Nor is it clear that reason alone would teach us that we are under such moral government. If the preponderance of vice and cruelty is any proof of the character of a Ruler in his dominion, then, truly, the condition of a world lying in sin would rather suggest the contrary view. We must not be misunderstood here. Man, as enlightened from above, reasons more correctly; but without any such supernatural knowledge, would, we fully believe, either look for no future at all; or, if he did, expect it with apprehension of evil.

If these things be so, where is the great use to us in betaking ourselves to the responses of natural reason to show that we shall live after death? Surely the evidences which have been adduced by the most powerful intellects are neither conclusive in proof of the fact, nor were they satisfactory to those who employed them. Shall the man, then, who has the more sure word of prophecy, as a lamp shining in a dark place, forsake this light and return to grope in the darkness of heathenism? Nothing can be more absurd than this procedure in its results; for whatever their wisdom taught them concerning a future state, the heathen lived as though not recognizing it. What can be a greater exhibition of folly than for Christians to employ the resources of heathenism to prove that which has already been demonstrated? There is no fact more clearly taught in Scripture, and one on which greater stress is laid, or more momentous issues depend, than the resurrection of the dead. If this be not proven all revelation is a myth. This issue is accepted by the Apostle; *If there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen: And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ: whom he raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not.* But, say some, If we thus summarily reject the use of reason in establishing the doctrines of religion, we at once alienate those who might otherwise be brought within the sphere of Gospel influence. But we do not reject reason in any case which lies within its sphere. However, as has been shown, the truth in question could never be established by reason, and hence, could only be known by direct revelation; and the experience of ages confirms this assertion. Nay, even the fact that any truth was revealed shows that it could not otherwise be discovered. Future life is constantly spoken of in the Word of God as a subject of direct revelation, and that cannot be revealed which is already known. Again, the disposition which makes men fly from the teachings of Holy Writ, and betake themselves to reason, is such that it cannot be satisfied by any proof which can be offered; so that the difficulty is not in the lack of sufficient evidence, but an unwillingness to believe that which is clear. Now, if we believe in the Word of God we must

accept its teachings as independent dicta, requiring no proof. If we do not, then abandon it altogether. The real question to be settled in that case is the credibility of Revelation. But the day for discussing this has well nigh passed. Every inch of the ground has been the theatre of a hard fought battle, and the infidel has been beaten in every encounter; so that the Christian now occupies the high vantage of eternal truth; and as long as he remains in this position he is secure. But if he abandons his stronghold, and attempts, single-handed, to establish that which man never yet succeeded in doing, he acts unwisely by the attempt, and loses all the moral strength of his cause by his evident distrust. All that can possibly be gained is a probability; and the reasoning by which this is arrived at, so long and perplexing, that it has no real influence on men, except in fostering a spirit of vain self-confidence that renders them still more averse to the Gospel. If there be any candid seekers after truth who are in perplexity, let them look around themselves for evidence of the credibility of Revelation. The Christian religion is itself, in its establishment and growth, the most conclusive evidence. It testifies for itself that it is divine, and reflects the character of its great Original in every lineament.

The revealed Word enables us now to read the testimony of Nature; and so far as this has been made to show that the latter accords with the former, it is all well enough. This is only showing that the Word of God interprets that which beside would be a mystery; for now being interrogated by its Master, Nature returns the voice of recognition. This is done by Butler satisfactorily. But this is very different from the attempt at independent demonstration. The one shows that Nature accords with Revelation; the other ignores what God has said, and tries to establish on better grounds that which is declared by eternal truth. With this we have no patience, no matter where and by whom employed; for it misapprehends the true position of the Christian, and fills weak minds with anxiety lest the truths thus advocated rest on no better evidence.

The Word then must be honored by a cordial acceptance and fearless exposition. It is the Christian's weapon; simple, yet powerful and unanswerable; sufficient to cast down every strong-

hold of infidelity, and accompanied by the Divine Spirit, to subdue the most determined unbelief. God will have his truth honored as the instrument of bringing men to the light; and thus it is, while the most labored efforts and powerful logic fall still-born, or at best amuse, the simple declaration of the Word by the plain, earnest-minded Christian, will prove more than a match for the hardest heart. Instead then of ringing changes on the argument for the soul's immortality which are as old as Socrates, he takes for his weapon the Sword of the Spirit. Instead of winnowing the chaff of heathenism in quest of the wretched grains upon which it hungered and died, he comes to the storehouse of God and is satisfied. He sees that the susceptible minds of true philosophers longed for more light from Heaven than they possessed, and is moved with pity as he views them staggering like blind men in the uncertain twilight of Nature. From this obscurity he gladly escapes; acknowledging with thankfulness his own superior ground of confidence. No longer does darkness throw its pall over the loved one who is consigned to the tomb; for even before light has departed in the west, the east is gilded by the beams of approaching day; and fearlessly the believer himself enters the dark valley, leaning on the arm of *our Saviour, Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel.*

C.

ART. VI. — *Ulphilas.*

Die Heiligen Schriften Alten und Neuen Bundes in Gothischer Sprache.

Mit Gegenüberstehendem Griechischem und Lateinischem Texte, Anmerkungen, Wörterbuch, Sprachlehre, und Geschichtlicher Einleitung von H. F. Massmann. Stuttgart. Verlag von S. G. Liesching. 1857.

No. I.

As an introduction to the history of the translation of the Scriptures into Gothic by Ulphilas, we propose to give, in the present number, a brief notice of the Goths and their language.

The tribes which overran and subjugated the Roman empire were denominated *Goths* — a name with which we associate rudeness and barbarity. Hence Goth has come to be used as a term of reproach. The Goths were doubtless rude and uncultivated; but in every moral quality they surpassed the refined nations that they conquered. Their blood still flows in the Germanic tribes, among which is found most of the learning, wealth, and power of the world.

The Goths were a branch of the great Indo-European family of nations, and spread irregularly towards the north of Europe, and at different periods, and in different regions, came in contact with the more civilized nations of the south. They were known to these nations by the name of *Getæ* or *Scythæ*. Though some writers seem to use the terms *Scythæ* and *Getæ* as distinct, yet it has long been admitted that they are the same ethnical name. Georgius Syncellus says, that "the Scythians are also designated Goths in their own language, and that passing the Ister, they depopulated the Roman empire in the time of Decius." Photius, on the testimony of Philostorgius, states, "that Ulphilas, bishop of the Goths, otherwise called Ulphilas, in his time brought much people with him into the Roman empire, of the Scythians beyond the Ister, whom the ancients indeed called *Getæ*, but the moderns, *Gothi*." Gibbon, who paid much attention to this subject, observes, that Zozimus, and the Greeks, give the name of Scythians to those whom Jornandes and the Latin writers constantly represent as Goths.

Jornandes, professing to derive his authority from the traditions of the Goths, makes them of Scandinavian descent. The Goths inhabited Scandinavia, but it was not their original habitation. Under different local names they occupied originally the whole of the districts, which extend from the north-east of Irân to the borders of Thrace. Stephanus describes them as a nation anciently inhabiting the district within the Palus Mæotis.

A term is frequently prefixed to the ethnical designation Getæ, or Gothi, to distinguish the particular tribe, or nation; as, *Mæso-Gothi*, *Visi-Gothi*, *Ostro-Gothi*. The *Mæso-Gothi* were the Goths of Mæsia, which extended from the confluence of the Save and the Danube to the Euxine, including the countries now called Bosnia, Servia, and Lower Bulgaria. The *Visi-Gothi*, *Vese-Gothæ*, or *Wisi-Gothi*, had their name from their western situation, *wese* signifying the west. The *Ostro-Gothi*, or *Austro-Gothi*, were the Goths of the east. The exact geographical boundaries of these tribes it is not necessary to delineate.

The Gothic language, according to Bopp, is the link between the Sanscrit and the modern Teutonic dialects. "I think," says that great philologist, "I am reading Sanscrit, when I am reading Ulphilas."

The oldest form of the Gothic language is the *Mæso-Gothi*, which is the most ancient of all written Germanic idioms. It was into this idiom that the Bible was translated by Ulphilas. The Gothic is not a separate dialect of the Germanic family, but the Low German itself in its primitive forms, and hence of great importance to the German philologist. Though as a national, or written tongue, it has ceased to exist, yet in it are found all the roots and important laws of more recent German idioms. It is the parent of both the Scandinavian and Germanic idioms; at least they are subject to the same linguistic laws, and closely related to it in form and structure.

The Germanic group of languages is divided into the *Low-German* and the *High-German*. The *Low-German*, of which the oldest form is the Gothic, comprises the Icelandic, Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, Anglo-Saxon, English, Frisian, Dutch, and Platt-Deutsch. The *High-German* differs in forms and laws of euphony from these dialects; and it had an independent existence

and a high degree of perfection at a time when the Gothic was still a national tongue.

"Jacob Grimm, who is here, as in all philology, master and highest authority, mentions four characteristic features of the *Low-German* group, which distinguish it from the languages of other nations. The *Ablaut*, or radical change of vowels as it occurs in the inflection of the strong verb; the commutation of sounds according to fixed and permanent rules; the weak noun and the weak verb. Of these the commutation of sounds is the most important principle, as its influence is seen already in those roots which the German idioms have in common with all Indo-European languages, and as it is that feature which gives to them now their peculiar Germanic character. The other three refer only to the mode of expressing certain relations in German proper." *

This commutation consists in the regular change of the mutes by the different members of the same family. So regular and consistent is the change that it constitutes an important philological law. These mutes retain their quality, as labials, dentals, and gutturals; but they pass from tenuis to media, and from media to aspirate. It is only their quantity, then, that is changed; and the law which governs the change is the following: The media of each of the three organs of speech, (labial, dental, and guttural,) passes into the corresponding tenuis, the tenuis into the aspirate, and the aspirate again into the media. This law, in its application to all three orders of mutes, has been indicated by J. Grimm, in the following table:

In Greek, Latin, Sanscrit.	In Gothic.	In Old High-German,
<i>Medial</i> corresponds to	<i>Tenuis</i>	and to <i>Aspirate</i> .
<i>Aspirate</i> "	<i>Medial</i>	" <i>Tenuis</i> .
<i>Tenuis</i> "	<i>Aspirate</i>	" <i>Medial</i> .

Applied to the labials only, this law may be expressed thus:

Latin, Greek, Sanscrit,	B.	F.	P.
Gothic,	P.	B.	F.
Old High German,	F.	P.	B. (V.)

* De Vere's Comparative Philology.

EXAMPLES.

<i>Sanscrit.</i>	<i>Greek.</i>	<i>Latin.</i>	<i>Gothic. Old High-German.</i>	
pāda-s	ποῦς, ποδ-ός	pes, ped-is	fotus	vuoz
pūrna	πῦρ	plenus	fulls	vol
pitr	πατήρ	pater	fadrein	vatar
upari	ὑπέρ	super	ufar	ubar
bhrātr		frater	brothar	pruoder
bhri	φέρω	fero	baira	piru
tvam	σύ	tu	thu	du
trayas	τρεῖς	tres	threis	dri
antara	ἕτερος	alter	anthar	andar
danta-m	ὀδόντ-α	dentem	thuntu-s	sand
dvar	θύρα	fores	daur	tor
gnā	γνώμ	gnosco	kan	chan

As the Gothic has no labial or guttural aspirates, and as the High-German uses *z* instead of the dental aspirate, this law cannot be carried out in all cases; but the anomalies are too few to impair its correctness.

The other characteristic features of the *Low-German* group of languages, enumerated by Jacob Grimm, are the *Ablaut*, the weak declension, and the weak conjugation. The *Ablaut* consists in a radical change of vowels in the inflection of the strong verb, though it is not confined to the verb, but passes through the whole language. For example, in German, *nehmen*, *nahm*, *genommenen*; *sterben*, *starb*, *gestorben*; and *binden*, *band*, *gebunden*: and, in English, most of the so-called irregular verbs. The law of the *Ablaut* is based upon the fact that, in these languages, *a*, *i*, and *u*, are the original vowels, and the source of the others.

The weak declension inserts an *n* in the syllable formed by inflexion, or adds it to that syllable, as in the following example:

	<i>Singular.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>
N.	han-a,	han-ans,
G.	han-ins,	han-anê,
D.	han-in,	han-am,
A.	han-an,	han-ans,
V.	han-a,	han-ans.

This is distinguished from the strong declension by the fact that the latter adds the syllable, or letter, formed by inflexion, imme-

diately to the stem of the noun, without the insertion of a letter to strengthen the termination. e. g :

	<i>Singular.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>
N.	fisk-s,	fisk-ôs,
G.	fisk-is,	fisk-ê,
D.	fisk-a,	fisk-am,
A.	fisk,	fisk-ans,
V.	fisk,	fisk-ôs.

The weak conjugation embraces such verbs only as are changed by adding a termination, while the strong conjugation is characterized by the change of the radical vowel in the preterite. e. g :

STRONG CONJUGATION.

PRESENT INDICATIVE.

	<i>1st Person.</i>	<i>2d Person.</i>	<i>3d Person.</i>
<i>Singular,</i>	nas-ja,	nas-jis,	nas-jith,
<i>Dual,</i>	nas-jôs,	nas-jats,	
<i>Plural,</i>	nas-jam,	nas-jith,	nas-jand.

IMPERFECT INDICATIVE.

	<i>1st Person.</i>	<i>2d Person.</i>	<i>3d Person.</i>
<i>Singular,</i>	nas-ida,	nas-idês,	nas-ida,
<i>Dual,</i>		nas-idêduts,	
<i>Plural,</i>	nas-idêdum,	nas-idêduth,	nas-idêdun.

WEAK CONJUGATION.

PRESENT INDICATIVE.

	<i>1st Person.</i>	<i>2d Person.</i>	<i>3d Person.</i>
<i>Singular,</i>	salb-o,	salb-os,	salb-oth,
<i>Dual,</i>		salb-ots,	
<i>Plural,</i>	salb-ôm,	salb-ôth,	salb-ônd.

IMPERFECT INDICATIVE.

	<i>1st Person.</i>	<i>2d Person.</i>	<i>3d Person.</i>
<i>Singular,</i>	salb-ôda.	salb-ôdês,	salb--ôda,
<i>Dual,</i>		salb-ôdêduts,	
<i>Plural,</i>	salb--ôdêdum,	salb-ôdêduth,	salb-ôdêdun.

To this brief outline of the characteristics of the Low German

group we will subjoin, as a specimen of the Gothic, the translation of the Lord's Prayer into that language by Ulphilas. Matthew, vi: 9--13.

9. Atta unsar thu in himinam, veihnái namô thein.

10. Kvímái thiudinassus theins. Vairthái vilja theins, svê in himina jah ana airthái.

11. Hláf unsarana thana sinteinan gif uns himma daga.

12. Jah aflet uns, thatei skulans sijáima, svasvê jah veis afletam thaim skulam unsarám.

13. Jah ni briggáis uns in fráistubnjái, ak láusai uns af thamma ubilin; untê theina ist thiudangardi jah mahts jah vulthus in áivins. Amen.

GRAMMATICAL REMARKS.

Atta signifies father. Striking analogies to it are found in the Basque *Aita*, Tartar *Atai*, Magyar *Atya*, in the Mississippi Indian *Ota*, in the Canadian Indian *Addathy*, and in the Greenland *Atatak*.

Unsar, our. The position of the pronoun and adjective after the substantive is an imitation of the Greek, and not idiomatic German.

Thu in himinam, thou in heaven. The omission of the verb is also an imitation of the Greek. *Himinam* is the dative plural from *himins*. *Veihnái*, *kvímdi*, and *vairthái* are in the third person of the present subjunctive, from the verbs *veiþan*, to sanctify, *kviman*, to come, and *vairthan*, to be done, (German *werden*, *ent- stehen*, *erscheinen*, *geschehen*, *kommen*.)

The *n* in *veihnái* is inserted for the sake of euphony.

Namo thein, thy name. The pronoun is placed last, in imitation of the Greek.

Thiudinassus theins, thy kingdom. The pronoun placed last, as before, according to the Greek idiom. *Thiudinassus* is from *thiuda*, people, whence comes *Deutsch*, the term by which the Germans designate themselves.

Vilja theins, thy will. German, *wille*; English, *will*. *Svê* corresponds to the German *wie*, as *jah*, equivalent to the Greek *kai*. *Ana*, on, in, or upon. *Airthái* is the dative singular of *airtha*, earth; German *erde*; Anglo-Saxon, *eard*, *cord*; Swedish, *iord*; Greek *spa*. The same forms are found in the Shemitic

languages: e. g. Hebrew, *erets*; Chaldaic, *arta*; Syriac, *arto*. *Hlaif unsarana*, our bread, the accusative singular of *hlaifs*, bread, and *unsar*, our. Anglo-Saxon, *hläf*, *hlaf*, *laf*: Old Frisian, *läf*; Slavonic, *chleb*; English, *loaf*.

Thana Sinteinan, the always-existing, or ever-continuing. *Thana* is the accusative singular of the article *thai*, the. *Sinteinan* is from *sinteino*, always. The construction of the whole of the fourth petition is modeled after the Greek idiom.

It is unnecessary to extend our analysis. The specimens that have been given are sufficient to show the leading characteristics of the Gothic. With that accomplished, we will conclude the present article.

C. E.

ART. VII. — *Nature and Revelation—in relation to the Origin of our Conception of a God.*

We propose to discuss in this Article, a question upon which the sentiments of thinkers are by no means in unison. As the position which we shall maintain, is one at variance with that held by many wise and good men, we wish to present our thoughts with becoming deference and modesty. Should we at any time be betrayed into expressions savouring of over confidence, we hope that such expressions will be attributed to the glow of argument, and the earnestness of conviction; not to any disposition to disparage the ability of those whose opinions are diverse from our own, or to underrate the strength of the arguments with which they attempt to sustain those opinions.

The question which is to occupy our thoughts, relates to the powers of the human mind, in the state in which man now is, as a fallen and depraved being, to form a system of religious belief, without any aid from a supernatural source. The pertinency of such a discussion at the present time, is apparent from the fact that there are men of talent, learning and influence, who professing to be religious men, utterly deny the fact—some of them even the possibility—of any supernatural revelation. These men influence the course of thought by books written with much ability,

exhibiting the polish imparted by high scholarship, and a certain *unction* of religion, marvellous to find in works of such principles and tendency. Nay, more; they control the teachings of one of our Foreign Quarterlies, exhibiting in its various departments a very high order of ability and culture; standing, in these particulars, second perhaps to no similar periodical in the English language.

The assumption upon which these men proceed, an assumption lying at the basis of the Deism of the eighteenth, and the Rationalism of the nineteenth century, is, that man, by the study of his own mental and moral constitution, and a contemplation of the works of nature, could, without any supernatural assistance, deduce therefrom the fundamental truths of religion and morals. And still further, they hold, that in point of fact, this is the way in which men first obtained a knowledge of these fundamental truths. There is a certain diversity of sentiment amongst those who agree on the main points of this system as to the extent to which men may go, in this process. Some admit articles into the creed, as evidently taught by the constitution and course of nature, which others exclude, as having no sufficient ground of belief; a fact in itself, in our judgment, fatal to the whole theory. But all, without exception, who espouse this system at all, claim that the existence of God is one of the truths taught by nature.

This opinion of man's ability to learn a system of religion from nature, independently of all supernatural interference, would exert a less baleful influence in the world, and be altogether less worthy of our present consideration, were it not for the sanction it has received from Christian Divines, and Philosophers of the highest name. These, in the contests which they have waged with Atheism, have used those arguments which, to men already in possession of an idea of one supreme, infinite, and eternal Spirit, Nature furnishes, in strength and number sufficient to convict the Atheist of inexcusable folly: but in pursuing with ardour the retreating forces of Atheism, they expose the flank of the Christian host to an enemy more dangerous, because more plausible and more numerous than the defeated foe. They are strenuous asserters of a "Natural Theology." And by Natural Theology they do not mean simply a body of truths in harmony with the constitution of

the universe—or in support of which strong and cogent, and even conclusive, arguments may be drawn from the course of nature and the structure of the human being. This is all that the argument against the Atheist requires. But they go further, and claim that the truths of Natural Theology are not merely accordant with the teachings of nature, and susceptible of being proved by arguments drawn from that source; but that man could originate, nay that man has, in some instances, for himself, originated a system of religious belief, comprehending the existence of One Supreme, Eternal, Infinite, Spiritual, Being, without any aid, direct or indirect, from a supernatural Revelation; but by a simple contemplation of the works of nature alone. Such being the course of argument pursued by the Christian Philosopher when opposing the onset of the Atheist, he finds that his own arguments are turned, with all the force of an *argumentum ad hominem*, against himself, when, in opposition to the hosts of Rationalism, he asserts the need of a supernatural Revelation.

We would not detract an iota from the argument drawn from nature, in proof of the existence of God. We freely grant that it is conclusive. But we deny that man destitute of all previous knowledge of a God ever did construct, or ever could have constructed, the argument. To invent arguments by which a truth already known may be proved, is one thing; to discover an unknown truth, a vastly different thing. A school-boy can demonstrate the forty-seventh proposition of Euclid: to discover it, required the genius of a Pythagoras. Men who have already obtained the idea of a God, can perceive proofs of his existence on every side. But suppose that idea obliterated; suppose all knowledge derived from supernatural revelation effaced: Would these proofs have been perceived? Would their significancy have been understood? Would a system of natural religion ever have been constructed? Here we take issue with the old fashioned Deist, the modern Rationalist, and those Christian Philosophers, who, agreeing with the opponents of revelation on this point, maintain the sufficiency of natural reason to discover the fundamental doctrines of religion. We hold that the first knowledge which man obtained of the existence of God, of His attributes, and of his own relation to Him, he obtained by revelation; that man by his degeneracy and in-

disposition of heart to the knowledge and service of God, was lapsing into idolatry, when God was pleased to perpetuate the knowledge of Himself, and the method of gaining His favour, by the selection of a single nation, to which He gave by extraordinary Revelation a system of laws and institutions, most peculiar in themselves, and intended to preserve this nation a separate and peculiar nation, as also to be typical of truths intended to be revealed more fully and clearly in future times; that, finally, God having at sundry times and in divers manners spoken unto the fathers by the prophets, did in the last days speak unto men through his Son, by whom life and immortality were brought to light; who is himself "God manifest in the flesh;" of whom and by whom it is declared: "No man knoweth the Father save the Son and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him!" Thus we believe the origin of man's knowledge of God was due to a supernatural revelation; the perpetuation of that knowledge to an extraordinary revelation; the completion and perfection of that knowledge to a most wonderful and gracious, and wholly supernatural, revelation. Nevertheless, it is admitted, that in the intervals between these successive manifestations of Himself, and in regions to which the first and second of them did not extend, "God left not Himself without witness;" but that man, both in the works of creation and providence, and in the mental, moral, and physical structure of his own being, had abundant evidence of the existence, power and goodness of God, had he been willing to use the light he had. In other words, the whole course of nature furnished abundant and conclusive confirmation of that original Revelation, made to the first pair, and repeated to the second progenitor of the human race, Noah, that God is, and is a rewarder of all them that diligently seek Him. Whatever then may be the logical order in which science requires natural and supernatural theology to be arrayed historically, and as a matter of fact, revealed religion was first in the order of time.

We bespeak the patient attention of our readers to a discussion of the prominent arguments of those who have embraced the opposite opinion, before setting forth the positive grounds upon which our own is based.

One of the arguments commonly used to prove that man, with-

out Revelation, can attain to a knowledge of God, is founded on the alledged universality of the belief in a God. The argument is a very plain and simple one, and may be thus stated: All men have some idea of a God. But all men have not Revelation. Therefore, without Revelation men may obtain an idea of God.

In order to the conclusiveness of this argument, there are two points that must be established: 1st. That the major proposition, that all men have some idea of God, is true. And, if this be made out, 2d. That this idea is not derived from Revelation. On the first point it is needless to say any thing more, at present, than this: its truth is seriously doubted, and requires proof before it can be admitted as an argument. But waiving this now, or admitting for the sake of the argument that all men have an idea of a Supreme Being; still, it is essential to the validity of the argument, that those who adduce it prove that this idea was not obtained, originally, from supernatural Revelation. Can this be established? Has any attempt been made to establish it? Is not the contrary both the most reasonable supposition in itself, and that in support of which most convincing testimony may be adduced? We will return to this point in our positive argument. In the mean time, as we address ourselves to those who admit both the possibility and the fact of a divine Revelation, it is sufficient for us to observe that on the very day of Adam's creation, there was a supernatural communication from God to him: [Gen. i: 28 29, and ii: 16, 17] that these communications were continued to him and others throughout the antediluvian period: that to Noah and his sons, both before and after the flood, direct revelations were made; that with them a covenant was entered into by God himself, and a visible token of that covenant agreed upon; and that of the three sons of Noah "was the whole earth overspread." [Gen. ix: 19.] Would it be at all strange, therefore, if there should be found amongst every people, some traces of the knowledge of a Supreme Being, thus revealed to the progenitors of the race? If the voice of Nature were hushed; if all the regularity of her works were changed into the wildest confusion; if no wise and skillful adaptations or benevolent contrivances were perceptible throughout the whole range of created things; if every sound were agony, every sight a petrifying spectacle; if, in a word, every

trace of God's handiwork were obliterated, would it be strange, if throughout the earth there could not be found a nation, tribe, or individual, without the idea of a God? Would not the great and momentous fact of the existence of One Supreme, Infinite, and Eternal Being, whose favour was to be propitiated, and whose displeasure shunned, be likely to be communicated from father to son, from one generation to another, in all their subsequent wanderings and dispersions? Would not the very appearance of the rainbow, a striking and altogether unique object, which their philosophy did not enable them to resolve into a purely natural phenomenon, be, to the primitive races of men, a most powerful means of perpetuating the knowledge of Him who had expressly declared it to be the token of his covenant? Thus may the widely diffused idea of a God be satisfactorily accounted for, without the assumption of man's ability, in the use of his natural reason alone, to make the sublime deduction. That idea is the trace of a primitive revelation. Precisely in the same way have other facts, of far less interest, been handed down by tradition. What is the Golden Age of the poets, but a tradition of the purity and happiness of Paradise before the Fall? What the idea of a progressive degeneracy from the Age of gold to one of silver, then of brass, and at last of iron, but the sad history of the fall and corruption of the human race? In nearly every land are found traditions of a Deluge, which destroyed the human race, traditions which must have taken their origin from the history of Noah, and been perpetuated among his descendants in all their wide dispersion. Admitting, therefore, all that is claimed for the universal diffusion of the notion of a God, we are still left to determine the origin of this conception. We are still to inquire whether it is originated by the mind for itself, from a consideration of the works of Nature, or is to be traced back to an original revelation.

Another of the arguments used to show that man without revelation can attain to a knowledge of God is drawn from the declarations of the Sacred Scriptures. "The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handiwork." [Psalm xix: 1.] "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are

without excuse." [Rom. i: 20.] We are not conscious of holding any opinion at variance with the doctrine of these passages. We have already admitted that on every page of the volume of Nature, there are stamped, indelibly, the characters of Divinity. We have further admitted that, benighted and ignorant as the natural man is, and alienated as he is from the life of God through the ignorance that is in him, because of the blindness of his heart, still, in his actual posture, with reference to a Divine Revelation originally given, man may and ought to trace, in the works of God, the evidences of that Supreme power and divinity by which they were made and are still sustained; and if he fail to do so, he is wholly inexcusable. Such we understand to be the teaching of the passages cited. They speak of man just as he is found. Their aim is not speculative, but practical. The object of the Apostle Paul is not to prove that the heathen would have been inexcusable, in a certain imagined state of case, wholly unlike the reality: but to show that, in their actual circumstances, they were without excuse. He does not consider the case of human beings, cut off from all sources of traditionary knowledge, placed in the midst of the Creation of God, and left to interpret, as best they might, the mysteries around and within them, without any guide but the darkened understanding and blinded heart which is their natural heritage. But he considers the case of men, who had a traditionary knowledge of God, and in addition, a discovery of His perfections in the works of His hands. It is of these latter — men really found at Rome, whither this epistle was first sent, and elsewhere — that he affirms "they are without excuse." This was all that his argument required. This is all that we can admit he affirms. It may be true that a human being, exposed in infancy, and having no intercourse with mankind, a mere Orson of the woods, is inexcusable for not discovering the perfections, and adoring the majesty, of Him whose eternal power and Godhead are clearly seen in the things that are made. But this is not Paul's doctrine here. Still less is it his doctrine, that such an one would actually discover the existence and perfections of the only living and true God.

Perhaps the most effective argument employed to show that supernatural revelation is unnecessary to communicate to man a

knowledge of the Supreme Being, is that drawn from the existence of the works of Nature, and the evidences of contrivance and design manifest therein. The whole argument, in both its branches, may be thus stated —

There can be no effect without an adequate cause:

But the material universe is an effect:

Therefore it must have had a cause.

Now as the first, in a long series of causes, must have been itself uncaused, or self-existent, it matters not how far back we carry the process, we must, at last, arrive at the First Cause or God, the self-existent Creator.

Take the other branch of the same general argument:

Wherever we trace marks of contrivance or design, we know there must have been an intelligent designer:

But throughout all nature, marks of design are manifest:

Therefore, Nature is the work of an intelligent designer.

And this again leads us up to the knowledge of a Wise, Omnipotent, Benevolent Being, the Creator of all things.

This is the substance of the argument exhibited by Natural Theology. The principle on which it proceeds is axiomatic. It admits of an endless induction of instances, in which the wise adaptations of means to ends, the benevolent adjustments of Nature in all her departments are manifest. We feel its force; we admit the overwhelming conclusiveness of the answer to every effort made to evade its crushing weight. It is utterly unanswerable. Is the question, then, settled against us? Must we abandon, as untenable, the position hitherto maintained? Not at all. What does the argument prove? It proves that God exists. But what is the point which it is adduced now to prove? That man, without other revelation than that made by Nature, could discover this great truth. These propositions are far from being identical. An argument, perfectly conclusive in establishing the one, may be wholly destitute of convincing force when adduced in support of the other. They who maintain the originality of Natural Religion, must advance one step farther before they can avail themselves of this argument. It is incumbent upon them to show that men, without the assistance of Revelation, would ever have thought of the argument. This we deny. Were it not for ideas

derived from an original revelation, entering essentially into the argument, it could never have been constructed.

Take the first statement of the argument. It is granted that every rational mind will assent to the proposition, that every effect must have an adequate cause. This is a first truth in moral reasoning. It requires no proof. But not so the minor proposition. That the material universe is an effect, produced by the operation of an independent cause, is not an axiom. It requires proof. How many men can prove it, in this nineteenth century? How many of these could have established this truth, had no light of revelation ever illuminated their minds? What says History in answer? What is the testimony of the Word of God? Those whose investigations of antiquity best entitle them to be heard upon this point, declare, with great unanimity, that the idea of Creation, as the word is now commonly employed — the production of something out of nothing — was absolutely unknown in all the schools of ancient philosophy. Widely different as were their notions respecting other matters, in this one thing they were well nigh all agreed, that matter is eternal. If eternal, then must it be self-existent, and wholly independent, as much so as God himself; so that, where this view prevails, men could no more infer the existence of God from the existence of matter, than they could demonstrate the existence of matter from the existence of God. We admit that some, though not all, nor those of highest name, called in the agency of a formative Principle, which reduced to order and harmony the chaotic elements. Others, however, maintained the eternal existence of the universe, in the form in which we find it. Others still, but they are of later date, hold that the present condition of the universe is the result of a process of "development" in accordance with certain primordial laws. The bearing which these historical facts have upon our discussion is this: If human reason, in its highest exercise, cannot discover the fact of a Creation, it cannot ascertain that the universe is an effect; and therefore the very basis of the argument is destroyed, which attempts to prove that men, by the force of unaided reason, can infer from the existence of the universe that there is, distinct from it, a Being who called it into existence. If unenlightened reason denies a Creation, it cannot lead to a

Creator. If it refuses to recognise the universe as an effect, it cannot ascend to the idea of a Great First Cause.

If the idea of Creation be not an idea originating in the human mind, in the exercise of its unaided faculties, as the history of human thought, and the severest scrutiny and analysis of the mind would appear to teach; it becomes a matter of interest to know what is the origin of that idea. Originally it is not a matter of knowledge, but of faith: we do not believe in Creation because we know it to be true; but we know it to be true because we believe. We reach it not by a process of ratiocination; but we accept it on testimony which completely satisfies our intelligence. Such we understand to be the plain teaching of the Apostle. "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear." [Heb. xi: 3.] The very nature of faith implies a communication *ab extra* to the mind. The framing of the worlds therefore, the making of the visible from the invisible, is matter of faith, and was communicated to man by a divine revelation. Without such revelation, there could have been no such faith. Without such faith there could have been no such understanding amongst men. The whole force of the argument therefore, from the existence of the universe to the existence of God as its Creator, is absolutely dependent on ideas which revelation imparts, and which without revelation could never have been discovered.

Our reply to the other, and more imposing, form of the argument — that founded on the contrivance, the wise adaptation of means to ends, the innumerable beneficent adjustments everywhere manifest in Nature — is in substance the same as that just given to the argument in its other form. When once the idea of a Creator, Ruler, and Moral Governor has been communicated to the mind, it is easy, comparatively, to show how every portion of the universe is in harmony with this idea, and furnishes abundant proof of its truth. But would the idea of a God as Creator, Ruler, and Moral Governor have spontaneously suggested itself to even thoughtful men, who had no other guide but reason, no higher teacher than Nature? It is imperative upon those who answer in the affirmative to show that the argument from final

causes could have been constructed; that the fundamental ideas on which it rests could have been known; had a supernatural revelation never been made to man. This, we may safely assume, never can be done, from the fact that no successful attempt has hitherto been made. But we go a step further. We think it possible to prove a negative. We think it susceptible of proof that not all the order, harmony, and innumerable marks of design, which are apparent to us in Nature, would have originated, in minds destitute of supernatural teaching, the idea of a God. Our reasons for this opinion are, 1st, the undeniable fact that God was at one time known to the whole human family by direct revelation: and 2nd, that notwithstanding the traditions spread among all people from this source, the knowledge of God had disappeared from the minds of an overwhelming majority of mankind. So far from originating the knowledge of the true God, the boasted light of Nature did not even preserve that knowledge once communicated from a higher source. Let us consider the actual condition of all the nations where a succession of Divine Revelations was not kept up:

1st. The schools of ancient philosophy, as we have seen, denied the possibility of Creation. *Ex nihilo nil fit* was a received maxim, which no one presumed to question. Since they acknowledged no Creation, they could believe in no Creator.

2d. The universally received notion of these schools, that matter is eternal, involves conclusions no less sweeping. If eternal, it must be self-existent; that is, it must have the reason of its existence in itself. If matter has the reason of its existence in itself, it is independent of any being. Then whatever qualities or properties we find belonging to it, must be due to some inherent force or energy; for to attribute the properties of an eternally existing independent substance to the operation of some external power upon it, is a contradiction. Such a declaration affirms and denies independent existence, in the same breath. What, in this view, becomes of the argument from final causes? Where is the proof of a Ruler and Governor of the universe? Could the existence of one independent, self-existent being, be inferred from the qualities or properties belonging to another?

3d. The almost universal prevalence of polytheism is a further

illustration of the imbecility of human reason when speculating upon the causes of those appearances which are presented in the works of Nature. If there be more Gods than one, no one can be supreme, else he infringes upon the province of some other; no one can be infinite, for two or more infinite essences is an inconceivable absurdity; no one can be omnipotent, for every where the power of one would be hemmed in, and limited by that of another: in a word, in a system of polytheism, there can be no true and proper conception of a God at all.

Here, then, is the position on which we mainly rely: Mankind, in the absence of supernatural teaching, would more readily conceive the various parts of Nature to be gods, than rise to the conception of an Infinite, Eternal, Spiritual Being, as the Creator and Ruler of Nature. We grant that man's dependent nature, and that conscience within, the feeblest motions of which bear testimony to the existence of a moral system, will prompt to the worship of something as a god. How far this feeling of dependence, and the stirrings of man's moral nature, are due to some straggling rays of light from the primeval revelation, we do not now inquire, and it were perhaps difficult, if not impossible, to determine. But grant that man, from a felt necessity of his nature, will seek some object of religious worship, we hold that he will be more likely to deify some part of Nature herself, than "ascend through Nature, up to Nature's God."

Is not this position confirmed by the history of religion among all nations, where God has not made repeated manifestations of Himself? This deification and worship of Nature has prevailed in all ages, and in various forms, from the grossest Fetichism to the most subtle and refined Pantheism. We find three prevailing forms of Nature worship, all admitting of various subdivisions. 1st The worship of the visible. Under this form we note Sabæaniam, or the worship of the sun, moon, and the host of heaven, which prevailed extensively, and formed the prevalent religion of ancient Chaldaea, Arabia, and Persia. Traces of this form of idolatry were also found in ancient Egypt, and, if we can trust Caesar's account, amongst the rude German tribes of his day. [De bello Gal. B. vi: cap. 21.] Here also belongs the worship of images made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and

creeping things, so common among the heathen of all times, and countries. And under the same head we range the worship of animals, of insects, of vegetable products prevalent in Egypt; and also the reverence paid to the rudest stick, or stone, which constitutes the Fetichism of the African savage. In all these, the worship of visible Nature is the principle.

We may as well anticipate a possible objection here. It may be supposed that these natural objects which the heathen worship, are regarded as the representatives merely of some unseen Divinity, which is the real object of worship, and of which the outward object is only the symbol. This may be true in a few instances. But it still remains to be shown that where this symbolism exists, the object symbolized is the true and living God. This we apprehend will prove a somewhat difficult task. Nor is this all. The explanation, at best, extends only to the philosophers and priests. They alone receive the esoteric explanation of the rites practiced. The poor untaught Hindoo—whose eye is as clear to perceive the beautiful order and wise contrivances apparent in Nature, and who, if she alone demonstrated the existence of God, would have as clear a knowledge of Him as the haughtiest philosopher or priest that ever read the Shaster—has not an idea of a God beyond the horrid image before which he bows, or the mighty Ganges to whose relentless current he commits his aged parents or his helpless offspring.

2d. Another form of Nature worship consists in a personification of her various objects, agencies and powers. Under this division falls the system of Roman and Greek Mythology, the gods of which are indisputably mere personifications of Nature herself. This is evident from the names they bear, the attributes they possess, and from the acknowledgment of those who had opportunities of understanding the system thoroughly. (a) As a specimen—and we can give only a few, in order that the idea may be clearly presented—by the common mythology the first of the gods, and the parent of them all, was Chaos. From Chaos sprang Nyx or Nox—Night: from Nyx, Hemera or Dies—Day. The Ge or Gaia of the Greeks, which is the same as the Tellus or Terra of the Romans, is likewise a daughter of Chaos.* But

* It is curious to observe how traditions from a primeval Revelation may be traced even in the heathen theogonies. First Chaos, then Night, after-

without noting the relation of one god to another, we will merely give the names of some of them, manifestly identifying them with natural objects. Thus we have Uranos—Coelus or Heaven; Saturnus, the same as Chronos or Time; Oceanus, or the water surrounding the whole earth: "the parent of the gods" (Homer); "the parent of three thousand rivers," (Hesiod): The rivers themselves were gods. The Xanthus was no mean antagonist of Achilles on the plains of Troy; the "Uxorious Tiber" avenged the wrongs of the weeping Ilia. Moreover we find Hupnos—Somnus, Sleep—"twin brother of Death"—"king of all gods and men:" Helios—Sol, the Sun-god; and Eos or Aurora, the harbinger of the Sun. Other names could be cited, but these will be sufficient to show the principle which pervades this entire system.

(b) In other cases where the very names of the gods do not designate the natural objects personified by them, the attributes and qualities ascribed to them by the poets, who follow the popular belief, enable us to determine those objects; from which it is manifest the system is a homogeneous one, being throughout an apotheosis of Nature. The kingdom of Saturn was divided between his three sons, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. Pluto is also called Hades, Dis, Orcus, and Tartarus. These terms are descriptive of the nether world, as Neptune is of the sea, and Jupiter of the æther, or upper air. This application of the names, Pluto and Neptune, is so clear as to require no proof. That Jupiter is the personification of the upper air is apparent from many places in the classics: of all which, let the "*Sub Jove frigido*" of Horace, the "*Pater Omnipotens Æther*" of Virgil, and the "*Vernus Jupiter*" of Juvenal, for the present, suffice. Indeed it was an ancient opinion that the distribution of the universe among Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto, the Earth being common to all three, had reference to the four elementary principles, Earth, Air, Water, and Fire. Jupiter representing the air, we can understand the Homeric epithets "cloud impelling," "thunder rejoicing," "far resounding," and "cloud collecting:" we have also an explanation of the fact that the eagle and the thunder-bolts are represented as

wards Day. So Hesiod. "And the earth was *without form and void*; and darkness was upon the face of the deep . . . And God said let there be *light*, and there was light." Thus Moses.

his constant attendants. As Jupiter is the only God in the system in whose behalf any plausible claim can be urged to the character of supreme dominion and almighty power, it may be well to remember that he had a beginning—he is a son of Time. But this is not all: he had also an end! In Crete his tomb was shown, with the inscription, *Οδε μνησιν νευται Ζαν*, “here lies great Jupiter!” There are such various and inconsistent accounts of his exploits, that it is supposed that the poets, with their usual license, attribute to some creature of their own imagination, the actions of many distinguished men. The primitive notion, that he is a personification of the upper air, is too well established to be subverted.

So, if it were needful, we might go on, and identify Juno with the Air, Ceres with Corn, Bacchus with Wine, Mars with War, Apollo with the Sun, Diana with the Moon, Minerva with Wisdom, Venus with Beauty, Cupid, offspring of beauty, with Love, and many other gods, with other natural objects or qualities; but already perhaps, the fact is so plain that further illustration would be tedious.

(c) With the citation of an authority or two, we close this topic. Plato in his *Cratylus* derives the very word which the Greeks use for gods, *θεος*, from the verb *θεω*, “to run,” assigning as a reason for this etymology, that the first gods were the sun, moon and stars, which seemed to run in regular courses round the earth. Seneca asks, “What else is nature than God?” adding. “God and nature are no more different things, than *Annaeus* and *Seneca*.” Even Cudworth admits that all the gods of this system save one, were either “dead men” or “the greater parts of the visible mundane system or corporeal world,” or “mere accidents or affections of substances,” or “ethereal and aerial animals invisible, called *Dæmons*, *Genii*, and *Lares*,” or beings “assigned to particular provinces, places, offices and functions;” but he is sorely puzzled to select the one who will answer his own prescribed conditions of Deity: “infinite goodness, with fecundity; infinite knowledge and wisdom; infinite active and perceptive powers; necessarily existing; and not only the framer of the world, but also the cause of all things.” *

* Intellectual System, B. 1, chap. iv: sec. 13.

3. Another form of Nature worship possessing peculiar attractions for speculative minds in all ages, is Pantheism. This consists in the identification of God with Nature. We find traces of this system in the philosophy of the East, in the earliest ages. Thence it spread to Greece, and was a favourite tenet in more than one of her schools. From Greece it passed into Italy, and distinct avowals of the doctrine are found both in the philosophers and poets of Rome. In the history of modern philosophy, it was revived by Spinoza, and it forms the conclusion to which the theories of many popular and influential thinkers in Germany, in England, in France, and in certain quarters amongst ourselves, inevitably lead. We simply state these facts: we cannot afford the space to adduce quotations, either in proof or for illustration. And the conclusion which we draw from the whole discussion is, that since men, contemplating the works of Nature, and prompted by the moral nature within them, have, even with the light of a supernatural Revelation shedding its rays directly or indirectly upon them, offered direct worship either to the visible objects around them, or to mere personifications and allegorical representations of the various parts, agencies, and powers of Nature, or have identified God with the universe, as a sort of soul, or universal principle, pervading all its parts, without personality or consciousness; it is an inference wholly unauthorized by history or reason, that even all the marks of design in Nature will infallibly lead men, without revelation, to the knowledge of an intelligent Creator.

And in this connection, better perhaps than in any other, we may notice the distinction attempted to be drawn between the vulgar or popular belief, and the views of the philosophers of Paganism. Suppose the Herculean labour accomplished, and the truth made chiefly apparent that the philosophers held to a system of Monotheism, and that the truth of God's unity of essence was a part of the esoteric system taught to the initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. We think neither of these assumptions are proven. But grant the fact to be so, it still remains to be shown, before any effective use can be made of these assumed facts: 1st, that the philosophers were not indebted to revelation for their superior insight. Now when we remember the extensive diffusion of ideas

transmitted by tradition; the long extended journeys of these philosophers and wise men in search of truth; their curious and inquisitive turn of mind; and the fact that God had given to one people the true knowledge of himself; that this was a people of most striking peculiarities, and therefore likely to be an object of peculiar interest; that they had been wisely planted by God, on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, in the highway of commerce, in the centre of the most noted nations of the earth, it will be very difficult to convince a reflecting inquirer, that no ray of Divine truth lighted up the darkness of heathen philosophy, and gave to a Plato or a Socrates whatever of superiority they possessed over the masses of their countrymen. And 2d, that the unity of the Divine Nature which some of the philosophers do certainly teach, is not a unity resulting from the adoption of the system of Pantheism. We have taken the pains to examine the arguments of one of the ablest and most learned, of those who insist that all the gods of the Pantheon were but one God, exhibiting himself variously; and it is our deliberate conviction, that the ground of unity, as set forth in the various citations made, is the identity of Nature and Deity. We have no difficulty in understanding that men may hold that there is one God, when they maintain that every thing is God. Then

"All are but parts of ONE stupendous WHOLE
Whose body Nature is, and God the soul."

But there is very little to choose between Pantheism and Atheism. Perhaps the more correct statement would be that Atheism and Pantheism are identical. We, therefore, reiterate our conclusion, that men, in the absence of supernatural teaching, will more naturally regard the various objects of Nature as God, than from the beauty, order, and harmony thereof, rise to the conception of an invisible, personal, self-conscious, and intelligent Being, if they had no idea of such a Being from another source.

Having thus replied to the more common, and more plausible objections which might be urged against our view, the way is now open for the presentation of some considerations going to show that supernatural revelation is indispensable to the knowledge of God.

We desire, first, to suggest, rather than positively assert, an argument springing from the very nature of the conception of a God, considered in relation to the human faculties, and the universe, so far as our minds are capable of comprehending it. The doctrine of innate ideas has long been exploded. The idea of a God is not born with us. Either it was communicated to the human family by a supernatural revelation, or it is deduced by man's own reason, from the phenomena of the universe. What then is comprehended in this idea? God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being and attributes. In the conclusion, then, of this high deduction, if man originates for himself the idea of God, we find the idea of Infinity, Spirituality, Immutability, Omnipotence, &c. But the works of Nature, cognizable by the human faculties, are finite; the same is true of the faculties themselves: how then can finite faculties, exercising their utmost powers on a finite universe, ascend to the idea of the Infinite? We believe in God, because he has told us what he is. We know that he exists, and that he possesses the attributes that enter into our conception of a God, because we believe. But could we by searching find him out? Is it not true that "the world by wisdom knew not God?" Does not the whole history of the human mind, even in its highest development, show its imbecility when dealing with ideas of God, eternity, and infinity? Do we not, of necessity, believe, on subjects of this sort, far more than we can comprehend? Does not our faith, of necessity, leave our logic far behind? It may be said that man's religious nature, the aspirations of his soul within him, will lead him to the knowledge of God. To this the brief but conclusive answer is, that this prompting of our nature has, in the absence of Divine teaching, been completely satisfied by deifying the objects of Nature around.

Leaving the region of speculation, however, let us come to matters of fact, so far as they bear on the question before us. We maintain that the religious history of the race amply sustains the doctrine of the indispensable necessity of revelation to a knowledge of God.

What is our own experience with reference to this idea? What the result of our observation? Examining our minds, we are conscious of the conception of a God. What is the origin of this

conception? It was not born with us. Did we then arrive at it by a profound argument from effect to cause, founded on what we had observed of the constitution and course of Nature? All will answer No. It was communicated to our minds by the teaching of others. It is traceable not to Nature, but to a kinder, gentler, teacher. As soon as the infant powers are capable of receiving it, a mother's tenderness, and a mother's watchful love and care, imparts an idea of the great God and Maker of all. As soon as the lips can lisp the words, we are taught to approach "Our Father who is in heaven." Trace the matter up, and try and ascertain the origin of this great truth, and we find that one generation was taught by another, and that by a preceding, until we reach the times when God, by direct revelation, made himself known to the parents of the race.

If we inquire of History respecting the origin of this great truth, her very silence is eloquence itself. She has immortalized in her pages the name of no one as the discoverer. Many a name she celebrates as the author of some discovery or invention, by many of which men have become the benefactors of their kind. Why is it that she has been so churlish in her treatment of him, who, as the author of this sublime discovery, merits more regard than all others whose names are on the scroll of fame? Who cried *εὕρηκα, εὕρηκα*, when this truth first burst upon his mind! Who sacrificed hecatombs in gratitude for the discovery? The truth is "I have found it," has never been said of the fact of the Divine existence, simply because it is a discovery which was never made by human reason. Socrates laid no claim to the discovery of the truths he taught, but only to repeat and enforce truths well known before. And how imperfect and inadequate were his conceptions! It is only in Christian countries, that complete systems of Natural Theology are constructed. It is only by plagiarizing the truths received originally by Revelation, that Rationalism can construct systems of belief, in which Revelation is dispensed with as unnecessary. The claim for human Reason, of the power to discover the truths of Natural Religion, has no historical basis on which to rest. It is not true then, historically, as a modern philosopher in dogmatic style asserts, that, "all revealed religion rests upon the pedestal of natural religion." * Systems of natu-

ral religion are only possible to man, as enjoying the light of an original revelation.

Another most important fact we desire to call attention to, as connecting itself with the historical view of this matter. We maintain that every form of religion which has prevailed in the world, exhibits internal proof of its origin in an original revelation. This appears from two circumstances. 1st. The theory which we oppose teaches that men may arrive at the knowledge of a God by contemplating the marks of design and contrivance as exhibited in the works of Nature. Of necessity, we are told, they will be led from a view of these works to infer the existence of Him who made and rules over all. If this be true; if such be the origin of man's conception of a God, what are the attributes and characteristics which will be prominent in the idea of a God, discovered by this process? From the works of Nature, man infers a Creator necessary to call them into existence. From the order and harmony of the universe, he infers a Ruler, guiding and controlling the works which he has made. Here then, if the theory be sound, are the primary ideas which men have of God. He is known as Creator and Governor. If every other relation of God to the world were veiled in obscurity, or utterly unknown, these, at least, will stand out in bold relief. But if we turn to history, we find that these are precisely the characters utterly denied to their gods, by far the greatest number of the nations left in some measure to themselves. The fact of a Creation is, by the most ancient and most enlightened schools of philosophy, utterly denied. Of course they never attribute to their gods the character of creators. And with respect to the power which controls and directs the events of time, this is not to be sought among their gods: but either all is supposed to be left to chance, or else the course of events is governed by the influence of a dark, and gloomy, and mysterious Fate, whose decrees not even the gods can set aside. Since then the very ideas which Nature would teach concerning God, are wanting in the heathen conception of his character, we conclude that this is not the process by which they arrived at their conceptions.

2d. Again, we argue that the notions of a God diffused among the heathen nations were not derived by human reason from a con-

templation of Nature, not only from the absence of certain attributes which, if such were the origin of the conception, would be the most prominent, but also from the presence of certain other ideas, which it is inconceivable that nature could teach, and which could be taught by revelation alone. Of this character is the idea of an atonement by sacrifice, which is found in greater or less clearness, wherever there is an idea of a God. This is a doctrine which by no possibility could originate with man. The most extravagant eulogist of natural religion never pretended that this doctrine formed part of it. To human reason, the slaying of an innocent animal would appear in the light of a new crime, instead of being an atonement for past sins. It is a doctrine of revelation, that without shedding of blood is no remission. The blood, then, of every sacrificial victim; the smoke that ascends from every altar, is proof conclusive that where there is an idea of a God, that idea was derived originally from revelation.

There seems to be wanting but one thing more to render the proof of our proposition complete: that is, that an experiment be actually made, and that the inability of man's reason to arrive at a knowledge of the divine existence, be in accordance with the facts developed by that experiment. But this, from the nature of the case, is well nigh impossible. There are, however, certain facts, which, to a candid mind, will be scarcely less conclusive :

1st. Is not the circumstance that men have, in all countries where the influence of Revelation is not continual, to so great an extent lost the knowledge of the true God which all alike once enjoyed, ample proof that the light of Nature alone is not sufficient to originate the idea in minds wholly destitute of it. If all the marks of creative power and wisdom manifest in the universe, be not sufficient to keep alive in the minds of men the memory of a truth once known; how unreasonable is it to suppose that they are sufficient to impart a knowledge of the truth at first! Strange, indeed, were the prodigy, if men could forget a truth like this, although unceasingly exposed to all those influences by which that truth was originally imparted. It is no sufficient answer to this suggestion to alledge the depravity of the human heart, and the blindness of the natural understanding. These, we admit, have much to do with the ignorance of God so prevalent in the world.

"As they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind." But does it not occur to the objector, that these same causes have been in operation since the Fall of man, and are as insuperable a difficulty in the way of depraved man's making the discovery originally, as they are a satisfactory explanation of the manner in which the knowledge of God, once imparted by revelation, has been so generally lost?

2d. There are men who have been exposed to all the influences from Nature, who have had all the sources of knowledge imparted by her opened up to them; and yet the idea of a God has never entered their minds. "Besides the Atheists, taken notice of amongst the ancients, and left branded upon the records of history, hath not navigation discovered, in these latter ages, whole nations at the bay of Soldania, in Brazil, in Boranday, and in the Carribbee Islands, &c., amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion?"* "Several tribes have been discovered in America, which have no idea whatever of a Supreme Being, and no rites of religious worship. . . . Some rude tribes have not in their language any name for the Deity, nor have the most accurate observers been able to discover any practice or institution which seemed to imply that they recognized his authority, or were solicitous to obtain his favour."†

We have in vain endeavoured, in the haste of preparing this article, to procure a copy of Moffat's account of his residence for twenty-three years as a missionary in Africa. Without pretending to give his language, therefore, we can state merely the substance of his remarks upon this same topic. He asserts that the people with whom he came in contact, during the period of his protracted residence on that continent, had no idea of a God or of the soul's immortality; and that they laughed at him when he mentioned to them what appeared such a manifest absurdity. The statement was made in our hearing, some years ago, by a missionary of our Church among the Sioux Indians, that they had no idea of a God previous to the arrival of the Whites in this country; that they had not even a word in their language by which to designate a God when the idea was communicated; and that the

* Locke, *Human Understanding*, B. 1, Chapter 4, Sec. 8.

† Robertson, *History of America*, vol i, p. 209.

word translated "Great Spirit," was invented to express the new idea communicated to them by the Europeans. The Chinese language would seem to be in the same predicament; else why the disagreement and asperities among those who render the Scriptures into that tongue, respecting the appropriate term to employ in designating the Supreme Being? At all events, it seems to be clear that there have been tribes of men without the idea of a God.

Doubt has been expressed as to the reliability of these statements: nor is it strange that it should be so. Not only do they subvert the argument from general consent, the inconclusiveness of which, on other grounds, we have already shown, and which is now seen to be utterly destitute of foundation; but they wholly destroy the force of every argument that can be adduced in opposition to our theory, by showing conclusively that the opposite theory must be unsound. That any nation of men could exist without a knowledge of God, if his existence were discoverable from the works of Nature, is wholly impossible. There is no speech nor language where her voice is not heard. It is not strange, therefore, that men should be loth to admit the reality of facts so utterly subversive of a favourite hypothesis. But men who, in their closets, form theories as to what ought to be, are not to be trusted in opposition to the statements of calm, intelligent, and truthful witnesses, who, with no pet hypothesis to sustain, simply give us the results of a long and carefully conducted investigation, in circumstances the most favourable for eliciting the truth.

3d. The uniform testimony of those who have had opportunities for learning the state of knowledge, as to religious matters, of Deaf Mutes, previous to instruction, gives additional support to our position. Some years ago, in an Eastern journal, a deaf mute published an account of his own state, before instruction. We make an extract. "I had," said he, "no conception of a Supreme Being; none of the immortality of the soul; and no knowledge of the origin of the world, nor of a future state. I am sure that if you were to enquire, you could not find a single instance in which a person born deaf, has formed an idea of a Supreme Intelligence from a view of the works of Nature." To the same

purport the North British Review — "Experience furnishes no instance in which a deaf mute, having nothing but the language of signs at his command, had ever attained to any distinct notion of a future world, of his own moral accountability, of man's ultimate destiny, or even of a Supreme Being." (Feb. 1847.)

There is but one way in which it is possible to evade the force of this testimony. It may be said that since these persons are destitute of one of the senses by which the works of Nature are perceived, and are thus cut off from one entire class of sensations, they are incompetent witnesses in the case. The objection has some plausibility, but this is all. No system of psychology, known to us, maintains that to the sense of hearing we are indebted for a knowledge of the existence of the material universe. Neither is it by means of it, that we trace the marks of order, design, and adaptation throughout Nature's works. But on that existence, and these marks, is founded the supposed power in Nature to originate the idea of a God. If any one at any time, has imagined that the idea of God is derived from Nature through the sense of hearing, he may have some excuse, however absurd his position, for urging this objection. Is it not an established truth, that the loss of one sense renders the others more acute? Are not deaf mutes then fully competent to perceive the proof which Nature presents, through the avenue of the senses? Have they not, as others, a moral nature within — the law written on the heart? Why then the utter vacuity of their minds, as to religious ideas? The answer forces itself upon the convictions of the candid inquirer. They have no advantage from tradition, or oral teaching, from which their misfortune cuts them off. They are thrown entirely upon Nature as a teacher; and the result of the experiment is, that their minds, as to any idea of a God, is a perfect blank.

4. To this mass of testimony might be added the case of persons cut off from infancy from any intercourse with mankind; instances of which, well authenticated, are found in standard authors. In every such case, however fully the volume of Nature had been spread open before them, no idea of a God had entered their mind. But our space forbids more than this passing allusion to these instances. We submit the case as it stands. We have attempted to

show that the hypothesis of man's ability to construct a system of Natural Religion, independently of ideas derived from Divine Revelation, is unsupported by any conclusive arguments; that it is contradicted by experience, and by the history and character of every religious system; and that it stands in hopeless antagonism to numerous well authenticated facts. The hypothesis, therefore, we must reject; and we are forced, with a constantly growing conviction, to the conclusion, mortifying indeed to the pride of human reason, that supernatural revelation is absolutely indispensable to the knowledge of even the first, and fundamental truth of Natural Religion.

†. †.

ART. VIII. — *Divine Sovereignty, manifested in Divine Predestination, is the only security for the Use and Success of Means.*

Why do men so dislike, and so revile, the doctrine of predestination? Is it because they have examined it well and thoroughly, and therefore understand it well and thoroughly; or is it because they have neither examined it nor understand it; that they denounce it with such hearty bitterness, and hold it up to the universal scorn of mankind? We ourselves have no fancy for a doctrine worthy of such odium. If predestination be all that its enemies say it is, then we have not, any more than anybody else, the slightest motive to take up this rewardless burden, and bear it to our injury and our shame. We do not wish to endure any volunteer infamy, nor to suffer in the cause of doctrines hideous, appalling, and ruinous to the denominational prosperity of all people believing them. But we have a few things to say in accordance with the heading of this article, which will show, as we trust, that all this denunciation of predestination is the sheerest misunderstanding and misrepresentation of this whole matter, as found in the creeds and upon the lips of its advocates and defenders.

And first of all, it may be asserted that the atonement, like all the other acts of God, was and is the result of divine and eternal predestination. And further still, it may be stated, that all the results of the atonement, in all their extent, and in all their vari-

ety, and in all their endless duration, are purely and efficiently and forever from this same source. There is no reason, there is no efficient cause, outside of the divine purpose, why the atonement should have a successful issue. Without this purpose of God, ever moving with efficacious power and never-failing success, the atonement would have been a failure, and a blot and an eternal dishonor upon the character of the great Jehovah. But that stupendous work of divine mercy is not suspended for its success upon any thing short of God's eternal and efficacious purpose. "He shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the glory of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied." Isaiah liii: 10, 11. No power of men or devils can turn aside or defeat the fulfillment of this language. The triune God will see the results of the atonement, and be satisfied. The work will be complete to the utmost jot and tittle, and therefore the satisfaction perfect and eternal. And it will be so for no other reason than that God holds the whole affair in his own hands, and will rule it all and complete it it all by and according to his infinitely wise, omnipotent, and eternal purpose. If there be any one failure, in any one place or period of the world; if God has "visited the gentiles and failed to take out of them a people for his name;" if Christ "has redeemed us out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation;" if that "great multitude out of all nations, which no man could number;"—if all these do not correspond to the very utmost of extent, and to the very utmost of duration, and to the very utmost completion of the divine foreordination, then has the divine government failed, and Christ cannot see the full travail of his soul and be satisfied. Let him believe this who can. The day of judgment will be an exact and eternal expression of the designs and results of the atonement. For if it be not, then have the designs of God been defeated; his intelligence has been outwitted, and his power successfully contested. From all this it is manifest and irresistible, that the atonement owes its existence, and its entire success in, and among, and over all people, to the eternal exactitude, definiteness, and compass of sovereign foreordination or predestination.

This same doctrine is also taught by all those prophetic Scrip-

tures which relate to the power, the spread, and certain triumph of the Gospel. These predictions, so absolute and so numerous, can be made upon no other ground than the divine and eternal purpose to accomplish them. Just as the prophecies relating to Nineveh, Babylon, Tyre and Egypt, were but manifestations of the divine purposes in regard to those cities and countries, so the predictions, relative to the present and future power and success of the Gospel, are but a preceeding manifestation of God's will, purpose, or predestination concerning it. All prophecy is full of, and is a proof of predestination.

The divine sovereignty, in the use and success of means, is also taught in all those passages which attribute salvation to God's will and good pleasure. "Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom." Luke xii: 32. All the benefits of this kingdom is a predestinated gift, the good pleasure of God. The adoption of children through Jesus Christ is according to the good pleasure of his will. Ephesians i: 5. Not according to worth, merit, or deeds, but according to that good pleasure which works all things after a wise and predestinated plan. But if the making of men Christians, be an act of God's mere good pleasure, certain and unfrustrable, then the means to this end are equally certain and unfrustrable.

That there is no hope whatever for the use and success of means, except in the divine and sovereign intention to render them definitely and certainly efficacious, is irresistibly implied in all those passages which wholly deny that salvation is of man. "Born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." John i: 13. "Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." 2 Timothy i: 9. "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us." Titus iii: 5. Now all this salvation, so wholly denied to be of man, and so wholly asserted to be of God, was given us by a predestination of mercy in Christ Jesus, before the world began. And if so, the means by which all this is accomplished must be equally predestinated, both as to fact and effect. Means are only wise as they are appointed of God, and they are only effectual as

they are rendered so by His eternal and merciful intention. Whatever He does is but the manifestation of what He designed to do from all eternity; and wherever and to whatever extent means become effectual, it is but the manifestation of a purpose existing from of old, from everlasting. As, therefore, the atonement itself depended upon and resulted from an eternal purpose, so likewise its end and object depend wholly upon the same invincible and infallible power. And as the making, and completion of the atonement could not be defeated, nor in any way nor by any power turned aside, so all the means by which its intentions are to be fulfilled are equally certain of present and ultimate success.

And as neither earth nor hell could prevent the atonement from being made, so neither earth nor hell can prevent the preaching of the Gospel from being successful. "The kings of the earth may set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord, and against his Anointed," and against his Gospel, but "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh, the Lord shall have them in derision. Then shall he speak unto them in his wrath, and vex them in his sore displeasure." Psalm ii: 2, 4, 5. But without the sovereign and eternal purpose of God to be with his ministerial servants, and to give divine efficiency and certainty to their labors, who could hope for anything beyond laboring in vain and spending his strength for naught? Upon any other ground than a divinely predestinated success, the work of the Apostles and all their true ministerial successors was, and is, and will continue to be, the most preposterous undertaking ever devised or attempted by man. And the only thing which can fully and fairly and forever relieve it from such a charge, and elevate it to the loftiness of supreme wisdom, is the wondrous success which God has given it. But that success is the exact measure of the predestination concerning it. "So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth: it shall not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereunto it is sent." Isaiah lv: 11. This reveals the divine purpose in regard to the divine word. It sets the preaching of the Gospel in the light of hope, and supports it by the energy of faith. It sets all defeats and all enemies at defiance. Hope, courage, and confidence spring up, before such an unfolding of

the divine intentions in regard to all true ministerial labors. The burden of this revelation is certainty, absolute certainty, to the very utmost extent and to the very minutest exactitude; and this is the secret and inspiring power of all true ministerial toils, energy, perseverance, and efficiency. And just as this predestinated certainty animates the heart of the Church and the ministry, so will their zeal become steady, their fidelity true, and their activity more evident and more ardent. And what we have said in regard to the atonement and the preaching of the Gospel, is equally true in regard to all the other means of grace. Their efficiency depends wholly upon the sovereign appointment of God.

And now, for a moment, let us inquire what the atonement, what Revelation, what the ministry, and what all the other means of grace would be worth, were it not for their predestinated efficiency and object. We assert, in the light of Scripture and in the confirmation of all human experience, that they would be utterly and forever worthless, a mere manifestation of folly, weakness, and discomfiture. They would be a failure and a defeat, an annihilating reflection upon the whole character of God. And if the success of these divine appointments is to depend upon anything outside of, and independent of, God's everlasting intention concerning them, then their universal failure is just as certain, as every other agent is incompetent to the production of such an effect. The Church of God is a certainty; and its successes among the nations of the earth are a certainty; but upon what grounds? Is it upon the ground of self-efficiency, ministerial efficiency, water efficiency, or divine efficiency? The ministry is a means, and water is an emblem, and both stand in their appropriate place; but all saving efficiency is of God. Means are powers; but they are only instrumental powers. But God himself is a power which operates directly and efficiently upon the soul. He opens men's understanding, that they understand the Scriptures. He opens the heart of the people, and then they attend to the things spoken by the ministry. He prepares the heart, and then the Gospel becomes instrumentally the power of God unto salvation. He opens men's eyes, and then they see wondrous things in the divine law. He does not change the light, nor modify the light, nor in any way alter the natural condition

of the light. He opens the eyes; and then, and not till then, does the light produce its appropriate effect. The efficient and the instrumental cause must go together, the one preparing the way for the other. The seeing eye and the existing light are essential to the existence of vision. But all this, with all its results in time and eternity, springs from a purpose whose age can only be expressed by eternity.

And, surely, whatever objections may be brought against Calvinism, this cannot be one of them. The evangelical Arminian is obliged to take refuge in this stronghold of our faith. He, too, in spite of all theories, looks to the divine purpose, to support him in his trials and crown the labors of his ministry. But it is alone the sovereign and eternal predestination of God, which provides all the means of salvation, and secures to them an infallible success.

H — s.

ART. IX. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — *Evenings with the Doctrines.* By NEHEMIAH ADAMS, D. D. Author of "Friends of Christ," "Christ a Friend," "Communion Sabbath," etc., etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1861. Pp. 415.

In an introductory note to this volume, we are told, "These pages contain the substance of familiar lectures delivered in the Lecture Room of the Essex Street Church, Boston, on successive Tuesday evenings, in the winter of 1858-9." The author is already favorably known to the religious public by his previous publications, and is *justly* esteemed, as we believe, a conservative man in both opinion and practice; holding fast the form of sound words as delivered in the symbols of the fathers, and mildly, but firmly, refusing to follow the lead of scheming demagogues, or crack-brained moralists and philanthropists. These lectures will not disappoint his friends, and — what is far more important — they will serve the cause of truth. We hope they will find many readers in the latitude of Boston.

The title, at least a part of it, wakes a sympathetic chord in

our hearts: *Evenings with the DOCTRINES*. Yes, here we have them — the fundamental *doctrines* of evangelical, saving religion. It is refreshing to run the eye over the table of contents: God; Man; the Trinity; the Deity of Christ; the Deity of the Holy Spirit: Atonement; Election; Regeneration; Perseverance, etc.; in all seventeen discourses, making up a volume of more than four hundred pages. We have read with some degree of care the three on Atonement, and the two immediately following — one on Election, the other on Regeneration. While the writer carefully avoids a dry scholastic method of treatment, he is very far from avoiding sharp and distinct statements of Christian doctrine: and while he adopts, as most suitable to his purpose, a familiar, earnest, practical, biblical method of handling these high themes, he by no means fails to state and to meet with fairness and candor the objections urged by opposers of the truth, and especially those current in his own locality. There is no attempt at concealment; no blinking and dodging of knotty points; no fear of being set down as an old-fashioned Calvinist. While the Bible, in its obvious meaning, is everywhere appealed to as the decisive authority, the views of Turretin, Owen, Andrew Fuller, and other eminent Calvinistic divines, are quoted or referred to with undisguised respect. And what is far more significant of the cast of his theology, the expression of his own opinions, both formally and informally, is frequently made in the very terms of the Assembly's Shorter Catechism. In confirmation of these remarks, we make two quotations; the first from the second lecture on Atonement, page 218:

+ “Pardon and justification are not synonymous. A prisoner pardoned is not thereby ‘justified.’ One is ‘justified’ whom the law pronounces ‘not guilty.’ ‘Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God’s elect? It is God that justifieth.’ ‘Justification is an act of God’s free grace, wherein he pardoneth all our sins, and accepteth us as righteous in his sight.’ — This act of justifying us, in addition to pardon, is among the wonders of redemption. Again; there is no transfer of character from Christ to us; nor from us as sinners to Christ when suffering for us; but an imputation — not an infusion — of merit and demerit. Again; while the Atonement shows the benevolence of God, promotes holiness, and does many things connected with moral

government, none of these things are the primary object of atonement. That object is, *To satisfy divine justice.* Let no human philosophy make us lose sight of this essential object of the Saviour's death."

The italics are the author's. The second quotation is from the lecture on Regeneration, pp. 281-2:

"With divine simplicity, fearless of the metaphysicians, Paul says, 'Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure.' God works in us 'to will;' He makes us 'will;' He makes us willing; He works in us to will, and we, at the same time, work out our salvation. *There are some who profess that they can explain this: it is generally most clear to some who are fresh from their academical studies; as they advance in knowledge, however, some of them happily conclude that it is best to show the sovereignty of God in conversion, and the conscious freedom of man, and to leave the manner of their cooperation where the Saviour cautioned Nicodemus to leave the infinite mystery.* Until we know the nature of the Spirit's operation in the soul, we cannot assert that it is inconsistent with the perfect responsibility of man. The simple duty of man is to repent and believe on Christ. Doing this, (by the operation of the Holy Spirit, for it is the gift of God,) a mysterious divine work is done in the soul by the Holy Spirit, which constitutes Regeneration. Repentance is not regeneration; faith is not regeneration; they 'accompany and flow from regeneration.' There is a work of the Spirit in the nature of the soul, and not merely among the volitions; something is done which causes those volitions to be otherwise than they are by nature."

In this instance the italics are ours. The sixteenth lecture, the Intermediate State, is an elaborate discussion extending through nearly fifty pages. After criticizing the insensibility theory, (lately revived and advocated by Archbishop Whately, in his "View of the Scripture Revelations concerning a Future State,") and what may be called the Hades theory, the author propounds his own, in words very familiar to most of our readers:

"The souls of believers are at their death made perfect in holiness, and do immediately pass into glory; their bodies, being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves until the resurrection."

There may be views presented in this volume, to which we could not subscribe; but judging from what we have read, we consider it an orthodox and a very valuable contribution to the

best class of our popular religious literature. It is admirably adapted to the wants of cultivated and inquiring minds. We are persuaded it would be a good thing were more *evenings* spent with the *doctrines* in the lecture room. A more symmetrical religious experience would be developed thereby; a more manly, vigorous, and stable piety be secured to the churches. Let other pastors take a hint from what Dr. Adams has done so well.

2. *The Gospel according to Matthew*:—Explained by JOSEPH ADDISON ALEXANDER, New York: Charles Scribner, 1861.

The Christian public, particularly the Presbyterian portion of it, has scarcely recovered from the shock experienced at the death of the distinguished man whose last days were devoted to the preparation of this work, but who did not survive long enough to complete it. He was cut down in the midst of his days and of his greatest usefulness to the church at large, and we have no man to fill the void. Those most competent to judge of the value of his labors, mourn *their* loss (not *his*), the most. Endowed with gifts and graces accorded to few, and bringing to his task the aids of a scholarship the most diversified and extensive, the most minute and accurate, and at the same time the most comprehensive, he applied his great powers and his great acquirements to the *explanation* of God's holy Word. And in reading his explanations, we are seldom disappointed. There is a most grateful absence of that weariness that settles down on one like a huge nightmare, as we turn over and over the pages of some tedious and shallow commentators, with barely energy enough left at last to cry out in vexation of spirit, "Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?" On the contrary, we shall not soon forget the delightful exhilaration of spirits experienced on reading for the first time Dr. Alexander's Acts of the Apostles and Mark. But while truly thankful for what has been done, we shall always regret that Dr. Alexander did not carry out his original plan as set forth in the preface to the Acts of the Apostles, and prepare his

expositions exclusively "with a view to the peculiar wants of ministers and students."

This work, as has been intimated already, is incomplete, so far at least as the last twelve chapters of Matthew are concerned. Of them we have only an analysis; no detailed exposition. The sudden death of the lamented author has deprived us of an Introduction, also; which would, no doubt, have been as instructive and as suggestive as the one prefixed to his Mark. We have not the time now, neither is this the place, to enter upon an extended criticism. At a future day this may be attempted. Nothing more is needed, to call attention to this volume, than to repeat the title, with the name of the author: *The Gospel of Matthew: Explained by JOSEPH ADDISON ALEXANDER.*

3. — *Thoughts on Preaching.* By JAMES W. ALEXANDER, D. D.
New York: Charles Scribner.

THE contents of a large part of this volume, as indicated by the title, are fragmentary — mere jottings, indeed, from the Notebook of the lamented Author. With reference to this part of the volume, the editor tells us in his Preface:

"It had long been the cherished wish of Dr. Alexander to prepare a volume on Homiletics, for the use of young ministers and students; and with this object in view, he was in the habit of jotting down in his private journals, in the form of paragraphs, such thoughts as occurred to him on the subject. In one of his later journals I find the following entry: 'If the Lord should spare me below, it will be well for me some day to look over all my dailies, and collect what I have written from time to time on Ministerial Work. It is already enough for a volume. It might do good when I am gone.' But Death defeated his plans. To carry out his purpose as far as is now possible, I have collected these paragraphs; and print them, just as they occur in his journals, without any attempt to arrange them in the order of subjects."

Additional to these Thoughts, are two or three elaborate Articles of the Author, from the *Repertory*, and the series of "Letters

to Young Ministers" originally published in the *Presbyterian*. Taken altogether, we regard this as the best work on Homiletics extant. Perhaps in no department of ecclesiastical literature is there so great a want, as in that which relates to the sublimest of all arts — the art of Preaching. The Professors in our Seminaries can find nothing in this department which they can use as a text-book, or even as furnishing a general outline of a course of instruction. And so glaring are the deficiencies and the faults of most of our existing treatises on Homiletics, that many have been induced to question, if not absolutely to condemn all attempts to treat of Preaching as an Art. The work of Vinet, with all its acknowledged excellencies, is intensely French — French in its modes of thought and its adaptations. The work of Porter, which is perhaps more frequently in the hands of our young ministry than any other, fails in many and most important particulars, to meet the real exigencies of the subject. And none with which we are acquainted meets the precise wants of the existing ministry in the Presbyterian Church of the United States. These Thoughts — all of them fragments of pure gold, many of them most precious gems — are invaluable, because of their precise adaptations to the necessities of our ministry in this age and in this country. No small part of the interest and the value of this volume is found in its frequent references to the experiments and experiences of the Author, in that Art of which he was an acknowledged master. He seems to have encountered in detail all the difficulties which await the young Preacher, and to have given us the results of his own experiments as to the best methods of surmounting them. Withal there is a point, a simplicity, a freshness about the whole which makes it a most fascinating as well as instructive volume.

Two things are worthy of special notice: the article on Expository Preaching, published originally we believe in the *Repertory* — an article which we would rejoice to see in the hands of every Preacher; and the thoughts on the Method of Sermonizing — particularly the mischievous habit of constructing the sermon upon a skeleton previously and precisely framed. What has the living to do with the dead, or why should living thoughts be compressed within dead moulds? Why compel the sermon to adjust itself

to the skeleton—a thing apart from itself—instead of letting both, the whole living organism, grow together?

We commend the following two paragraphs to special notice:

"1. *Mode of making a brief.* I follow a brief penned at my table during a short interval. I made it thus: mere catch-words—took a general thought to start with, let the next come of itself, then the next, and so on without effort. It served well. The thing to be noted is, that in a few moments, by letting the mind flow and not interfering with the flow, one may jot down materials for a long discourse. It was not merely *heads*, these are barren, they are disconnected; it was concatenation, it was *genesis*. I consider this a little new; but Nevins shows me something like it, for Sabbath lectures: I have done too much in the way of naked skeleton. I wish I could embody my thoughts in a formula; try it thus: 1. Write rapid sketch, the faster the better. 2. In first draught, omit all partition, and do not force your mind to method. 3. Let thought generate thought. 4. Do not dwell on particulars; leave all amplifications for the pulpit. 5. Keep the mind in a glow. 6. Come to it with a full mind. 7. Forget all care of language. 8. Forget all previous cramming, research, quotation and study.

2. *Sermonizing.* I have just finished a sermon on Isaiah lix, ult. I am not pleased. I was hampered throughout by a preconceived skeleton. Thus it worked. Things would arise in my mind and flow into my pen just at the right place, but I could not use them because they belonged to another head. The result was, the articulation was broken, the flow was interrupted, the work became a mosaic. I perceive my father was right when he advised me to write my first draught *currente calamo*, without any plan, with absolute abandon; giving free scope in every direction whenever a vein was struck, and reserving the particulars for the copy."

NEW PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED.

[Books and other Publications designed for notice in this work, should, if practicable, be sent directly to the "Danville Review," Danville, Ky.; or if sent to the publisher, RICHARD H. COLLINS, 25 West Fourth Street, Cincinnati, Ohio, will reach their destination.]

Evenings with the Doctrines. By Nehemiah Adams, D. D., Author of "Friends of Christ," "Christ a Friend," "Communion Sabbath," etc., etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1861. 12mo. pp. 415.

The Gospel according to Matthew. Explained by Joseph Addison Alexander, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner. 12mo. 1861.

Thoughts on Preaching. By James W. Alexander, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner. 12mo. 1861.

Sermons for the New Life. By Horace Bushnell. Seventh edition. New York: Charles Scribner. 12mo. 1861.

The Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Records stated anew. By George Rawlinson, M. A. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. Cincinnati: Geo. S. Blanchard. 1861.

A Greek Grammar for Schools and Colleges. By James Hadley, Professor in Yale College. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 12mo. 1861.

Plato's Apology and Crito. With Notes by W. S. Tyler, Professor of Greek in Amherst College. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1860.

Rickey, Mallory & Co.'s Catalogue Raisonné: A General and Classified List of the most important works in nearly every department of Literature and Science, published in the United States and England; with a Bibliographical Introduction. Cincinnati: Rickey & Carroll. 12mo. pp. 259. 1861.

Rhetorical Praxis: The Principles of Rhetoric exemplified and applied in copious Exercises for Systematic Practice, chiefly in the Development of the Thought. For use in Schools and Colleges. By Henry N. Day, Author of "Elements of the Art of Rhetoric," and the "Art of Elocution." Cincinnati: Moore, Wiltach, Keys & Co. 12mo. pp. 309. 1860.

History of the United Netherlands: From the Death of William the Silent, to the Synod of Dort; with a full view of the English-Dutch Struggle against Spain, and of the Origin and Destruction of the Spanish Armada. By John Lothrop Motley, LL. D., D. C. L., Corresponding Member of the Institute of France, Author of "The Rise of the Dutch Republic." New York: Harper & Brothers. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1861. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 532, 563.

Logic in Theology; and other Essays. By Isaac Taylor. With a Sketch of the Life of the Author, and a Catalogue of his Writings. New York: William Gowans. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1860. 12mo. pp. 297.

Notes on New Testament Literature and Ecclesiastical History. By Joseph Addison Alexander, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner. 1861. 12mo. pp. 319.

if
if
u,
or
"
on
w
n.
ls
n-
y,
o.
or
0.
s-
of
;
d
ne
y
d
o.
m
n-
f
ne
n-
a
s.
0.
y
r.